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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates mobile electronic transfer of prescription (ETP) in 
compliance with the security requirements mandated by the Australian healthcare 
industry and proposes a framework for the development of an Android mobile 
electronic prescription transfer application. Furthermore, and based upon the findings 
and knowledge from constructing this framework, another framework is also derived 
for assessing Android mobile ETP applications for their security compliance. 
The centralised exchange model-based ETP solution currently used in the 
Australian healthcare industry is an expensive solution for on-going use. With 
challenges such as an aging population and the rising burden of chronic disease, the 
cost of the current ETP solution’s operational infrastructure is certain to rise in the 
future. In an environment where it is increasingly beneficial for patients to engage in 
and manage their own information and subsequent care, this current solution fails to 
offer the patient direct access to their electronic prescription information. The current 
system also fails to incorporate certain features that would dramatically improve the 
quality of the patient’s care and safety, i.e. alerts for the patient’s drug allergies, 
harmful dosage and script expiration. Over a decade old, the current ETP solution 
was essentially designed and built to meet legislation and regulatory requirements, 
with change-averting its highest priority. With little, if any, provision for future 
growth and innovation, it was not designed to cater to the needs of the ETP process. 
This research identifies the gap within the current ETP implementation (i.e. 
dependency on infrastructure, significant on-going cost and limited availability of the 
patient’s medication history) and proposes a framework for building a secure mobile 
ETP solution on the Android mobile operating system platform which will address 
the identified gap. 
The literature review part of this thesis examined the significance of ETP for 
the nation’s larger initiative to provide an improved and better maintainable 
healthcare system. The literature review also revealed the stance of each jurisdiction, 
from legislative and regulatory perspectives, in transitioning to the use of a fully 
electronic ETP solution. It identified the regulatory mandates of each jurisdiction for 
ETP as well as the security standards by which the current ETP implementation is 
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governed so as to conform to those regulatory mandates. The literature review part of 
the thesis essentially identified and established how the Australian healthcare 
industry’s various prescription-related legislations and regulations are constructed, 
and the complexity of this construction for eTP. 
The jurisdictional regulatory mandates identified in the literature review 
translate into a set of security requirements. These requirements establish the basis of 
the guiding framework for the development of a security-compliant Android mobile 
ETP application. A number of experimentations were conducted focusing on the 
native security features of the Android operating system, as well as wireless 
communication technologies such as NFC and Bluetooth, in order to propose an 
alternative mobile ETP solution with security assurance comparable to the current 
ETP implementation. The employment of a proof-of-concept prototype such as this 
alongside / coupled with a series of iterative experimentations strengthens the 
validity and practicality of the proposed framework. 
The first experiment successfully proved that the Android operating system 
has sufficient encryption capabilities, in compliance with the security mandates, to 
secure the electronic prescription information from the data at rest perspective. The 
second experiment indicated that the use of NFC technology to implement the 
alternative transfer mechanism for exchanging electronic prescription information 
between ETP participating devices is not practical. The next iteration of the 
experimentation using Bluetooth technology proved that it can be utilised as an 
alternative electronic prescription transfer mechanism to the current approach using 
the Internet. These experiment outcomes concluded the partial but sufficient proof-
of-concept prototype for this research. 
Extensive document analysis and iterative experimentations showed that the 
framework constructed by this research can guide the development of an alternative 
mobile ETP solution with both comparable security assurance to and better access to 
the patient’s medication history than the current solution. This alternative solution 
would present no operational dependence upon infrastructure and its associated, on-
going cost to the nation’s healthcare expenditure. In addition, use of this mobile ETP 
alternative has the potential to change the public’s perception (i.e. acceptance from 
regulatory and security perspectives) of mobile healthcare solutions, thereby paving 
the way for further innovation and future enhancements in eHealth. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
During the last decade, the processing power and storage capacity of 
handheld computing devices has advanced exponentially. Today's smartphones and 
handheld computing devices such as tablet PCs possess a processing power and 
storage capacity far superior to those of desktop computers a decade ago. This 
advancement opens up a whole new territory in mobile computing platforms, both 
for the consumer and for industry partners such as social networking, health and 
fitness and banking. These industries are seizing the opportunity to extend their 
reach, while mobile computing devices are now ubiquitous in the consumer market. 
This shift of focus enables mobile devices to become major candidates for 
integral roles within the evolving eHealth systems. Utilisation of mobile/handheld 
computing devices in healthcare systems will significantly alter how healthcare 
services are delivered, improve the quality of patient experience and reduce the cost 
of healthcare in general (West, 2012) by virtue of the better use of information 
technology in facilitating the electronic access, transmission and recording of health 
information. However, the adoption of mobile computing in healthcare inevitably 
transforms the ways in which health information is acquired, used, disclosed and 
stored. This transformation requires the establishment of sophisticated health 
information systems and governance frameworks within which to facilitate and 
dictate information sharing and exchange (Hodge, Gostin & Jacobson, 1999), explore 
opportunities and seek solutions to the current and potential issues associated with 
secure transmission and use of electronic data for health in a mobile environment. 
Among many other facets of eHealth, mobile computing can be adopted in the 
electronic Transfer of Prescriptions (eTP) for improved healthcare system outcomes 
and better cost-effectiveness of healthcare services. ETP creates a pathway of 
technological development from the current paper-based manual or web-based 
hybrid prescription processes to a fully electronic, mobile and paperless initiative. It 
is an important step towards an eHealth-enabled healthcare system which ensures 
medicines information is accurately and securely shared, providing a range of 
healthcare benefits to both prescribers and consumers (“NPS MedicineWise”, 2012). 
When fully implemented, this sharing of high quality patient medication information 
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between the prescriber and dispenser enables quality use of medicine, thus enhancing 
the safety and quality of patient care (“AMA Position Statement”, 2009). 
1.1 Background 
Developed countries with digital health capabilities implement electronic 
prescribing systems to some extent, depending on their acts, regulations and the 
various levels (i.e. state and national) of their healthcare infrastructure. These 
systems play a crucial role in connecting prescribers and dispensers, and deliver 
indisputable benefits such as improved patient safety via reduced transcribing errors 
during dispense; increased workflow efficiency in dispensing at the pharmacy; 
reduced readmissions due to adverse drug events and preventable medication 
prescribing errors and the better coordination and management of care between 
doctors and pharmacists (“Boot”, 2011). An electronic prescribing system facilitates 
the secure and efficient management and sharing of a client’s/patient’s medication 
information and provides a wide range of benefits for all parties involved (i.e. 
prescribers, dispensers and consumers) ("AMA Position Statement", 2009; "NPS 
MedicineWise", 2012). The use of electronic prescription is also crucial in improving 
patients’ safety by reducing preventable adverse drug events through accurate 
medication information sharing and improved medication compliance. Since almost 
70,000 hospital admissions per year are associated with adverse drug events, the 
decrease in these occurrences as the result of the employment of an electronic 
prescription would imply a significantly reduced demand on health funding. 
(“NEHTA Blueprint V2”, 2011). It is not an overstatement to say that electronic 
prescription is the key to enhanced patient safety, better medication compliance, 
improved accuracy and efficiency in medication information sharing between 
Clinical Information Systems (CIS) and reduced healthcare costs. However, these 
benefits do not come without a significant impact on Australian healthcare 
expenditure. 
In Australia, the current electronic prescribing model for delivering electronic 
prescription details from the prescriber to the patient/user-selected prescription 
dispenser makes use of one of two Prescription Exchange Services (PES) – Script 
Exchange from eRx and Script Vault from MediSecure. Use of electronic 
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prescription is cost-free for prescribers but each prescription downloaded from PES 
services by a pharmacy attracts an electronic prescription fee of fifteen cents. At 
present it is also cost-neutral to the pharmacies because the electronic prescription 
fee of fifteen cents for each eligible prescription is subsidised by the 6th Community 
Pharmacy Agreement (6CPA). Since December 2012, interoperability between the 
two PES operators allows prescribers to upload the electronic copy of their 
prescription to one PES service and the dispensers (i.e. pharmacies) to download 
from the other PES service. Prior to achieving interoperability between the two PES 
services the electronic prescription fees were as much as eighty-five cents per 
prescription (McDonald, 2015). There has been a considerable increase in the use of 
electronic prescriptions by pharmacies and doctors since the launch of eRX in 2009. 
A significant milestone in Australia’s eHealth journey was achieved on 30th July 
2015 when eRx, one of the two PES services, dispensed its one billionth prescription 
(ibid). When combined with the prescriptions dispensed by the other PES service 
operated by MediSecure (Script Vault), the numbers could be considerably higher. 
This indicates improved confidence in the use of electronic prescriptions and a 
substantial uptake by the pharmacies and doctors. On the other hand, eRx’s 
announcement in August 2015 regarding the dispensing of its billionth electronic 
prescription also proves that electronic dispensing had cost the nation at least 
AU$150 million at that point in time (i.e. calculated using the current minimum fees, 
although it was much more expensive in the earlier years) (ibid). Since there are two 
PES services, the total cost of using both services will be considerably more, if not 
twice as much. A recent survey by eRx found that pharmacies using eRx are 
dispensing 753,000 electronic prescriptions per day, with up to twenty-five 
prescriptions per second during peak periods (ibid). The fees alone for 753,000 
electronic prescriptions on just one day represent a cost to the nation of AU$112,950. 
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Figure 1.1: Number of prescriptions over an 11 year period (using PBS data) 
Despite the decrease in the total number of prescriptions in 2016 compared to 
that of 2015, there has been an increase of 13.3% in electronic prescription fees for 
2016 (i.e. AU$8,091,750 in 2015 and AU$9,164,954 in 2016) (“Expenditure and 
Prescriptions Twelve Months to 30 June 2016”, 2016). Since there has been no 
change in the Electronic Prescription Fee for each prescription in recent years, this 
increase indicates that more electronic prescriptions are being used in 2016 compared 
to the previous year. Although this higher usage of electronic prescriptions perfectly 
aligns with the nation’s eHealth initiatives, electronic prescriptions will continue to 
contribute to the nation’s increasing healthcare expenditure unless more cost-
effective, long term alternatives with comparable security measures are put in place. 
 
Figure 1.2: PBS expenditure over an 11 year period (using PBS data) 
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Using statistics from the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme website, Figures 
1.1 and 1.2 show the PBS expenditure and number of prescriptions over an eleven 
years period, 2006 to 2016. It is evident that, although the PBS expenditure 
fluctuated slightly, the number of prescriptions increased steadily over the eleven 
years period. This indicates that unless cheaper alternatives are found, the ongoing 
cost associated with the current electronic prescription transfer model will continue 
to increase with the increasing volume of use. Although the Commonwealth 
subsidises the electronic prescription fee through a series of Community Pharmacy 
Agreements, the significant ongoing cost implied by these statistics prompted the 
exploration of cheaper or more cost-effective alternatives. Potential alternatives to 
using the current PES services for transferring electronic prescriptions include 
CD/DVD-ROM as used in Japan (“Japan Association for Medical Informatics”, 
2014), Universal Serial Bus (USB) flash drives, smartcards, mobile smart phones and 
Health Level 7 (HL7) messaging via SMS or Secured Message Delivery (SMD) 
services. 
Of these potential alternatives to using PES services, this research focuses on 
the use of the patient’s mobile device as the secure transfer media/mechanism for 
electronic prescriptions. Figure 1.3 illustrates the participants of the current 
electronic prescription model and its operation from a high-level perspective. 
PES server
(eRx script exchange / MediSecure Script vault)
Rx details
1. Upload
2. Print
3. Present
4. Download
Prescriber
Prescription
Patient/Agent
Patient/Agent
Pharmacy
 
Figure 1.3: Current electronic prescription using PES services (overview) 
This research examines the existing methods for the transfer of prescription 
information around current practices and legislative and regulatory constraints as 
well as enablers at Commonwealth, state and territory levels. Finally, it presents a 
framework for the development of a secure mobile application for prescription 
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transfer which is compliant with those constraints. This research also assesses and 
then compares the security of prescription information in the current PES-based 
approach to that of mobile devices using the proposed secure mobile ETP 
application. 
1.2 Significance of Study  
This research offers potential financial, clinical and administrative benefits 
for all parties involved in the prescribing process (i.e. prescriber, dispenser and 
patient). Furthermore, it provides opportunities for future enhancements such as the 
implementation and integration of a Clinical Decision Support System component as 
part of the proposed mobile prescription solution. This component would require a 
study of its own within the ETP context and is outside the scope of this research. 
1.2.1 Financial Benefits 
Since this research is to explore the potential of using a mobile electronic 
prescription transfer mechanism as an alternative to the current approach which uses 
PES services, the fifteen-cent electronic prescription fee associated with using PES 
services might be eliminated. Although this fifteen cents sounds trivial for an 
individual prescription, its elimination would save tens of millions of dollars in 
annual healthcare expenditure. The savings on the 211.4 million prescriptions 
dispensed in 2015 alone would have been as much as AU$31.7 million (see Figure 
1.1). This research, therefore, has the potential to significantly reduce the nation’s 
healthcare budget. The current cost-neutrality of using electronic prescription (i.e. 
cost-free for all parties involved) is achieved via Commonwealth subsidy: the 
electronic prescription fee provided through a series of Community Pharmacy 
Agreements (i.e. 5CPA and 6CPA agreements). Whilst it is yet to be determined who 
will bear this cost when it is no longer subsidised by the Commonwealth – the 
prescriber, dispenser or patient – this research proposes a secure solution that allows 
the electronic prescription process to remain cost-free for all parties involved.  
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1.2.2 Clinical Benefits 
This proposed alternative also opens up opportunities to incorporate certain 
useful features such as prescription expiration alerts and last repeat alerts. Currently 
the patient only receives this communication when a prescription is dispensed. More 
importantly, this proposed solution enables the implementation of alert features for 
drug allergies and harmful doses as part of the mobile electronic prescription transfer 
application. Whilst the implementation of these features is not part of the current 
study, opportunities for this are opened up, with potential to significantly improve 
patient safety and benefit all parties involved in the prescribing process. 
Hospitals are also a major beneficiary of this solution. When the interface of 
the proposed application is implemented and integrated with the hospital information 
system, the application can directly transfer the full history of a patient’s medication 
from the patient’s mobile phone into the hospital’s information system. Such access 
to the patient’s complete medication history would be of inestimable clinical benefit 
both to the healthcare professionals in delivering better quality of care and the patient 
receiving it. 
1.2.3 Administrative Benefits 
Enabling the patient’s smartphone as the secure transfer medium for 
electronic prescriptions allows the patient to be in control of their personal and 
sensitive information without negative impacts on public health initiatives and 
government recorded data such as the National Prescription and Dispense Repository 
(NPDR). It empowers the patient to take more responsibility for their health and 
places them in full control of personal, sensitive information, which in turn also 
controls the secondary use of such information by third parties (i.e. public health 
monitoring, program evaluation, research etc.). In addition to this, the proposed 
mobile solution has the potential to both reduce the complexity of the electronic 
prescription transfer process and remove the dependency on the current major 
supporting infrastructure (i.e. PES services) and Internet connectivity. Free from 
those dependencies, the proposed mobile solution will therefore function just as 
effectively in remote locations with poor or non-existent Internet connectivity, 
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making it suitable for remote regions of Australia where the network availability is 
limited or unreliable. 
From a wider perspective the proposed mobile electronic prescription transfer 
application is hypothetically suitable for the other countries and jurisdictions, for 
instance in Japan, where healthcare information is considered to be too sensitive to 
be transferred via the public Internet network. 
Furthermore, without the requirement for the supporting network 
infrastructure and associated ongoing costs, this proposed solution has another, 
wider-reaching, facet: the potential to improve the quality of care in third world 
countries with limited resources, or indeed anywhere with network availability 
issues, by enabling the use of electronic prescriptions. 
1.2.4 Conclusion 
As an enabler for mobile electronic prescription and potential future 
innovations in the mobile ETP context, this research was conducted with a focus on 
the practicality of its outcomes both from development and utilisation perspectives. 
ETP plays a fundamental role in Australia’s eHealth initiative to improve its 
healthcare system. The mobile electronic prescription transfer solution proposed in 
this research offers an alternative to the continued use of the current costly and 
technologically constrained ETP implementation. The current ETP implementation 
has a significant ongoing operational cost (i.e. the Electronic Prescription Fee) and, 
while this represents only a small part of the nation’s overall healthcare expenditure, 
the funds could be invested in direct improvements in healthcare rather than spent on 
ongoing infrastructure. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
This research identified the relevant acts, regulations and standards governing 
the ETP implementation in the Australian healthcare industry at Commonwealth, 
state and territory levels. Further assessment and analysis of the relevant regulatory 
mandates determined each jurisdiction's readiness for the fully electronic ETP 
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implementation, and established the mandatory security requirements for mobile 
ETP applications (in fact for any fully electronic ETP implementation in general). 
The research outcomes were recorded in two tables: one table contains each 
jurisdiction's readiness for fully electronic ETP and the other lists the mandatory 
security requirements from the data at rest and data in transit perspectives. The table 
listing the mandatory security requirements will also serve as the security compliance 
matrix for ETP applications in accordance with the Australian healthcare industry's 
regulatory mandates. This security compliance matrix was used in determining 
whether mobile operating and wireless communication have sufficient security 
measures for ETP in the Australian healthcare industry. 
Furthermore, this research proposed a fully electronic mobile ETP solution 
using a number of technologies which comply with the security requirements listed 
in the security compliance matrix. In order to propose said solution, a further series 
of research into the governing standards and experimentations was conducted on 
each candidate technology, assessing their compliance with the security 
requirements. 
This research began with a preliminary study (Chapter 1) where the 
researcher explored the nature of electronic prescriptions and its usages and expenses 
over the past decade. Chapter 2 delved into the literature review on how the current 
implementation of ETP functions using the PES services and its governing standards, 
regulations and acts. This second chapter also examined the potential issues and 
shortcomings of current ETP implementation from various aspects, including 
availability and consistency of the patient’s medication information, its requirements 
for the supporting infrastructure and finally the associated ongoing expenses. It 
should be noted that before formulating the Research Questions – one primary 
question followed by two subsidiary questions – the researcher had previously 
investigated the functions of the current ETP in terms of infrastructure, security and 
its regulatory enablers and barriers. This research contributed to the publication of a 
paper titled, “The hare and the tortoise: the potential versus the reality of ETP 
implementation”. 
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Chapter 3 discussed the underlying principles (i.e. research methodology, 
methods and theoretical framework) and developed the research design and 
investigative approaches with which to answer the Research Questions devised in 
Chapter 2. Chapter 4 presented the research results and, based on those results, 
proposed an alternative mobile ETP solution using a number of potential candidate 
technologies   in supporting comparable security assurances. Table 4.1 (Analysis 
matrix of each jurisdiction’s readiness for fully electronic ETP solution) recorded 
each jurisdiction’s readiness for the fully electronic prescription system from the 
regulatory perspective. The regulatory mandates were interpreted into a set of 
security requirements, the outcomes of which were recorded in section 2 and 3 of 
Table 4.2 (Analysis matrix of Security requirements for electronic prescription 
information). 
Chapter 5’s emphasis is on Android’s security features from the data at rest 
perspective. Data at rest is information stored on a mobile device, PC hard drives or 
removable media (Hochmuth, n.d.). The experiment conducted was targeted towards 
the Android’s encryption being able to handle and comply with the security 
requirements from the data at rest perspective. This is an output from a research 
paper titled “Security of ePrescription: Security of data at rest in Prescription 
Exchange Services vs on mobile devices”, published as proceedings of the 4th 
Australian eHealth Informatics and Security Conference in 2015 (Htat, Williams, & 
McCauley, 2015b).  
The emphasis of Chapter 6 was on the security aspects of data in transit, with 
a detailed study of NFC technology’s security features and governing standards. The 
experiment in section 6.2 found that, due to development and portability issues, the 
use of NFC technology is not a practical solution. It was then decided to examine 
Bluetooth wireless technology as the alternative transfer mechanism. The in-depth 
study and experimentation on the Bluetooth technology’s security features and 
governing standards proved it to be suitable for the proposed mobile ETP solution. 
The findings from this in-depth Bluetooth technology research was published in 
another paper titled “Security of ePrescriptions: Data in Transit Comparison Using 
Existing and Mobile Device Services”, published as proceedings of the Australasian 
Research Thesis - 11 of 269 
 
Computer Science Week Multiconference 2017 (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 
2017). 
Chapter 7 extended, from a more holistic perspective, the discussion built 
from the previous chapters, the literature review and the experimentation and 
research results. These discussions also reflect against the Research Questions 
devised in Chapter 2. Additional output from this research development phase 
yielded another publication titled “Future of Australia’s eTP: Script Exchange, 
Script Vault or secure mobile alternative”. This was published as proceedings of the 
14th Australian Information Security Management Conference 2016. Note that the 
publication dates of the third and fourth papers are not in sequential order due to the 
difference in the lead time between their submission dates and publication dates. 
Figure 1.4 depicts the thesis structure reflecting on the research activities and 
published papers. Finally, Chapter 8 concluded the research by listing its potential 
impact and contribution towards the body of knowledge and identifying ways of 
extending this research.   
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Figure 1.4: Thesis structure reflecting the research activities and published papers 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Overview 
The literature review explores the progression from the paper-based manual 
prescription process to the current implementation of the electronic prescription, with 
an emphasis on how it functions, its regulatory enablers and constraints at 
Commonwealth, state and territory levels and its limitations and issues as depicted in 
Figure 2.1. 
Literature Review
How current model of 
electronic prescription works
Potential issues and 
challenges of current eTP 
implementation
A brief history and 
eTP s role in eHealth
manual prescribing vs 
current electronic 
prescribing
Conclusion
Limitation of the current 
model and potential 
extensions to it
eTP Architecture
Governing Standards, 
Regulations and Acts
Security Model
 
Figure 2.1: Structure of ETP Literature Review 
The literature review begins with the identification of the relevant acts, 
regulations, standards and specifications (such as Australian Technical Specification 
- ATS4888 series) governing ETP implementation in the Australian healthcare 
industry. The identification process commences at the Commonwealth level, 
gradually narrowing down to state and territory (jurisdictional) levels. Once the 
relevant Commonwealth and jurisdictional acts and regulations for ETP have been 
identified, a thorough analysis is conducted to document the security requirements 
mandated by those law and regulations. Further study is then conducted on the 
relevant standards and specifications governing the ETP implementation in order to 
document the security requirements imposed on the current ETP implementation. 
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These combined requirements define the minimal set of security measures for the 
Android mobile electronic prescription transfer application. 
2.2 A brief history and ETP’s role in eHealth 
Although eHealth has many unique definitions from various perspectives, the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) defines it as the transfer of health resources and 
healthcare by electronic means (“eHealth”, 2014). Despite its diverse definitions 
from various standpoints, eHealth’s crucial involvement in improving the Australian 
healthcare system and making it a better maintainable system is irrefutable (Bennett, 
2013). The National eHealth Transitioning Authority’s (NEHTA) Electronic 
Medication Management (eMM) program is one of the first few critical phases in 
laying the foundation of eHealth for the Australian healthcare industry. The eMM 
program offers the promise of better healthcare services delivery via significant 
improvements in reduced medical errors (e.g. through the sharing of precise patient 
medication information between prescriber and dispenser), better compliance, time 
and cost savings and better drug safety ("AMA Position Statement", 2009; 
Ostergaard, 2011). 
The eMM program primarily focuses on designing and developing eHealth 
specifications to improve medication-related outcomes through improving the quality 
and availability of medication-related healthcare information across the Australian 
health sector and supporting organisations in implementing these specifications. In 
fact, despite the significance of eHealth on eMM’s agenda in recent years, improving 
medication management has been the objective of several national medicines 
policies, such as Quality Use of Medicines (QUM) and the APAC Guidelines 
(Ostergaard, 2011; “NEHTA Blueprint V2”, 2011), for well over a decade. 
In this eHealth journey, the implementation of ETP is the first step towards 
more efficient and effective medication management and it delivers several 
capabilities in realising the promise of eMM (“NEHTA Blueprint V2”, 2011). In 
addition, since one of eMM’s highest priority initiatives was to have the ETP process 
in place, an early opportunity was presented for connecting a significant group of 
healthcare providers (i.e. prescribers and dispensers) on a national scale (Ostergaard, 
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2011). With ETP in place, the client’s/patient’s medication information is accurately 
and securely shared, and a wide range of benefits are provided for all parties 
involved such as prescribers, dispensers and consumers ("AMA Position Statement", 
2009; "NPS MedicineWise", 2012). 
All of these benefits were made possible by the initial step taken in the 
prescription process: converting the conventional manual prescription process/model 
to a digital equivalent one. In Australia, the Commonwealth Government’s Practice 
Incentive Program (PIP), introduced in the late 1990’s to encourage desktop 
computing by General Practitioners (GPs), also contributed to the foundation which 
made this conversion a success. (Quinlan, 2000). 
Developed countries around the world implemented their electronic 
prescribing systems depending on their acts, regulations and the various levels of 
healthcare infrastructure (i.e. government or private funded etc.). In United States of 
America, the electronic prescribing facilities are provided by various healthcare 
information exchange networks such as Surescripts, RelayHealth, McKesson, 
ProviderPay, Truveris, AmerisourceBergen and a few others. Surescripts is the 
dominant electronic prescription network used by the majority of all community 
pharmacies in the U.S (Gabriel and Swain, 2014) and similar to Australia’s Script 
Exchange, half of the company is owned by the Pharmacy Associations 
(Moukheiber, 2014). Communication between the systems using different software, 
drug vocabularies and terminologies is mediated using RxNorm. RxNorm provides 
normalized names for clinical drugs and links them to the drug vocabularies 
commonly used in pharmacy management and drug interaction software (e.g. First 
Databank, Micromedex, Gold Standard Drug Database, and Multum) and 
terminology used in coding clinical drug properties sch as mechanism of action, 
physiologic effect, and therapeutic category (“RxNorm”, 2018). Meanwhile, 
Canada’s national e-prescribing service is called PrescribeIT™. At the national level, 
it enables prescribers to electronically transmit a prescription to a pharmacy of 
patient’s choice (“PrescribeIT™”, 2018). The programme is lead by Canada Health 
Infoway, a government funded not for profit organization, and offers three options to 
patients; Directed, Deferred and Paper (“Backgrounder”, 2018). The "Directed" 
option securely delivers the electronic prescription directly to the pharmacy using the 
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PrescribeIT™ service if the patient has a pharmacy of choice at the time of 
prescribing. The "Deferred" option enables the prescriber to send the prescription 
electronically to the PrescribeIT™ service from which a pharmacy participating in 
PrescribeIT™ can retrieve it when the patient presents the prescription summary they 
have received from the prescriber. The "Paper" option allows the patient to request 
for paper prescriptions to be issued (ibid). In Spring 2018, PrescribeIT™ extended its 
functionalities to provide secure physician-pharmacy messaging, and to allow 
prescribers and pharmacists to create, receive, renew and cancel prescriptions 
(“PrescribeIT™”, 2018). In Portugal, the Electronic Medication Prescription (PEM in 
Portugal), is a service implementing the electronic process of prescription, 
dispensing and reimbursement of ambulatory medication (Patrao, Deveza & Martins, 
2013). It was developed by a Portuguese Government institution SPMS EPE with 
original intention of implementing additional safety and control in the medication 
circuit, as well as increases the potential to avoid fraud and to reduce costs. Access to 
prescription by pharmacy is authorized by the patient using the electronic 
personal/citizen identification card (i.e. with a chip) and prescription code. While 
prescriptions are integrated into the patient's electronic records within healthcare 
institutions and updated, it also allows access to chronic medicines, prescription 
history and alerts for interaction with allergies and adverse reactions registered on a 
nationwide electronic health records and conveyed to the national patient summary 
(ibid).  
Despite all the differences in governing Laws and supporting infrastructures, 
all of these e-prescribing systems share the common objectives in improving the 
quality of the prescribing process (i.e. reduced fraud and abuse, and easier 
communication), increasing the safety of the patient (i.e. through greater accuracy 
with fewer errors and safer drug use with stronger medication compliance) and 
optimizing the health-related federal and territorial expenditures. 
One critical aspect of electronic prescribing and eMM is how the prescription 
information and electronic health records are securely communicated between 
healthcare providers. Almost two decades ago, before the extensive use of 
smartphones, Chan (2000) proposed how to achieve a highly mobile health 
management framework by combining World Wide Web and smart card 
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technologies. In this approach, using the SmartCard–Web Gateway Interface (SGI) 
as a common interface to communicate and access the medical records stored in a 
smart card, Chan (2000) demonstrated the feasibility of the concept in facilitating a 
truly mobile access of patient’s medical records. After almost a decade later, Jürjens 
and Rumm (2008) proposed the use of model-based security analysis to address the 
risk associated with inherent vulnerabilities of such devices and the significant 
complexities of the architectures based on the study of the German Health Card. In 
their study, Jürjens and Rumm (2008) stated that the security analysis has to be 
embedded in the development and management of the systems. 
2.3 Manual prescription vs current electronic prescription 
Figure 2.2 demonstrates the conventional manual prescribing model with the 
prescriber writing on a pre-printed prescription pad. Once signed by the prescriber, 
the prescription is handed over to the patient/agent, who at later time will present it 
to the pharmacy. When the prescription is presented by the patient/agent at the 
pharmacy, the prescription details are transcribed into the pharmacy’s Electronic 
Dispensing System (EDS) for dispensing. This collected and transcribed information 
is also used in subsequent processes such as Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) 
claiming and repeat dispensing processes. Before the dispensing occurs, the process 
mentioned above may include verification of the prescription details with the 
prescriber if any information is unclear or should the pharmacy have concerns about 
the validity of the prescription. This is usually carried out through a telephone call to 
the prescriber. However, this conventional model depicted in Figure 2.2 has 
numerous associated risks and vulnerabilities, including the loss of the prescription 
by the patient, transcription errors during the pharmacy data-entry process, illegible 
or misread script elements (especially with handwritten scripts) and fraudulent 
production or alteration of scripts. 
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Figure 2.2: Manual prescribing process (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015) 
The current implementation of ETP addressed these issues by facilitating the 
electronic generation of a prescription by a prescriber, encryption of the generated 
electronic prescription using the prescriber’s Commonwealth issued PKI certificates, 
its secure transmission to a dispenser along with the electronic authentication of the 
prescriber and dispenser access to the transmitted prescription using Commonwealth 
issued PKI certificates. Figure 2.3 describes the current electronic prescription model 
in Australia (Henderson, et al., 2014). 
 
Figure 2.3: Current electronic prescription transfer process (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015) 
This model makes use of the Prescription Exchange Service (PES), Electronic 
Prescribing System (EPS) and Electronic Dispensing System (EDS) as its 
fundamental components. The PES is an intermediary service which enables secure 
transmission of electronic prescription information between prescribers and 
dispensers (“ePrescriptions”, 2012). It is mandatory for a PES system to meet the 
specified security and privacy standards approved by the Commonwealth 
(“Electronic Transfer of Prescriptions”, 2016). To this day there are only two PES 
systems in Australia, Script Exchange from eRx and Script Vault from MediSecure 
(“Set up Electronic Transfer of Prescriptions”, 2016). The EPS is a component of the 
prescriber’s clinical software package for generating an electronic prescription, 
digitally signing it and finally uploading it to the PES (“ePrescriptions”, 2012). The 
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EDS is another key component of pharmacy software which facilitates downloading 
the electronic prescription from the PES and submitting dispense records to the PES 
upon dispensing (“ePrescriptions”, 2012). 
2.4 How current model of electronic prescription works 
In this model, the EPS component of the prescriber’s clinical management 
software generates electronic copy of the prescription, encrypts it using the Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificate and then uploads it to one or both of the 
registered prescription exchange service (PES) whenever the prescriber prints a 
prescription (Standards Australia, 2013a). 
Once uploaded, the prescription is stored securely on the PES to await 
download by the dispenser. In the meantime, the prescriber signs the prescription and 
hands it over to the patient/agent as per the manual prescription model. However, this 
printed prescription has one or more barcodes, depending on whether the prescriber 
is registered with one or both PES systems. Upon the patient/agent presenting the 
prescription, the pharmacy’s eTP-enabled pharmacy software scans the barcode on 
the prescription in order to download and decrypt the prescription details from the 
PES system. These downloaded prescription details provide the pharmacy’s EDS 
with the necessary information for dispensing and other subsequent operations such 
as PBS claiming and updating National Prescription and Dispense Repository 
(NPDR) (Standards Australia, 2013a). 
Initially, prescriptions needed to be downloaded from the specific PES 
system to which the prescriber had uploaded it. This restriction not only imposed 
limitations on the prescription process but also added additional work load; having to 
register with both PES systems and upload the prescription to both systems upon 
prescribing. If this was not done and the pharmacy’s registered PES system was 
different to that of the prescriber, the prescription could not be downloaded 
(McDonald, 2012). This interoperability issue between the two PES systems not only 
disrupted the flow of the prescription process but also incurred a higher cost in 
delivering the service, costing eight-five cents (i.e. compared to thirty-five cents after 
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achieving interoperability and later down to fifteen cents) in electronic prescription 
fees for each prescription downloaded from PES (ibid). 
Furthermore, earlier studies on ETP revealed that despite the large number of 
prescriptions uploaded to PES by prescribers, the number of prescriptions being 
downloaded by dispensers was much lower. This was primarily due to the pharmacy 
at which the patient presents the prescription not being registered with the specific 
PES to which the prescription was uploaded by the prescriber (McDonald, 2012). 
The two PES systems became interoperable in December 2012 and the prescription 
process consequently became much more efficient, with prescribers able to upload to 
either PES system and dispensers to download from any PES system. 
As part of this initiative for better interoperability between PES systems, the 
cost of downloading a prescription was reduced to fifteen cents per prescription. In 
addition to the interoperability, the two PES systems agreed to split the electronic 
prescription fees when a prescription was uploaded to one PES and downloaded or 
dispensed by the other (McDonald, 2012). At present, both PES systems are free of 
charge to prescribers (i.e. general practices and specialists etc.) and cost neutral to 
dispensers (i.e. pharmacies). There are no fees associated with registration or 
licensing for both prescribers and dispensers. However, whilst there is no transaction 
fee for prescribers for electronic prescriptions, pharmacies pay fifteen cents for each 
eligible transaction (i.e. an eligible prescription downloaded from PES). This fee has 
been offset as part of the two Community Pharmacy Agreements (CPA); 5th CPA for 
1st July 2010 to 30th June 2015 and 6th CPA for 1st July 2015 to 30th June 2020 
(“Electronic Transfer of Prescriptions (ETP)”, 2013), which Agreements provide a 
mechanism by which the PES infrastructure is subsidised by the Commonwealth. 
In the current prescription model, the printed prescription serves a dual 
purpose; firstly as a legal instrument when signed by the prescriber and secondly as a 
prescription notification slip (token) with one or more barcodes on it. In the current 
ETP system, each electronic copy of a prescription is identified by a set of 
alphanumeric characters that are unique in combination as mandated by the Section 
6.2.2 of the ATS 4888.2-2013. This unique set of alphanumeric characters is called 
the Document Access Key (DAK). The barcode on the prescription is the printed 
representation of this unique DAK. As illustrated in Figure 2.3, when the pharmacy’s 
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eTP-enabled EDS scans this barcode from the printed prescription, the DAK enables 
the pharmacy software to download the prescription details from their PES system 
and decrypt it for dispensing and other secondary uses (Standards Australia, 2013a). 
This eliminates potential transcription errors, the need to verify prescription details 
with the prescriber and the ability to fraudulently alter prescriptions. 
This electronic prescription model described in Figure 2.3 is, however, 
vulnerable to new potential issues such as incorrect medication code mapping 
between the prescriber’s EPS and dispenser’s EDS systems (e.g. the use of 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) coding, Australian Medicines Terminology 
(AMT) coding or other third-party product-specific coding systems), and other 
interoperability failures between the participating systems. After dispensing the 
medication, the EDS system provides a record of the dispensed medication to the 
PES (Standards Australia, 2013a). In the original implementation, upon receiving 
this dispensed record information the PES sent an automatic dispense notification 
back to the original prescriber. However, this automatic dispense notification service 
has been disabled at the request of the Royal Australian College of General 
Practitioners, due to potential implications for clinician duty of care (McDonald, 
2013a). 
In both PES systems the Cipher Key, a unique symmetric key generated using 
a one-way function from the DAK, is never disclosed to the PES operators so as to 
assure the security and privacy of confidential information such as patient and 
prescription details (Standards Australia, 2013a). NEHTA and Standards Australia 
released the first draft of ETP technical specifications in December 2010, ETP 
version 1.1 (“Electronic Transfer of Prescriptions v1.1”, 2010). The Script Exchange 
from eRx, however, had been running live across Australia for seven months when 
this technical specification was released. Script Exchange, eRx’s implementation of 
PES was therefore built using XML and Web Services technology based on the 
international and Australian standards (“ETP Standards”, 2016). On the other hand, 
MediSecure’s Script Vault was implemented in compliance with the HL7 Standards 
as set out in the Australian Technical Standards (ATS) 4888 series and has 
undergone the compliance audit process (“Frequently Asked Questions”, 2015). 
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2.4.1 Security model 
The security of electronic prescriptions on PES systems is primarily governed 
by the Australian Technical Specification (ATS) 4888 series, with 4888.2-2013 
particularly emphasising the platform independent model. The security mechanism in 
ETP from a data at rest perspective revolves around the use of the Document Access 
Key (DAK), which is presented as a barcode on the paper prescription produced by 
any eTP-enabled electronic prescribing system (Standards Australia, 2013a). 
In the current ETP implementation using PES systems, the DAK is used for 
encrypting the electronic prescription prior to uploading to the PES system, 
authorising access to the prescription stored on the PES system and decrypting it 
when downloaded from the PES system. In fact, the DAK is the primary pillar on 
which the entire ETP security model is built (ibid). Section 5.3 of ATS 4888.2-2013 
provides an overview of the security mechanism using the DAK for securing the 
electronic prescription (i.e. in the form of Secured Clinical Documents) in the current 
ETP implementation and Figure 2.4 illustrates this operating mechanism. 
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Figure 2.4: DAK usage for storage and retrieval of prescription with PES (Standards Australia, 
2013a, Figure 19) 
The DAK is the parent key from which all other keys such as Retrieval Key 
(RK), Cipher Key and DAK Holder Proof Key are derived using a published 
algorithm. Each DAK contains a Provider ID which uniquely identifies the 
operator/provider of the PES system and an entropic random value from which all 
other keys are derived. The RK is a random value which references a specific 
Secured Clinical Document (i.e. a prescription) from the PES system once it has been 
qualified with the Provider ID, hence it is called Qualified RK (Standards Australia, 
2013a). 
Because the DAK’s random value has sufficient entropy, it is impractical for 
a party to have knowledge about it unless it is explicitly disclosed to that. Possession 
of a Qualified RK derived from the DAK therefore acts as a bearer’s credential and 
thus grants the holder the right to retrieve the Secured Clinical Documents associated 
with that specific Qualified RK (ibid). 
Research Thesis - 24 of 269 
 
The Cipher Key is a unique symmetric key generated using a one-way 
function from the DAK and is used in encrypting and decrypting the payload/content 
of the Secured Clinical Document (i.e. the prescription). This encryption of the 
prescription by the electronic prescribing system is evident in Figure 2.4 prior to 
pushing/uploading it to the PES system. This Cipher Key is never disclosed to the 
PES operators, ensuring that the content of the Secured Clinical Document is not 
accessible and thereby keeping secure the individual’s private-information. This 
process also eliminates the need to gain the consent of the prescription subject (i.e. 
patient) to PES operators having access to their private information (ibid). 
The DAK Holder Proof Key is another important key derived from the DAK 
using a one-way function and is used by a dispensing pharmacy to prove to the PES 
system that it holds a DAK. Figure 2.5 shows the various data types portraying the 
implementation independent characteristics of a DAK (ibid). 
 
Figure 2.5: DAK and its constituent data types (Standards Australia, 2013a, Figure 21) 
To ensure the security of electronic prescriptions stored in PES system, each 
of DAK’s mandated characteristics is accompanied by a list of security conformance 
points. The security mechanism from the data at rest perspective makes use of the 
DAK for encryption mechanisms within the PES system. Storing the DAK or its 
derived Cipher Key on any stable storage (i.e. a permanent storage) requires a 
minimum of 128 bits encryption. In addition to this, derivation of any Cipher Key, 
Retrieval Key or DAK Holder Proof Key from a DAK by any system is strictly 
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prohibited unless the user of that system is authorised to access the prescription 
subject’s information from the Secured Clinical Document (i.e. the prescription) 
associated with that particular DAK (ibid). 
The specification ATS 4888.2-2013 also prohibits sharing of a DAK Holder 
Proof Key as well as storing it in any non-transient recoverable form. Figure 2.6 
depicts the structure and data types of an electronic prescription; the crucial piece of 
information upon which the entire ETP system is built (ibid). 
 
Figure 2.6: Electronic prescription and its constituent data types (Standards Australia, 2013a, Figure 
23) 
Despite being a platform specific implementation for web services, the 
technical specification ATS 4888.6-2013, section 3.4, outlines how the Secured 
Clinical Document is to be encrypted and decrypted for ETP or eHealth in general. 
The way in which a Secured Clinical Document is created has no direct 
impact on the security of electronic prescriptions on the PES from a data at rest 
perspective. However, due to both the document type resulting from and the actions 
required during this creation process it is crucial in determining whether the use of 
mobile devices for transferring electronic prescription is achievable. The technical 
specification ATS 4888.6-2013 mentions that the Secured Clinical Document is a 
Signed Clinical Document encoded as Base64 binary data within the Message 
Payload element in compliance with clause 7.3.1 of the specification ATS 5822-
2010. In turn, the Signed Clinical Document is indeed an IHE’s Cross-Enterprise 
Document Media Interchange (XDM) representation of an HL7 CDA form as 
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defined in the specification ATS 4888.3-2013 (Standards Australia, 2013b; Standards 
Australia, 2013c).  
In summary, the security and integrity of prescription information within the 
PES system from the data at rest perspective is governed by a set of specifications 
and standards such as ATS 4888.2-2013, HL7 CDA and IHE, while facilitating the 
national transition towards eHealth. On the other hand, the specification states that 
the security of electronic prescription from the data in transit aspect is specific to the 
implementation platform (Standards Australia, 2013a). This research found that the 
security of the data in transit between ETP participants (i.e. Prescriber, Prescription 
Subject, Prescription Exchange and Dispenser) relies principally on the encryption 
mechanism of the specific implementation platform (ibid). 
2.4.2 Limitation of the current model and potential extensions to it 
The primary limitation of the current ETP model in our progress towards 
more effective medication management is the availability of the patient’s medication 
history. Despite the existence of the National Prescription and Dispense Repository 
(NPDR), availability of patients’ medication history is limited and generally 
acknowledged to be an issue for healthcare professionals. Moreover, the medication 
information stored in NPDR has varying levels of clinical value and usefulness since 
not all the information stored in NPDR is coded as per the Australian Medication 
Terminology (AMT) coding system. Depending on where the information was 
collected/submitted (i.e. the source of information), the medication information 
stored in NPDR can be in image form, uncoded text or coded text using medication 
coding systems other than AMT. The AMT system delivers unique codes to 
unambiguously identify trade products and medicines approved for use in Australia 
(McDonald, 2014; “Australian Medicine Terminology”, 2016).  
In response to this, as a second step towards more effective medication 
management, pharmacy software vendor FRED IT rolled out the first phase of 
MedView Medicines Workspace during the later stages of the Northern Queensland 
trial for the opt-out model of the My Health record (MyHR). This is a secured web 
application to enable doctors, pharmacists, hospitals and patients to have shared 
access to a patient’s critical medicines information in a summary form (McDonald, 
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2016a, 2016b). The following figure, Figure 2.7, depicts the various sources from 
which MedView will retrieve medication information in order to compile a 
consolidated list of a patient’s medication history. Because it is still in early trial 
stage, its practical usefulness and benefits to the healthcare industry are yet to be 
witnessed. 
 
Figure 2.7: MedView for consolidated patient’s medication history (“MedView and eRx”, 2012) 
Another area yet to be explored to improve healthcare services is mobile 
health or mHealth (“M-HEALTH”, n.d.). Along with both hardware and software 
advancements in mobile technologies, the term “going mobile” is a recent trend in 
digital transformation, affecting many industries such as retail, social networking, 
banking and the legal industry. This even includes such highly regulated fields as the 
public healthcare sector. The first instance of this assimilation into Australian 
healthcare is the child health extension of the Commonwealth’s Personally 
Controlled Electronic Health Records (PCEHR), which allows parents to enter 
information such as immunisations, growth parameters and developmental 
milestones for children up to the age of 14 years (McDonald, 2013b).  
In the pursuit of better medication management, the mobile health option was 
explored. As a result, a mobile application called eRx Express was released by eRx in 
2014 to enhance the current electronic prescription process model described in 
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Figure 2.3. It enabled patients to scan the DAK barcode from the prescription to their 
mobile phone and securely submit it to their choice of pharmacy for a scheduled 
pickup at later time (“Express Scripts”, n.d.). However, this application still requires 
the printed prescription notification from which the DAK barcode was scanned 
before being transmitted to a specific pharmacy. As a result, the prescriber’s 
signature on the printed prescription is still mandatory as it is mandated by relevant 
acts/regulations in each state and territory (e.g. Poison Regulation 1965 Regulation 
51 (1B) in Western Australia). This requirement will only be replaced once the use of 
digitally signed electronic prescriptions has legislative approval. 
2.4.3 eTP Architecture 
Over the past a few years, the healthcare industries in developed countries 
have witnessed a significant increase in adopting electronic prescribing systems 
(Monegain, 2013). The majority of these ETP adoptions were initially led by the 
Government to improve the quality of healthcare and reduce Adverse Drug Events 
(ADEs), while significantly reducing long-term costs via better prevention of ADEs 
and readmissions (Reeve & Sweidan, 2011; Roughead, Semple & Rosenfeld, 2013). 
However, once eHealth components are in place, even if partially operational, the 
improved healthcare infrastructure, such as electronic healthcare records, will 
increase the demand for electronic prescribing systems and unlock massive potential 
for future growth. The level of ETP adoption in various countries, states and 
jurisdictions varies based on diverse interpretations and implementations of data 
protection as well as confidentiality laws, availability of required infrastructure and 
resistance to embrace the change by the stakeholders at various levels (Jolly, 2011). 
Figure 2.8 depicts the levels of ETP adoption, the extent to which ETP is 
implemented, its influence on the information workflow and the form in which the 
information is communicated (Gregory, 2013). Despite being a key government 
initiative to improve the delivery and quality of healthcare, the level of ETP adoption 
varies across the different sectors of the healthcare industry such as primary care 
clinics, aged care facilities and hospitals. 
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Figure 2.8: Level of ETP adoption (Gregory, 2013) 
According to Figure 2.8, the printed prescription is both the legal prescription 
for dispensing and the transfer medium for delivering the DAK identifier to the 
dispenser in Level 1 ETP adoption. Having the prescription details printed with the 
DAK benefits the patient because the printed prescription details may be used for 
dispensing if the pharmacy’s EDS system is not eTP-enabled or access to PES is not 
available (Gregory, 2013; “Electronic Transfer of Prescriptions”, 2016). However, 
this requires the prescriber’s handwritten signature on the printed prescription as 
mandated by the s. 51(1B) of the Poisons Regulations 1965 in WA and similar 
legislation in other states.  
On the other hand, using a data storage device as the transfer media for the 
electronic prescription rather than the printed paper version eliminates the 
requirement for the prescriber’s written signature, as this is exempted by the s. 51 
(1A) and s. 51(1C) of the WA’s Poisons Regulations 1965 and s. 9(1) and s. 9(3) of 
the Commonwealth’s Electronic Transaction Acts 1999.  
In Level 2 ETP adoption, represented in Figure 2.8, the printed prescription 
notification is used as a transfer medium for delivering the identifying DAK to the 
dispenser. The printed prescription notification also contains the same prescription 
details as the electronic prescription thereby facilitating dispensing if access to PES 
system is not available (Gregory, 2013; “Electronic Transfer of Prescriptions”, 
2016). Nonetheless, due to this potential alternative use, the same principles and 
restrictions apply to the prescriber’s handwritten signature as in Level 1 ETP 
adoption. 
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In the current electronic prescription transfer process, upon receiving the 
printed prescription or the prescription notification submitted by the patient/agent, 
the pharmacy’s eTP-enabled EDS system downloads the prescription details from the 
PES system using the DAK. Finally, the Level 3 ETP adoption replaces the paper 
notification with a fully-electronic notification thereby eliminating the requirement 
for handwritten signature by the prescriber (Gregory, 2013). 
However, since the digitally-signed electronic prescription is the legal 
document in both level 2 and 3 of the ETP adoption, legislative approval for the use 
of digitally signed electronic prescription is necessary. According to Figure 2.8, the 
current implementation of ETP in Australian healthcare can be categorised as 
between level 1 and 2 because, despite having the ability to use the electronic 
prescription notifications in certain sectors of the healthcare industry, the printed 
paper prescription remains the legal document and the legislative approval for the 
use of digitally signed electronic prescription is yet to occur. 
2.4.4 Governing Standards, Regulations and Acts 
In order to remove the legislative barriers to the electronic communication of 
health information and the consequent facilitation of an improved healthcare system, 
numerous standards have been adopted and/or developed by various national 
programs and authority bodies over the past decade, with the Commonwealth and 
state governments repealing and/or amending acts and regulations for the same 
purpose. The Australian Commonwealth government, for instance, has removed 
Commonwealth legislative barriers to electronic prescribing and dispensing of PBS 
medicine by implementing changes to the National Health (Pharmaceutical Benefits) 
Amendment Regulations 2006. 
However, state and territory legislative barriers remain unchanged despite 
being identified for necessary changes. Alignment with Commonwealth amendments 
is occurring slowly and this will provide rules for electronic prescribing and 
dispensing in the respective jurisdictions. The following table briefly lists the 
Commonwealth, state and territory acts and regulations which have been repealed 
and amended to accommodate the implementation of ETP for Australian healthcare. 
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Table 2.1: Commonwealth, State and Territory Acts enabling ETP implementation 
Jurisdiction Acts/Regulation 
Commonwealth Electronic Transactions Act 1999 
Commonwealth National Health Act 1953; National Health (Pharmaceutical 
Benefits) Regulations 1960 
NSW Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Regulation 2008 
VIC Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Regulations 2006 
QLD Health (Drugs and Poisons) Regulation 1996 
WA Poisons Act 1964; Poisons Regulations 1965 
SA Controlled substances Act 1984; Controlled substances 
(Poisons) Regulations 2011 
TAS Poisons Act 1971; Poisons Regulations 2008 
ACT Medicines, Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Act 2008; 
Medicines, Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Regulations 2008 
NT Medicines, Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Act 2012 
Table 2.1 lists the acts and regulations which govern the implementation of 
ETP at Commonwealth, state and territory levels. Figure 2.9 shows how these 
governing acts and regulations fit together at Commonwealth, state and territory 
levels in order to accommodate current nationwide ETP implementation. Figure 2.9 
also demonstrates the relationship between legislation and regulations in Australia, 
along with the complexity of this construction for eTP.  
The outermost circle represents the encompassing regulation for the entire 
nation. The next inner circle defines the regulations for each state and territory 
amended as per jurisdictional legislative requirements. These two circles enable the 
use of electronic transactions at national, state and territory levels, making the use of 
ETP and other electronic transactions possible. The third circle lists acts and 
regulations governing the poisons and therapeutic goods for each jurisdiction, which 
play a key role in enabling the use of ETP system. The centre circle contains various 
standards and specifications developed in compliance with those national and 
jurisdictional legislative requirements. Because the closer the circle to the centre of 
the diagram the more ETP specific it becomes, this diagram is named “Dante’s 4 
circles of eTP”; its concept analogous to 14th century poet Dante Alighieri’s Nine 
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Circles of Hell from Divine Comedy, where the lower circles are for more severe 
sins.  
Medicines, Poisons and 
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2012
Poision Act 1964
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Figure 2.9: Dante’s 4 circles of eTP 
The Electronic Transaction Act 1999 (Commonwealth) facilitates the use of 
electronic means and enables the use of electronic communications in dealings with 
government, business and community for future economic and social prosperity of 
Australia. Various states and territories amended and adopted this overarching act 
according to their jurisdictional legislative requirements. These jurisdictional 
Electronic Transaction Acts, along with various acts and regulations governing the 
poisons and therapeutic goods for each jurisdiction, dictate the requirements for ETP 
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implementation in that jurisdiction. Additionally, various standards and 
specifications have been developed reflecting those requirements. The ATS4888 
series and AS4700.3, which primarily govern the implementation of eTP, are 
examples of those standards and specifications. Table 2.2 briefly describes the 
constituent standards and specifications in Figure 2.9, Dante’s 4 circles of eTP, and 
their usages and applications in ETP implementation. 
Table 2.2: Standards and specifications governing the ETP implementation 
Standards/Specification Usages/Applications in implementing eTP 
ATS 4888.1-2013 
Electronic transfer of 
prescriptions - Platform 
independent (logical) 
information model to 
support electronic 
transfer of prescriptions 
Specifies the essential clinical data groups and elements required in an e-
prescription exchange for prescriptions that are generated by registered 
medical practitioners and dispensed by pharmacists, and the constraints 
that should be applied. In addition to specifying the requirements it also 
identifies how the data elements of a typical printed prescription are 
recorded in the structure of an e-prescription. 
ATS 4888.2-2013 
Electronic transfer of 
prescriptions - Platform 
independent (logical) 
services model to 
support electronic 
transfer of prescriptions 
Describes a technology platform independent model which describes the 
constituent primary functionalities, processes and their interactions. 
Implementing those functions allows conceptualizing and synthesizing of 
a new model using mobile storage devices. 
ATS 4888.3-2013 
Electronic transfer of 
prescriptions - Platform 
implementation specific 
e-prescription HL7 
Clinical Document 
Architecture 
implementation guide 
Defines the representation of a prescription using HL7 Clinical Document 
Architecture (CDA) Release 2 for the electronic exchange of e-
prescriptions between healthcare providers as per Electronic Transfer of 
Prescriptions (eTP) Specification. 
 
This document guides implementers step by step through mapping each 
data component of ATS 4888.1 to a corresponding CDA attribute or 
element and specifies the descriptions of constraints on the CDA and 
custom extensions to the CDA in order to fulfil the requirements for 
Australian implementations of an electronic prescription (e-prescription). 
It also contains conformance requirements against which implementers 
can attest the compliance of their systems. 
ATS 4888.4-2013 
Electronic transfer of 
prescriptions - Platform 
implementation specific 
dispense record HL7 
Clinical Document 
Architecture 
Describes the Dispense Record for Electronic Transfer of Prescriptions 
(eTP). 
 
Dispense Record is primarily used in current ETP specification for 
updating the Dispensing State, issuing Dispense Notifications to the 
prescriber and sending the dispense information to the National 
Prescription and Dispense Repository (NPDR). 
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Standards/Specification Usages/Applications in implementing eTP 
implementation guide 
ATS 4888.5-2013 
Electronic transfer of 
prescriptions - Platform 
implementation specific 
prescription request HL7 
Clinical Document 
Architecture 
implementation guide 
Describes the Prescription Request Electronic Transfer of Prescriptions 
(eTP). 
 
This would primarily be used by a dispenser for requesting a formal 
prescription to legitimate the dispensing of therapeutic goods following an 
instruction from a prescriber to supply a therapeutic good without a 
prescription. 
 
ATS 4888.6-2013 
Electronic transfer of 
prescriptions - Platform 
implementation specific 
web service 
Defines a platform-dependent technical services specification for an 
Electronic Transfer of Prescriptions (ETP) package using web services. It 
defines the roles, behaviours and service interfaces for the implementation 
of an interoperable E-prescribing, E-dispensing, Prescription Exchange, 
Facility Based Supply Manager and Last Supply Notification Agent 
system. Compliance with ATS 4888.2 (i.e. platform independent 
Specification) is implied by conformance with this Technical 
Specification. 
AS 4700.3-2014 
Implementation of 
Health Level Seven 
(HL7) Version 2.5 - 
Electronic messages for 
exchange of information 
on medicines 
prescription 
It is based on AS 4700.3-2005 and supersedes AS 4700.3(Int)-2007. It 
covers the implementation of the Health Level Seven (HL7) Version 2.5 
protocol for communication between prescribers, dispensers and their 
healthcare trading partners in Australia and is an alternative approach to 
the use of HL7 Clinical Document Architecture Release 2 (CDA) as 
described in ATS 4888.x. The Standards Australia Working Group IT-
014-06-04, Prescription Messaging, has reviewed and interpreted data 
segments and data elements as either mandatory, conditional or optional, 
and provided relevant usage notes in the Australian health environment. 
In addition to these standards and specifications listed in Table 2.2, the 
following standards and technical specifications listed in Table 2.3 may also be 
useful to support and govern various aspects of ETP implementation in the 
Australian healthcare industry. 
Table 2.3: Additional standards and specifications governing the ETP implementation 
Standards/Specification Usages/Applications in implementing eTP 
AS 5550-2013 E-health 
web services profiles 
  
Specifies a Standard for interconnectivity between implementations using 
Web services toolkits. Three profiles are specified - a base Web services 
profile, and profiles for securing Web services using either TLS or WS-
Security. These can be used to secure Web services using existing toolkits 
instead of bespoke approaches. 
Research Thesis - 35 of 269 
 
Standards/Specification Usages/Applications in implementing eTP 
AS 5551-2013 E-health 
XML secured payload 
profiles   
Describes a standard method for securing an XML document and defines 
mechanisms for representing signed and/or encrypted XML fragments 
using digital signatures, cryptographic encryption, or a combination of 
these at multiple levels as required. 
 
Unlike theW3C recommended XML structure where the signature and 
encryption contains optional and implementation defined/specific 
features, this standard only defines four XML elements for representing 
secured XML fragments. One or more of these XML elements can be 
used to secure the data as long as they are in XML fragments and the 
signature and the XML fragment being signed, or the encryption keys and 
cipher text, are represented together in the same XML document. 
AS 5552-2013 E-health 
secure message delivery 
  
This standard defines an interoperable mechanism, a set of roles and their 
associated interfaces and behaviour, for clinical messaging between 
software systems at two distinct organizations over the Internet using the 
industry-standard Web services protocols. 
 
Clinical messaging requires a network infrastructure, broad 
interconnectivity, end-to-end privacy and assurance of delivery. 
Organisations which cannot rely on significant infrastructure or 
technology expertise within the organization are accommodated by the 
standard interfaces that cater for hosted services while retaining end-to-
end privacy and delivery assurance. 
 
Key constraints/characteristics are (a) its only intended for use for 
transmission of message payloads from an identified sender organization 
to an identified receiver organization (b) Does not constrain the message 
payload content. Only the control and routing information necessary for 
transmission in a safe and secure manner is defined (c) Business processes 
or business services are not included. Only the externally visible 
behaviour necessary to implement interconnected messaging is defined. 
ATS 5546-2013 E-health 
endpoint location service  
Provides a scalable and easily maintainable discovery mechanism for an 
information sender to dynamically locate a relevant known target recipient 
in the national e-health environment where communications between 
different healthcare organizations is facilitated through the use of various 
kinds of service invocation. 
 
This document defines the technical service specification for the Endpoint 
Location Service (ELS) and contains the requisite data types, interfaces 
and their behaviours for unambiguous operation between clients and 
service providers. It also provides the sender with technical information 
required to invoke the instance. 
HB 308 2011 Location 
of digital signatures in 
Despite not being a comprehensive guide to the security concerns of 
digital signatures, it proposes a method for creating and storing digital 
signatures in HL7 V2 messages that meet Medicare Australia (MA) 
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Standards/Specification Usages/Applications in implementing eTP 
HL7 V2 Messages requirements for a healthcare sector electronic transaction. It enables 
paperless digitally signed documents to be implemented in place of 
physically signed paper documents. 
The Standards and Technical Specifications listed in both Table 2.2 and 
Table 2.3 are neither complete nor comprehensive as only those relevant to this 
research are shown. Also listed, however, are the applicable standards and 
specifications; for the future implementation of digital signature usage in electronic 
prescriptions, for instance, or for a different implementation such as replacing the 
simple Subscriber-Provider architecture used in current ETP systems with Endpoint 
Location Services (ELS). Their applicability varies depending on both the design and 
the architecture of their implementation such as development of a web service or a 
client-server application.  
Whilst Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 list the relevant eHealth standards for 
implementation of ETP and secure communication for healthcare information, as 
well as the clinical documents in general, the Figure 2.10 depicts how some of these 
eHealth standards fit together with other existing industrial standards from various 
areas such as Extensible Mark-up Language (XML), Web services, cryptography and 
communication protocols. While Figure 2.9 focused on the Acts and Regulations 
specific to ETP implementation, Figure 2.10 emphasises how eHealth standards and 
specifications sit within the existing industrial standards and protocols from a more 
generic perspective of communicating healthcare information securely. Figure 2.10 
was constructed by studying the relationship and dependencies between AS5550-
2013, AS5551-2013, ATS5546-2013 and AS5552-2013. 
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AS 5552-2013 E-health secure message delivery (SMD)
ATS 5546-2013 E-health endpoint location 
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• RFC2616
• RFC4122
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• WSA2006
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Figure 2.10: eHealth standards and industrial standards 
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2.5 Potential issues and challenges of current ETP implementation 
Current ETP implementation using PES has enabled us to progress forward 
according to the national strategy for improving Australian healthcare system 
outcomes in a sustainable manner. However, the current implementation is not 
without significant issues. 
Current ETP implementation requires a supporting infrastructure and 
involves an ongoing cost. Due to this dependency on the supporting infrastructure 
(i.e. the Internet connection), current ETP implementation is not suitable for remote 
regions of Australia where network availability is limited or unreliable. Moreover, 
the associated ongoing fee of fifteen cents for each prescription downloaded, whilst 
negligible for an individual prescription, represents a substantial amount nationwide 
and will have a significant impact on the nation’s healthcare expenditure in the long 
run. 
The announcement by eRx in August 2015 regarding the dispense of their 
first billionth electronic prescription indicated that this approach had cost the nation 
at least $150 million at that point in time (McDonald, 2015). When combined with 
the figures of the only other PES service in Australia, the total electronic prescription 
fees incurred so far was significantly more. According to eRx’s survey outcomes, 
eRx is currently dispensing approximately 22.5 million electronic prescriptions each 
month, resulting in AU$3.3 million dollars for electronic prescription fees alone 
(“One billion eRx electronic scripts”, 2016). 
Predictably, an annual increase of at least five percent in the number of PBS 
prescriptions is shown in Figure 1.1. This increase will eventually lead to an increase 
in cost over time while making use of the current PES implementation, and this cost 
will continue to rise significantly over time unless a more cost-effective alternative 
approach is implemented. 
Another challenge with the current PES infrastructure is the availability of the 
patient’s medication history (Productivity Commission, 2015; “MedView Medicines 
Workspace”, 2016). Since the medication information stored in the NPDR is not 
coded according to the AMT coding protocols, it has varying levels of clinical value 
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and usefulness for the healthcare professionals (McDonald, 2014). In fact, this 
shortcoming resulted from another issue which was the failure to adhere to a single, 
consistent coding system (ibid). The Jurisdictions require that the AMT coding be 
used in medication-related clinical activities such as prescribing, recording, 
medication review, prescription dispensing, medication administration and transfer 
of medicines information between and within healthcare organisations. Despite this 
requirement, however, getting all the stakeholders to conform to this practice has 
proved very challenging (“Electronic Medication Management Systems”, 2012). 
For instance, although PBS data should match AMT data in most cases, some 
AMT codes in PBS distribution are different to those in the AMT distribution from 
the National Clinical Terminology and Information Service (NCTIS) (“AMT PBS 
FAQs”, 2016). This is due to PBS system creating its own description and using its 
own namespace identifier – the 7 digit ID which appears within the full identifier 
string – where a product needs to be described differently for legislative and 
reimbursement purposes, or even where the AMT concept does not meet PBS 
requirements, for example the PBS description requires more or less detail than the 
associated AMT description provides (“AMT PBS FAQs”, 2016). 
In addition, AMT and PBS have different release cycles, making the change 
incorporation more difficult and increasing the chances localised changes being 
required (i.e. non-AMT PBS codes). Both the NEHTA, which is now known as 
Australian Digital Health Agency (ADHA), and PBS have been working together to 
ensure quality mapping processes and alignment between both the AMT and PBS 
releases (“Answers to questions on notice”, 2016). 
This inconsistent use of coding systems nonetheless has the potential to create 
interoperability issues between the stakeholders, which would represent significant 
delays in reaching eTP’s full potential. Furthermore, this potential interoperability 
issue discouraged the EPS and EDS software vendors from adopting the AMT 
coding system (“MSIA Issues presented at the eHealth ICT meeting”, 2013). In any 
case, adoption of AMT coding by EPS and EDS software vendors may not be an 
issue in the future as AMT coding has been provided as a formal subset of the 
SNOMED CT-AU release since late 2015 (“Australian Medicine Terminology”, 
2016). 
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Another inconvenience of the current ETP implementation is the remaining 
legislative requirement for a handwritten signature by the prescriber in most 
jurisdictions. While awaiting the legislative changes supporting the use of digital 
signature in electronic prescriptions, the printed, paper-based prescription remains 
the legal document, requiring the prescriber’s signature as per current acts and 
regulations. Because the current ETP implementation uses a printed, paper-based 
prescription to transfer the identifying DAK to the dispenser, the necessity of a paper 
token from the prescriber remains active and in place, along with all the legislative 
and regulatory constraints. This requirement for prescriber’s handwritten signature 
impedes the adoption of the electronic prescription process and its full potential such 
as remote prescription. 
Compared to the prior challenges such as the ongoing operation cost, the 
inability to assist in recording the patient’s medication history and the requirement 
for the prescriber’s hand-written signature, the following two issues are specifically 
from the technical and implementation perspectives. Despite interoperability between 
the two PES systems, further information sharing is unlikely to be straightforward, as 
their implementation and governing standards differ from one another; MediSecure’s 
Script Vault complies with HL7 standards as mandated in ATS 4888 series, while 
eRx’s Script Exchange is built using XML and Web Services technology drawn from 
different International and Australian standards (“ETP Standards”, 2016; “Frequently 
Asked Questions”, 2015). 
This being the case, unless significant modifications are made to both 
systems for better information flow, further interaction or information sharing is 
more likely to require a third-party tool/utility such as a protocol translator or 
integration engine, for instance Orion Health's Rhapsody, NextGen Healthcare’s 
Mirth Connect or Infor's Cloverleaf. This introduction and utilisation of third-party 
tools would produce not only an additional cost to the system but also the 
considerable associated risks and vulnerabilities. 
One definition of vulnerabilities is “weaknesses in a computer’s makeup that 
allows it to be exploited by cybercriminals” (“Vulnerabilities”, 2017). Since tools 
and programs are written by humans, they are inherently imperfect and are not free 
of errors and therefore have the potential to create avenues for would-be attackers 
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(Holt, 2017). The current PES implementations do not utilise the established eHealth 
infrastructures for transferring prescription information. Over the course of the 
eHealth journey, a tremendous amount of time, effort and funding has been expended 
on putting in place various eHealth specifications and infrastructures such as the 
Health Identifiers (HI) Services, Secure Message Delivery (SMD) and Endpoint 
Location Services (ELS). 
However, the PES prescription exchange model uses none of these features. 
Instead of making use of HI and ELS services, PES implements a simple Subscriber-
Provider pattern. Use of SMD is also irrelevant for PES prescription exchange model 
as it is not a dedicated point-to-point transmission; the prescriber’s submitted 
prescription is stored on PES to await its download by a subscribed dispenser (i.e. 
pharmacies). Therefore, these costly eHealth services are of little use for current PES 
implementation although they could have been utilised for better security and 
consistency. 
2.7 Summary 
The literature review presents and discusses the issues and shortcomings 
surrounding the current implementation of ETP in the Australian healthcare industry 
from a number of aspects including availability and consistency of the patient’s 
medication information and the nation’s healthcare expenditure. 
Beginning the literature review on ETP is a brief history of Australia’s 
eHealth journey under the guidance of NEHTA, which signifies a crucial step 
towards Electronic Medication Management and many other programs on the 
eHealth agenda. This is followed by an outline of the transition from manual 
prescribing to the current implementation of ETP using two PES services. The 
functioning of ETP implementation is briefly and clearly described, along with its 
interactions with external systems such as NPDR and the PBS online claiming 
system. The technical details of ETP are explored next, including its security 
measures using DAK and the requirement for the prescriber’s signature on printed 
prescriptions. 
Research Thesis - 42 of 269 
 
The ongoing associated cost of a fifteen-cent electronic prescription fee and 
its current subsidisation by the Commonwealth is briefly discussed before 
emphasising the inability of ETP to provide patients’ complete medication history to 
the clinician and other healthcare provider despite the existence of the National 
Prescription and Dispense Repository (NPDR). The fact that NPDR’s varying levels 
of clinical value and usefulness is primarily due to the use of different coding such as 
AMT coding and non-AMT PBS coding is highlighted. Following this is a 
description of FRED IT’s current attempt, using MedView Medicines Workspace, to 
facilitate shared access of critical medicines information among healthcare service 
providers such as doctors, pharmacists, hospitals and patients. 
The current “going mobile” trend in the Australian healthcare sector is 
highlighted by a brief mention of the release and use of the child health mobile 
application extension of the Commonwealth’s Personally Controlled Electronic 
Health Records (PCEHR) and the eRx Express mobile application. This is followed 
by an explanation, from the architectural perspective, of the various levels (i.e. Level 
1-3) of ETP adoption and its influence on the information flow, the form in which 
the information is communicated and the legal document format (i.e. printed or 
electronic form) in each ETP adoption level. 
The next section identifies and examines the relevant Acts, regulations, 
standards and specifications governing the ETP implementation at Commonwealth, 
state and territory levels in terms of their influence on current ETP process and the 
security measures they mandate. How they fit together and form a complex 
legislative and regulation construct for ETP is depicted by Figure 2.9 (Dante’s 4 
circles of eTP), whilst Tables 2.2 and 2.3 briefly describe each of the eTP-related 
standards and specifications relevant to this research. Figure 2.10 helps to explain the 
positioning of eTP- and eHealth-specific standards within the existing industrial 
standards from contexts such as communication, web services, XML and encryption. 
The literature review concludes by highlighting the shortcomings of the current ETP 
implementation such as its reliance on the supporting infrastructure and associated 
ongoing cost, its inability to provide a patient’s complete medication history and its 
requirement for the prescriber’s handwritten signature, which presents an obstacle to 
becoming a fully electronic process. 
Research Thesis - 43 of 269 
 
The literature review also contributes by providing a clear awareness of the 
fact that, despite being a crucial development in eHealth initiatives towards a safer 
and better outcome in Australian healthcare, current ETP implementation has some 
significant and costly flaws in terms of availability and consistency of the patient’s 
medication information and an ongoing expense which can only rise with the 
increase in population. Given the advancements in security and widespread user 
acceptance of mobile computing, it is imperative to explore a viable alternative 
electronic prescription transfer mechanism with comparable security assurance at a 
cheaper cost, if not completely cost-free.  
From the legislative and regulatory perspectives, the Commonwealth and the 
states and territories have repealed and amended Acts and Regulations and developed 
and/or adopted numerous standards and specifications in order to pave the way for 
implementing eTP. However, legislative approval for the legal use of digitally-signed 
electronic prescriptions is still pending, thereby impeding one of the final processes 
supporting the efficient use of electronic information communication in electronic 
prescribing. While awaiting further legislative changes supporting ETP 
implementation to the next level, it is therefore necessary to explore alternatives 
which can be implemented within the existing legislative framework - alternatives 
with reduced complexity, comparable security measures and controls and without the 
need for major supporting infrastructure and its associated ongoing costs.  
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2.8 Research Questions (RQs) 
2.8.1 Main Research Question 
The primary research question is: 
Can a technical framework be constructed to serve as a guide for development of 
ANDROID mobile electronic prescription transfer applications in compliance with 
the security requirements mandated by Australian healthcare laws, regulations and 
standards? 
The Primary Research Question was addressed through the exploration of 
two supporting Research Questions. Based upon the findings from the supporting 
questions, this research determined whether a technical framework can be 
constructed for development of an Android mobile electronic prescription transfer 
applications in compliance with the relevant laws, regulations, standards and 
specifications governing the Australian healthcare industry. 
Based on the outcomes and preliminary analysis of the Primary Research 
Question in the creation of such technical framework, an associated series of 
procedures was then developed to validate and verify a functional, practical and 
implementable solution, which could potentially serve as an alternative approach in 
the adoption of a mobile electronic prescription transfer mechanism for the 
Australian healthcare industry. The first supporting question relates to the security 
requirements for electronic prescription transfer applications in the Australian 
healthcare industry. 
2.8.2 Subsidiary Research Question 1   
How can the security requirements imposed by the relevant laws, regulations and 
standards in the Australian healthcare system be integrated into a framework for the 
assessment of mobile electronic prescription transfer applications? 
Answering this Subsidiary Research Question involved analysing the acts, 
regulations, standards and publications related to the security requirements and the 
electronic prescription transfer specifications for prescribing in the Australian 
healthcare context. The publications included those produced by the Australian 
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Digital Health Agency (formerly NEHTA), Standards Australia, the Department of 
Health, the Pharmacy Guild and other relevant authorities. The resultant analysis 
formed the assessment criteria for the next phase of the research: further 
investigation of and experiments on the candidate technologies such as operating 
system platform, encryption and wireless communication. 
2.8.3 Subsidiary Research Question 2   
How can the assessment criteria framework developed in Subsidiary Research 
Question 1 be used in assessing the native security features and third-party tools on 
the Android for the security compliance of mobile electronic prescription transfer 
applications? 
This second supporting question required a detailed study of the capability of 
the Android’s native security features, other third-party security tools/frameworks 
and wireless communication technologies, to fulfil the security requirements 
identified by the previous Research Question. Through a series of experiments, 
potentially some in an iterative manner, this research identified the candidate 
technologies and studied their relevant security measures/mechanisms which address 
the security requirements specified in the outcome of Subsidiary Research Question 
1. The experiment outcomes were assessed for technical viability and practicality in 
the development and deployment of potential solutions for the Australian healthcare 
industry. 
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2.9 Learning from the Research 
This study of the current implementation of ETP emphasises on how it 
functions, its regulatory enablers and constraints at Commonwealth, state and 
territory levels as well as its limitations and issues. This study states the vital role of 
ETP in improving the Australian healthcare system and its future maintainability. It 
examines the security model of current ETP implementation, which revolves around 
the use of DAK for securing prescription information. It investigates the levels of 
ETP implementation/adoption and subsequently categorises the current ETP 
implementation in Australia as between level 1 and 2, according to Gregory's (2003) 
levels of ETP adoption. The limitations of the current ETP implementation are 
discussed, along with its potential extensions for improvements. Next it identifies the 
relevant laws, regulations, standards and specifications governing the ETP 
implementation at Commonwealth, state and territory (i.e. jurisdictional) levels. 
These findings establish the minimal security requirements for Android mobile ETP 
applications. 
This study concludes with the construction of the Primary Research Question 
and two Subsidiary Research Questions, which in turn lead to the next stage of the 
research. The paper produced at the end of this stage (i.e. Research Paper 1 in 
Appendix A) firstly briefly describes these findings and secondly contrasts the 
current ETP implementation with its full potential as a mobile implementation. The 
research findings published in the paper produced were verified by the “triple-
blinded peer review” process. 
Htat, K. K., Williams, P. A. H., & McCauley, V. (2015). The Hare and the Hortoise 
[sic]: The Potential Versus the Reality of eTP Implementation. In 
Proceedings of the 23rd Australian national Health Informatics Conference 
2015, Brisbane, Australia (pp. 114-120). 
Contributions: Htat (65%), Williams (25%) and McCauley (10%) 
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODS 
3.1 Overview 
 This chapter begins by exploring some qualitative research methods relevant 
to this research and is followed by a discussion of the underlying principles, designs 
and investigative approaches employed in endeavouring to answer the Research 
Questions. 
3.2 Methodological Approach 
Denzin and Lincoln (1994) suggest that there are three essential components 
to understanding the nature of qualitative research. The first component declares that 
qualitative research is interpretive, the second states that it is multimethod and the 
third articulates that it is conducted in the field or in the person’s natural setting and 
surroundings. 
Christensen et al (2011) refer to the use of several methods (i.e. multimethod) 
as triangulation because it is believed that “the use of several methods provides better 
understanding of the phenomenon being investigated”. Whilst Moore (2002) defines 
research methods as the tools selected by researchers to provide the data that 
explores research questions (i.e. subsequently analysis conducted, and conclusions 
are drawn upon), Williamson (2002) stresses their importance by suggesting that the 
selection of an appropriate methodology is crucial to the success and applicability of 
the research. Pickard (2007) supports the importance of selecting an appropriate 
method, as well as the researchers’ understanding of the methods in establishing the 
validity of the research findings. Williamson then cites that “truth value”, 
“applicability”, “consistency” and “neutrality” are the four concepts with which to 
gauge the value of the research. In qualitative research such concepts are mapped to 
“credibility”, “transferability”, “dependability” and “confirmability” respectively 
(Pickard, 2007). 
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In order to establish such value and credibility for the research, the following 
section explored and investigated different research methods selected for their 
apparent relevance to the nature of this research. 
3.2.1 Hermeneutics 
Initial investigation of the hermeneutics approach was conducted, since 
answering Subsidiary Research Question 1 required deciphering the true meaning of 
what the legal texts imply and interpreting them into a set of security requirements. 
The name hermeneutics comes from the Greek word “hermeneuein”, meaning “to 
interpret or translate”, and it offers a theoretical framework for interpretive 
understanding, or meaning, with an emphasis on context and original purpose. It 
originally provided guidelines for scholars in interpreting biblical texts into actual 
explanation (Crotty, 1998). 
Ree & Urmson (1991) point out the radical redevelopment of hermeneutics 
by modern thinkers from a method used by theologians to investigate the inner 
meanings of sacred texts to a reflective practice of unmasking hidden meanings 
beneath apparent ones. In 2003, Laverty described the data generation and analysis 
processes conducted in a Hermeneutical Circle method as being comprised of 
reading, reflective writing and interpretation with rigour. Laverty also depicted these 
processes as shown in the Figure 3.1. 
 
 
The initial intent of this research was to utilise the hermeneutics approach to 
derive a set of acceptance criteria (i.e. security requirements) from the applicable 
legislations, regulations and standards for the security of electronic prescription 
information in the Australian healthcare industry. However, further investigation 
Reading 
Reflective Writing 
Interpreting 
Figure 3.1: Hermeneutical Circle (Laverty, 2003) 
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revealed that hermeneutics was not a suitable method, since this research is seeking 
neither the transcendental interpretations of the text nor the meaning determined by 
the researchers using their interpretation for further discussion and understanding 
(Crotty, 1998; Cole & Avison, 2007). This research simply needed to interpret the 
legal texts and standards in order to create a set of technical and security 
requirements. 
3.2.2 Document Analysis 
Bowen (2009) defines document analysis as “a systematic procedure for 
reviewing or evaluating documents - both printed and electronic (computer-based 
and Internet-transmitted) material”. He also mentions that it is a low-cost, 
unobtrusive and non-reactive way to obtain empirical data. Although it has been used 
primarily as a complement to other research methods for triangulating and theory 
building, its uses as a stand-alone method have increased considerably within the 
public health research environment, especially in evaluating the impact of initiatives 
such as a committee-led venture to increase immunisation uptake in an area or a 
Board-led approach to reduce sexual ill-health (“Document Analysis”, n.d.; Bowen, 
2009).  
In the document analysis approach, documents containing texts and images 
produced without the researcher’s intervention are examined and interpreted in order 
to elicit meaning, to gain a more in-depth understanding and to develop empirical 
knowledge (ibid). The documents can be in a variety of forms retrieved from various 
sources such as libraries, newspaper archives and organisational or institutional files. 
Researchers using this approach would normally review prior literature as part of 
their studies and then incorporate that information in their reports (Bowen, 2009). 
According to Bowen (2009), document analysis is an iterative process which 
combines elements of content analysis and thematic analysis involving skimming 
(superficial examination), reading (thorough examination) and interpretation. In this 
approach, the use of content analysis organises the information into categories 
related to the phenomena of interest and entails a first-pass document review which 
identifies the meaningful and relevant passages of texts or other data (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008). Through a more in-depth and focused re-reading and review, 
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thematic analysis in this approach identifies patterns within the data, as well as 
emerging themes, as the basis for further analysis, coding and category construction 
based on the data’s characteristics (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006).  
Like other research methods, document analysis is not without inherent 
limitations (Bowen, 2009). However, limitations such as “insufficient detail” and 
“low retrievability” were not applicable to the documents used in this research, and 
the benefits of the method outweighed its limitations. Based on these findings, this 
research employed the document analysis method for evaluating documents (i.e. the 
applicable legislations, regulations and standards) in such a way that empirical 
knowledge was produced. 
Through document analysis an understanding was developed to derive a set 
of acceptance criteria (i.e. security requirements) from those documents with the aim 
of securing electronic prescription information in the Australian healthcare industry. 
The value and credibility of this particular research was strengthened by the use of 
triangulation. Whilst Angers and Machtmes (2005) stress the necessity of 
triangulation to minimise bias and establish credibility of the data obtained during 
the research, Patton (1990) claims that the use of triangulation helps in preventing 
the introduction of vulnerabilities due to the research findings being an artefact of a 
single method or source, or influenced by a single investigator’s bias. The research 
findings are corroborated by the supervisory review at the end of each research stage. 
3.2.3 Experimental Research 
Pickard (2007) defined experiment as “a controlled research situation” in 
which the researcher can establish the experimental conditions down to the smallest 
details, where the experimental environment can be isolated from the unwanted 
variables and external influences. The extent of error (i.e. experimental error) must 
be identified when these conditions cannot be met entirely (Pickard, 2007). Pickard 
also stresses that understanding the nature of experimentation and experimental error 
is crucial in establishing the value and significance drawn from the research. 
The basic model of the true experiment not only demonstrates that “If X then 
Y” but also “If no X then no Y” (Pickard, 2007). The inherent difficulties in 
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measuring the extent of error and identifying the variables responsible for it classify 
many studies which claim to be “experimental research” as “quasi-experimental 
research”. Whilst the true experiment aims towards covariance between the identified 
variables, with deliberate manipulation of the independent variables, the quasi-
experiment aims to establish levels of correlation between observable variables 
without any intervention and temporal restrictions (Pickard, 2007; Field & Hole, 
2002). 
Christensen et al (2011) describe experimental research as an attempt to 
identify cause-and-effect relationship by conducting controlled experiments. From 
the most simplistic perspective, cause is something that produces something else and 
effect is the difference between what would have happened without the manipulation 
of the independent variables and what did happen with the manipulation of those 
(ibid). Christensen et al (2011) also state that it is impossible to obtain the true 
measure of an effect as it requires the situation to both be X and Y at same time, 
when they are in fact mutually exclusive (i.e. impossible). 
Before developing enough understanding of the experimental research 
method, it was initially assumed that answering Subsidiary Research Question 2 
would follow the quasi-experimental research method. With better understanding of 
the method, however, and since Subsidiary Research Question 2 only sought “how to 
use the findings from Subsidiary Research Question 1 in assessing security 
compliance of an Android electronic prescription transfer application” rather than 
pursuing the “cause-and-effect” of using those findings in such a security compliance 
assessment, it was concluded that the use of the experimental research method was 
not an appropriate approach for this particular research. 
3.2.4 Action Research 
Seale (2007) state that action research is “grounded in the belief that research 
with human brings should be participative democratic”. Reason and Bradbury (2001) 
second this by declaring that “A primary purpose of action research is to produce 
practical knowledge that is useful to people in the everyday conduct of their lives”. It 
is more often used in the fields of information and communication research due to its 
Research Thesis - 52 of 269 
 
value in improving service provision, encouraging reflective practice and structuring 
and disseminating experience to the wider community (Pickard, 2007). 
Kurt Lewin, who first used the term “action research”, believes that some 
form of action/change has to be part of the research design from the beginning in 
order to make a difference (Pickard, 2007). Therefore, an investigation leads to some 
form of action and it is then followed by an evaluation (ibid). However, Williamson 
(2002) calls this design the “most basic action research cycle” and describes it as in 
Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2: The most basic action research cycle (Williamson, 2002) 
Williamson states that the “reflection is based on experiences of action” and 
describes the whole practice as a learning process. She portrays it iterative nature of 
action research’s thusly: “Action research is usually carried out in discrete cycles, 
where later cycles are used to challenge, support and refine insights and results from 
previous cycles” (Williamson, 2002). The Action Research cycle, with multiple 
elements for more complex scenarios, is depicted in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3:  A typical action research cycle (Williamson, 2002) 
Whilst participation in the research context leads to the thorough 
understanding of the problem, the action/change introduced and the outcome of that 
action/change, the researcher actually being part of the context being researched and 
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having such tacit knowledge of the situation posed the greatest challenge for this 
research method, which calls into question the credibility or validity of the outcome 
because it relies on the researcher’s notion of objectivity. Nevertheless, Herr and 
Anderson (2005) point out that it is irrelevant to use the same validity criteria used in 
judging the positivistic and naturalist researches, and provided “democratic validity”, 
“outcome validity”, “process validity”, “catalytic validity” and “dialogue validity” as 
the five criteria applicable in measuring the credibility of action research. 
Although this research is not a perfect candidate for the use of the action 
research method, better understanding of this method enabled the researcher to 
derive from it an iterative experimentation and reflection approach for this particular 
research. This derived approach still agreed with Williamson’s (2002) brief 
description of the action research cycles as “mini-experiments in practice”. 
In each cycle of research, the reflection on the experimentation result 
indicated whether or not the candidate technology complied with the mandated 
security requirements, that is to say whether or not it could be used in the proposed 
mobile ETP solution, and whether or not the experimentation needed iteration with a 
different technology. 
3.3 Theoretical Framework for the Research 
Williamson (2002) uses the architect’s house-plan metaphor to depict a 
theoretical framework; a theoretical framework describes the key ideas underpinning 
the research and how they are related in the same way in which a house plan 
describes the rooms of the house and how they are interconnected. Crotty (1998) 
says that the starting point in developing a research proposal is to identify the 
methodologies and methods that will be utilised in the research and consequently 
justifying the choice. Therefore, this section identifies and describes the relevant 
theoretical framework to be employed in addressing the Research Questions.  
This research falls into the realm of mixed methods, these being qualitative 
and iterative experimentation and reflection. It used qualitative data from the 
document analysis research followed by iterative experimentation to explore and 
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verify potential solutions and subsequently derive a framework to answer the main 
Research Question. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) mention that the qualitative aspects are based on 
observation, interviews or reading documents, whilst Wolcott (1992) describes it as 
“watching, asking or examining”. The objective of this study is to interpret the 
requirements mandated by acts, regulations and standards into a set of acceptance 
criteria (i.e. security requirements) to be fulfilled by such potential candidate 
technologies as Android’s native security features and third-party tools and short-
range wireless communication technologies such as NFC and Bluetooth. 
Williamson (2002) categorises research as basic research, primarily 
concerned with deriving new knowledge and focusing on theory building and/or 
hypothesis testing, and applied research, which concerns solving specific problems in 
real-life situations and is immediately usable as solutions to actual problems. While 
basic research mainly contributes to the advancement of the general knowledge of 
society, applied research intends to help practitioners to be better informed about 
their work environment and to do their job better (Williamson, 2002). According to 
Williamson’s categorisation, this particular research is of applied research type with 
exploratory nature.  
Despite qualitative research being a widely used approach and offering many 
ways of being conducted, there are some pervasive issues associated with qualitative 
research such as labour-intensive data collection, the distinct possibility of researcher 
bias, time demands for processing and coding data and the credibility and quality of 
conclusions (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The reliability and validity of the 
qualitatively derived findings in particular can be seriously in doubt (Dawson, 1979, 
1982; Ginsberg, 1990; Kirk & Miller, 1986; Kvale, 1989a; LeCompte & Goetz, 
1982) as it is mainly dependent on the competence of the analysis process. 
Williamson (2002) suggests the use of triangulation, which encourages validation of 
interpretivist research findings by adding rigour, breadth and depth to the 
amalgamation, analysis and writing up of the data. This is achieved by using multiple 
methods and theoretical constructs; (1) the use of data triangulation which allows the 
researcher to access variety of data sources for the study, (2) the use of several 
different researchers and/or evaluators, (3) the adoption of multiple theories and/or 
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perspectives to interpret a single set of data and (4) undertaking multiple methods to 
study a single problem or phenomenon. 
May (2002) also states that the relationship of the researcher to the research is 
important since the researcher’s ability to interpret data sensibly and avoid reading 
too much or not enough into a situation will depend on firsthand experiences. 
Moreover, Liamputtong (2009) adds that it is crucial for qualitative researchers to 
have a good understanding of the methodology so that they can interpret data 
sensibly and with insight and not simply interpret data in the light of preconception 
and prejudice which has the potential to perpetrate unsatisfactory or inappropriate 
understandings of the phenomenon of interest. 
As this research was conducted in eHealth, an emerging field at the 
intersection of medical informatics and public health and information security, there 
was little literature about theoretical frameworks for use in this integrated field. Since 
this study was designed to decipher the true meaning of the legal texts, interpret them 
into a set of security requirements and build a framework to guide the development 
of a mobile ETP application in compliance with those security requirements, a 
combination of document analysis and repetitive/cyclic experimentation research 
approaches was employed.  
Bowen (2009) describes document analysis as a systematic procedure for 
reviewing or evaluating documents in textual or graphical forms that have been 
recorded without the researcher’s intervention. Similar to other analytical methods in 
qualitative research such as hermeneutics, document analysis method examines and 
interprets documents in various forms in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding 
and develop empirical knowledge (Bowen, 2009). However, unlike the hermeneutics 
approach, the interpretation using document analysis did not reflect the researcher’s 
perception of the phenomena transcending its textual meaning. Instead, using 
document analysis, the artefacts were examined and interpreted by the researcher to 
derive their genuine meaning relevant to the context of interest. 
In this study the document analysis research approach was used to derive the 
acceptance criteria (i.e. security requirements) via analysis and interpretation of the 
existing artefacts, namely the applicable laws, regulations and standards related to 
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electronic prescribing and dispensing, together with information security in the 
Australian healthcare industry. 
The data generation/collection phase involved extensive study and analysis of 
the applicable legislations, regulations and standards. However, this research 
extended the interpretation of artefacts to construct the relationships between the 
legal explanations and a practical understanding for real-life application. Manen 
(1990) suggests that there is no fixed set of methods to perform this type of study. 
Both the data generation and analysis processes used a document analysis circle 
method which mainly comprised skimming, reading and interpretation (Bowen, 
2009). By adding the process of “knowing the research context and finding relevant 
artefacts” to Bowen’s (2009) description of the document analysis method, Figure 
3.4 portrays the Document Analysis Circle for this particular research and is adopted 
from the Laverty’s (2003) depiction of the Hermeneutical Circle. 
Knowing context & finding materials
Skimming
Reading
Interpretation
 
Figure 3.4: Document Analysis Circle derived from Laverty’s (2003) Hermeneutical Circle 
Initially, the interpretations and conclusions drawn from this study were to be 
reviewed by the expert panel as part of the source triangulation process, involving 
cross-checking, for better reliability and validity, for consistency of information 
derived at different times and from different people. After much deliberation 
however, the use of the expert-panel for the triangulation and verification process 
was considered redundant since firstly, all the significant findings of the research 
were published in a series of four double-blinded peer-reviewed papers during the 
course of the research and secondly, because the research findings were reviewed by 
the internal supervisory panel of domain experts who were actively involved in the 
research context.  
The data collection and analysis phases for exploring the native security 
features and third-party tools on Android in fulfilling the security requirements were 
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designed using the iterative experimentations and reflection approach. Once the 
interpretation of the legal texts had been sufficiently conducted using the document 
analysis approach to identify the security requirements and construct the acceptance 
criteria, the rest of the research mainly involved a series of experimentations and 
reflection based upon the experimentation outcomes as to whether they satisfied the 
identified security requirements. 
In agreement with Maxwell (2005), who says “Sequential models are not a 
good fit for qualitative research, in which any components of the design may need to 
be reconsidered or modified during the study in response to new development or to 
changes in some other component”, the iterative experimentation and reflection 
approach employed for the rest of the research was very similar to the action research 
approach. For each security requirement identified, a series of potentially repetitive 
experimentations were conducted to explore and determine which candidate 
technology fulfilled the security requirement and complied with the constructed 
acceptance criteria. In a similar way action research is used to bring about change of 
practice while creating knowledge at the same time (Williamson, 2002) the selected 
iterative experimentation and reflection approach is employed for the exploratory 
research to bring about improvement of practice or to propose new solutions to 
practical problems. Figure 3.5 depicts the constituent elements of each experiment iteration 
for this research in a detailed form. 
 
Figure 3.5: Iterative Experimentation and Reflection Cycle 
McNiff and Whitehead (2002) define action research not as a set of concrete 
steps but as a process of learning from experience: a dialectical interplay between 
practice, reflection and learning. In a similar way, each iteration of the 
experimentation for this research explored the available options by learning further 
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details about the tools, technologies and features, conducting an experiment to verify 
its viability and finally reflecting whether the outcome is a suitable one for the 
specific security requirement, before proceeding to the next experimentation for 
another legislative/security requirement or repeating the iteration with necessary 
changes based on the lessons learnt and the experience gained. Similar to 
Williamson’s (2002) description of the typical action research cycles, these repetitive 
experimentations are employed in this research as a process through which findings 
and insight are generated in an explorative manner, since details of each iteration are 
seldom planned up-front and new insights and experience gained through 
experimentation and reflection may necessitate repeating the iteration. 
This approach is designed to be critically reflective, the need for reflection 
existing in times when current action did not produce the desired results and the 
change was needed (Williamson, 2002). However, unlike the extensive version of the 
action research approach, not much rigour was anticipated to be utilised in these 
iterations. All the research findings and conclusions drawn from this stage were also 
subject to review by the experts as part of the triangulation process (i.e. reviewed by 
the supervisory panel of domain experts). 
Every step of the analysis and derivation of conclusion from this entire 
research was designed and carried out with the utmost care as the strength of 
qualitative data mainly relies on the competence of the analysis process and iterative 
experimentation process. The analysis process was performed using the analysis 
matrix populated from answering the two Subsidiary Research Questions.  
Although referred to as analysis, the process actually consisted of three 
integrated activities: data reduction, conclusion-drawing and verification. Data 
reduction itself generally consisted of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting 
and transforming the data to assemble into the information required for conclusion-
drawing and other necessary actions. It also allowed the researcher to understand 
what was happening and enabled further actions based on that understanding. 
Conclusion-drawing and verification followed data analysis. Triangulation process 
was used to ensure the validity of qualitative data by means of experts testing its 
plausibility, sturdiness and conformability. Reviewing may take as little as a few 
seconds, while extensive conclusion-drawing required replicating the findings in 
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another data set. In all the expert review activities of the triangulation process the 
dialectics action research technique was exercised by welcoming disagreement as a 
way to generate better information and by achieving consensus through focusing on 
disagreement and its resolution (Williamson, 2002).  
3.4 Research Design 
This research focused on a specific facet of mobile health, that being the 
security of electronic prescription data on Android mobile devices, which in turn is a 
segment of the national eHealth program. Marshall and Rossman (1995) suggest that 
the Research Questions in qualitative research should be general enough to permit 
exploration but focused enough to delimit the study. Accordingly, the two supporting 
Research Questions were carefully designed so that they clearly defined the 
boundary of this research context while allowing exploration from different 
perspectives. In addition, for better segregation of the emphasis and in-depth 
understanding of the findings, all the studies and experimentations for this research 
were conducted from two perspectives: security of the prescription information from 
the perspectives of both data at rest and data in transit. 
As a result of the document analysis, the first supporting question derived a 
set of security requirements from the applicable national as well as eHealth-specific 
standards, laws and regulations for security of prescription information in Australia. 
This document analysis process also developed the practical understanding of the 
security requirements for real-life application from the legal explanation. The 
preliminary study identified that standards and publications such as “AS 4700.3-
2014”, “ATS 4888.1-2013 ~ ATS 4888.6-2013”, “AS 5550-2013”, “AS 5551-2013”, 
“AS 5552-2013”, “ATS 5546-2013”, “ATS 5822-2010” and “HB 308 2011” by 
Standards Australia will be emphasised in answering the first Subsidiary Research 
Question. In addition, other standards and publications from organisations and 
authority bodies such as the Australian Digital Health Agency (ADHA, previously 
NEHTA), International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), Health Level 7 
(HL7), Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE) and the International Health 
Terminology Standards Development Organisation (IHTDSDO) will also be 
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considered for their relevance to ETP implementation in the Australian healthcare 
industry.  
Subsequently, through a series of experimentations the second supporting 
question explored and verified the native encryption features of Android which could 
potentially fulfil the security requirements for the electronic prescription information 
from a data at rest perspective. The later iterations of the experiment explored and 
verified the candidate short-range wireless communication technologies such as NFC 
and Bluetooth for security assurance from the data in transit perspective while 
transferring the electronic prescriptions between the ETP participating devices (i.e. 
between the patient’s smart phone, prescriber’s EPS and pharmacy’s EDS). 
Despite an initial plan to use a panel of domain experts (i.e. external expert-
panel) for triangulation and verification of the research findings, the significant 
findings from different stages of the research were in fact published as a series of 
four double-blinded peer-reviewed papers. The first paper, published at the end of 
the preliminary study of the research, portrayed the current implementation of ETP 
and compared it against its full potential. It was published as the proceedings of the 
23rd Australian National Health Informatics Conference 2015. The second paper 
revealed the research findings on securing the electronic prescription information 
from the perspective of data at rest and compared how it is achieved in the current 
implementation using PES services against the proposed mobile alternative. This 
paper effectively covered the research findings of Experiment 1 and was published as 
the proceedings of the 4th Australian eHealth Informatics and Security Conference 
2015. The third paper focused on the security of electronic prescription information 
from the data in transit perspective and the comparison of how it was implemented in 
current ETP versus its implantation in the proposed mobile solution (i.e. using the 
potential candidate wireless communication technologies such as NFC and 
Bluetooth). This paper is in fact a summary of the research findings from 
Experiments 2 and 3. It was published as the proceedings of the Australasian 
Computer Science Week Multiconference 2017. The final published paper from this 
series presented the comparison between the current ETP and the proposed mobile 
alternative from a more holistic perspective, basically reflecting the “Discussion of 
Results” and “Conclusion” sections of this thesis. This last paper was published as 
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the proceedings of the 14th Australian Information Security Management Conference 
2016. 
Based on these research findings, the Primary Research Question was 
formulated to determine whether it is possible to create a framework for the 
development of an Android mobile electronic prescription transfer application in 
compliance with security requirements mandated by relevant standards, laws and 
regulations. 
This study reveals that such a framework can be built from the legislative and 
security perspectives and, as such, this developed framework could be used to guide 
the development of an Android mobile ETP application for the Australian healthcare 
industry, thereby creating a significant contribution towards the national eHealth 
program. The following diagram graphically depicts the scope and context of this 
research. 
 
Figure 3.6: Scope and context of the research 
The extensive document analysis and rigorous iterative experimentation and 
reflection derived from Williamson’s action research cycle were used for data 
collection and analysis processes, in conjunction with the triangulation process 
employing the dialectic action research method for verification and scrutiny from 
different perspectives before progressing further to the next step, iteration or final 
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conclusion (Williamson, 2002). The document analysis emphasised on the current 
established acts, regulations and standards and publications mainly produced by the 
Department of Health and Aging, NEHTA and Standards Australia. Data collection 
populated the analysis matrix with applicable security requirements and the 
candidate technologies (i.e. Android’s security features, NFC and Bluetooth) which 
would potentially fulfil those requirements. 
Data analysis surveyed the collected information against the essential criteria 
and measured the outcomes accordingly for synthesis and conclusion. The synthesis 
and conclusion process derived a framework to guide the development of an Android 
mobile ETP application in compliance with the security requirements or drew a 
conclusion as to why it cannot be achieved. The conclusions made from the previous 
iteration become part of the input for the next iteration. A rigorous internal review 
was conducted by the researcher and the thesis supervisors after every stage to ensure 
that the data collection, analysis and synthesis processes were carried out 
appropriately and that any necessary adjustments were applied. 
These data collection, analysis, synthesis and conclusion and review 
processes continued in an iterative manner within the defined context until the 
research had produced the final report. The following figure graphically depicts these 
iterative processes. 
 
 
Table 3.1 briefly describes how the data collection and analysis were 
performed for each research question during the iterative processes of the entire 
research. The principal supervisor's active involvement with national and 
2. Data 
analysis 
4. Synthesis & 
Conclusion 
3. Review 
(internal/expert) 
1. Data 
collection 
Figure 3.7: Conceptual framework derived from the iterative data collection and analysis model of Miles & 
Huberman (1994) 
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international digital health systems and eHealth standards, as well as the associate 
supervisor's extensive experience and knowledge in the clinical and health IT 
industry provided the researcher invaluable guidance, support and critical review 
throughout the learning journey. 
With access to such extensive knowledge and guidance the internal review 
process was effectively a triangulation and verification process for the research 
findings at every stage. 
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Table 3.1: Data collection and analysis for each research question 
Subsidiary Research Question 1 
 How can the security requirements, imposed by 
the relevant laws, regulations and standards in 
the Australian Healthcare system, be integrated 
into a framework for the assessment of mobile 
electronic prescription transfer applications? 
The procedures to be followed in this study are 
crudely depicted in Figure 3.9. 
Data collection method 
Analysis and synthesis of the applicable laws, 
regulations, standards and interpretations of 
those for the desired context. 
Participants in data collection 
Researcher 
Data analysis method 
Extensive reviews and research by researcher 
and then followed by an internal review by the 
thesis supervisors who are also domain experts. 
Participants in data analysis and 
review (triangulation process) 
Researcher and then followed by an internal 
review by the thesis supervisors (domain/area 
experts). 
Recruitment process 
Not applicable/necessary. 
Subsidiary Research Question 2 
How can the assessment criteria framework 
(from subsidiary research question 1) be used in 
assessing the native security features and third-
party tools on the ANDROID for the security 
compliance of mobile electronic prescription 
transfer applications? 
The procedures to be followed in this study are 
roughly depicted in Figure 3.10. 
Data collection method 
Conduct the experiment with knowledge from 
reading books, research papers and technical 
discussion forums of relevant areas. 
Participants in data collection 
Researcher 
Data analysis method 
Performing experiments using appropriate tools 
for each security requirements documented then 
followed by an internal review by the thesis 
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supervisors who are also domain experts. 
Participants in data analysis and 
review (triangulation process) 
Researcher and then followed by an internal 
review by the thesis supervisors (domain/area 
experts). 
Recruitment process 
Not applicable/necessary. 
Main research question 
Can a technical framework be constructed to 
serve as a guide for development of ANDROID 
mobile electronic prescription transfer 
applications in compliance with security 
requirements mandated by the Australian 
Healthcare laws, regulations and standards? 
The procedures involved in this study are 
roughly depicted in Figure 3.8. 
Data collection method 
Populating the analysis matrices (i.e. Table 4.1, 
4.2 and 7.1) with the research findings from 
subsidiary question #1 and #2. 
Participants in data collection 
Researcher 
Data analysis method 
Analyse the contents of the analysis/compliance 
matrices collated by the two subsidiary research 
questions. 
Participants in data analysis and 
review (triangulation process) 
Researcher and then followed by an internal 
review by the thesis supervisors (domain/area 
experts). 
Recruitment process 
Not applicable/necessary. 
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Explore and identify all the relevant Acts, regulations, standards and 
publications for the security of electronic prescription information by 
the Australian Digital Health Agency (formerly NEHTA), Standards 
Australia, Department of Health, the Pharmacy Guild and other relevant 
authority bodies in Australian Healthcare Indistry
Analyse each relevant laws, regulations and standards in the Australian 
Healthcare industry for transfer of electronic prescription (eTP)
Examine the security features/tools on Android platform against the 
security requirements and assessment criteria for transfer of electronic 
prescription (eTP)
Derive/Create a technical framework or a guide for development of 
Android mobile electronic prescription transfer applications
Reviewed
(Supervisory expert review)
Require
Adjustment 
 
Figure 3.8: Building a framework for examining Android mobile electronic prescription transfer 
applications for compliance with security requirements 
Figure 3.8 is a high-level depiction of the overall process of the entire 
research. It began with a preliminary study which explored and identified the 
relevant acts, regulations and standards of and publications by the relevant authority 
bodies in the Australian healthcare industry for the security of electronic prescription 
information. The draft of the analysis matrix template, which was later finalised and 
populated by the studies answering the supporting questions 1 and 2 (Figure 3.9 and 
Figure 3.10), was also designed as part this stage. The first study (Figure 3.9) 
translated the acts, regulations and standards into security requirements and its 
findings populated the analysis matrices. Through a series of repetitive experiments 
and reflections, the second study explored and examined the security features of the 
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candidate technologies (i.e. Android platform’s encryption, security of NFC and 
Bluetooth) for security requirements translated from a plethora of acts, regulations 
and standards in the previous study. The outcomes of this examination were recorded 
in the analysis matrices for the final assessment. Based on the content of these 
matrices, the final research conclusion was drawn and a framework was derived if 
the study revealed that it was viable as well as practical. The review process at the 
end of this stage may also result in additional iterations, potentially starting from any 
stage of the study. 
Selection of applicable Acts, regulations and standards on the 
security for the transfer of electronic prescription (eTP)
Study/Examine each
Interpret into security requirements and 
construct the acceptance criteria for each 
requirement
Populate the analysis matrix with research 
findings (i.e. security requirements)
Analysis Matrix collation
and supervisory review
Repeat for each
Require
Adjustment 
  
Figure 3.9: Constructing the technical/security requirements and acceptance criteria 
As depicted in Figure 3.9, this study began with the selection of applicable 
acts, regulations and standards related to the security for the transfer of electronic 
prescription in the Australian healthcare industry. Each selected act, regulation and 
standard was examined in detail and interpreted into a set of security requirements, 
which in turn formed the acceptance criteria for later experimentation and analysis 
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stages. This study populated the analysis matrices with its findings, and the same 
process was repeated for all the rest of the selected acts, regulations and standards. 
The review process at the end of this study could potentially lead to further iterations 
with certain adjustments. Based on the required adjustment and the ground for the 
repetition, the next iteration may start from any step within this stage of the study. 
Selection of features/tools on Android platform which potentially 
fulfil the security requirements identified in the prior stage of the 
research
Conduct the experimentation
Can be tested?
Analysis Matrix collation and supervisory review
Assess whether the experimentation outcomes satisfy the security 
requirement and comply with the acceptance criteria
Comply?
Populate the analysis matrix with 
the failed test outcome
Populate the analysis matrix with 
the successful test result
Y
N
Y N
Study/Examine each
Determine whether the feature/tool can be tested
Require
Adjustment 
Repeat for each
Repeat?
Y
N
  
Figure 3.10: Examining the security and privacy features/tools on Android platform 
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This study started with the selection of security features of the candidate 
technologies (i.e. Android’s encryption capability and security of NFC and 
Bluetooth) which would potentially fulfil the security requirements for the transfer of 
electronic prescription as identified in the previous study. Each feature was then 
studied for further details to determine whether it could be tested. When the study 
revealed that it could not be tested, this failed outcome was recorded in the analysis 
matrices. When the study proved that it was testable, an experimentation was 
conducted to verify whether the selected feature satisfied the security requirement 
(i.e. complied with the acceptance criteria) and whether its application was practical 
for the industry. Depending on the experimentation outcome from both viability and 
practicality perspectives, another iteration of the investigation was repeated with the 
necessary changes. At the end of the potentially iterative experimentation the 
outcome was recorded in the analysis matrices for later analysis and derivation of the 
framework. 
This process was repeated for each security requirement identified in the prior 
study. As previously, the review process at the end of this study would potentially 
lead to further iterations with certain adjustments. 
3.5 Equipment or Apparatus 
Internet access was critical for the research, as was unlimited access to the 
related standards and regulations and local and federal laws of the Government and 
relevant authority bodies. This included access to the departmental libraries, 
document archives and repositories. 
As part of the hardware requirements, experiments conducted for this 
research required a computer running Windows 8.1 with decent hardware 
configuration (e.g. Intel i5 or equivalent processor, 4 GB RAM with 256 GB HDD), 
and a smartphone with Android OS version 4.0 or higher with NFC and Bluetooth 
capabilities. In addition, a generic (i.e. no manufacturer-specific) NFC card reader 
with USB connection and a generic (i.e. no manufacturer-specific) Bluetooth USB 
dongle or a laptop with Bluetooth capabilities were also mandatory for the 
experiments involved.  
Research Thesis - 70 of 269 
 
At this point in time, no other associated cost anticipated such as licenses and 
subscription fees. 
3.6 Procedure 
The research to address Subsidiary Research Question 1 commenced after research 
ethics was granted. This was followed by a supervisory expert review to verify and 
validate the outcome from this phase.  Similarly, for Subsidiary Research Question 2, 
the outcome was subjected to review a by supervisory expert panel to ensure the 
outcome was relevant and appropriate for progression to the next phase of the 
research. Based on these outcomes, the assessment was performed against the 
acceptance criteria as part of the iterative experimentation and reflection, and the 
conclusion drawn on whether it was possible to build a framework for development 
of electronic prescription transfer applications on Android platform in compliance 
with the security requirements of the Australian healthcare industry. This conclusion 
was also reviewed and validated by the supervisory expert panel for necessary 
adjustments. If the final conclusion, verified by supervisory expert panel, reveals that 
such a framework can be built, a working framework will be produced, representing 
substantial contribution towards the national eHealth program.  
During the course of the study, these supervisory expert panel reviews and 
feedback processes were planned as part of the fortnightly meeting. The materials 
and outcomes were reviewed and emailed to the supervisors prior to the scheduled 
meeting. When any disagreement occurred as part of the meeting’s dialectic 
triangulation process, it was decided that the supervisors’ feedback was to be 
incorporated back into the study before the next round of experiment.  
For each stage, a set of applicable acceptance criteria for assessing the 
outcome was prepared prior to the data collection and analysis. Where applicable, the 
assessment metrics and mechanisms were measured and defined, as they have 
significant impact on the outcomes and accuracy of the analysis and review 
processes. During the study, each review process could result in further repetitions 
and this iterative process was governed using the methodology of repetitive 
experimentation and reflection. 
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In each repetition of the experiment, the necessary adjustments were applied 
before continuing with another round of iteration and review. Depending on the 
context of the experimentation and the required adjustments, some repetitions took 
different approaches to those in prior repetitions and were not pre-planned or 
designed up front (as in Williamson’s description of the typical action research 
cycles in 2002). These reviews were designed to examine not only the collected data 
and synthesised product but also the assessment metrics and criteria within the 
context, such as the legislative and regulatory requirements and mobile security. 
In order to divide the research into manageable components, investigations 
for both Subsidiary Research Questions 1 and 2 were carried out from two different 
security perspectives: (1) security of the electronic prescription information at rest 
and (2) security of the electronic prescription information in transit. All the research 
outcomes from exploring and identifying the mandatory security requirements (i.e. 
derived from a plethora of acts, regulations and Standard) and how to fulfil them (i.e. 
technically on the Android platform) were assessed from these two security 
perspectives. Figure 3.11 shows how the security measures for prescription 
information in the current electronic prescription transfer model were categorised 
into these two security perspectives. 
eRx script exchange / MediSecure Script vault
Rx details
Data at rest
Data at rest Data at rest
Data in
transit
Data in
transit
 
Figure 3.11: Current ETP model from security of data at rest and in transit perspectives 
Given that the research context is not only highly regulated but also highly 
proprietary, this research investigated how these two aspects of security are 
implemented in the existing implementation, for example how acts and regulations 
are complied with, how standards are implemented and how security mechanisms are 
employed. The research then explored and verified how these implementations could 
be achieved on the proposed Android platform (i.e. using its native security features, 
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existing technologies and third-party tools) with a short-range wireless 
communication technology. Figure 3.12 depicts the roadmap of this research, its 
results, the papers produced from the research findings and the frameworks 
constructed. 
Literature review
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and standards
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data at rest
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Figure 3.12: Research roadmap 
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3.7 Data analysis 
Using qualitative research methods, a significant amount of analysis activity 
was implicitly involved in the data collection for both Subsidiary Research 
Questions. The study for Subsidiary Research Question 1 analysed the applicable 
acts, regulations and standards and transformed these legal explanations into a set of 
practical understanding and security requirements. 
The second Subsidiary Research Question involved analysing the 
experimentation outcomes on the Android’s native security features and short-range 
wireless communication technologies (i.e. NFC and Bluetooth) which potentially 
fulfil the security requirements. The review process validated the study outcomes by 
triangulation at the end of each study. During the triangulation process (i.e. expert 
supervisory review) for each study, the collected data, applicable assessment metrics 
and derived essential criteria were reviewed. The feedback from this review was then 
incorporated back into the study, which resulted in either making necessary 
adjustments prior to the next iteration of experiment or proceeding to the next stage 
of the study. 
Table 3.1 depicted the generic template format of the analysis matrices (i.e. 
Table 4.1, 4.2 and 7.1) which were populated by the research findings from the two 
studies involving Subsidiary Research Questions 1 and 2. The “Feature or usage”, 
“Jurisdiction”, “Governing regulations, standards & specifications” columns of the 
Table 4.1, 4.2 and 7.1 were populated by the research findings from answering 
Subsidiary Research Question 1. In addition, findings from Subsidiary Research 
Question 1 also populated the "Requirements mandated and impact on proposed fully 
electronic prescribing process" and "Jurisdiction’s readiness for the fully electronic 
ETP solution" columns of the Table 4.1, and “Security requirements mandated” 
column of the Table 4.2. 
Investigations for Subsidiary Research Question 2 were then conducted for 
each of these security requirements recorded in Table 4.2. The “Technology 
conforming to the mandated requirement” column of the Table 7.1 contains the 
research findings from a series of iterative investigations, as well as experimentation 
outcomes fulfilling the mandated requirements identified in the prior stage of the 
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research (i.e. the investigation to answer the Subsidiary Research Question 1). These 
iterative investigations and experimentations also examined the practicality of the 
outcomes from development, deployment and operational perspectives. 
The researcher then performed the analysis based on the holistic knowledge 
and understanding acquired from these studies. Once the supervisory expert review 
panel had verified the analysis outcome and the conclusion drawn, a framework was 
constructed to guide the development of an Android mobile ETP application in 
compliance with security requirements of the Australian healthcare industry. Once 
again, this synthesised product was also subjected to review by the supervisory 
expert panel for further adjustment. 
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Table 3.2: Template of the Analysis matrix 
No Feature or usage Jurisdiction 
Governing regulations, 
standards & specifications 
Requirements mandated and 
impact on proposed fully 
electronic prescribing process 
(or) 
Security requirements mandated 
Jurisdiction’s readiness for the 
fully electronic ETP solution 
(or) 
Technology conforming to the 
mandated requirement 
 (1) Legislative and regulatory requirements 
1 … … … … … 
2 … … … … … 
 Section (1): Security requirements for electronic prescription from data at rest perspective 
3 … … … … … 
4 … … … … … 
 Section (2): Security requirements for electronic prescription from data in transit perspective 
5 … … … … … 
6 … … … … … 
 
Research Thesis - 76 of 269 
3.8 Limitations 
Conducted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Professional Doctorate 
Degree in Information Technology (DIT), this thesis inherently focuses less intensely 
on the research aspect so as to emphasise making a difference in the workplace 
and/or profession via directing and informing change (“Difference between 
Academic and Professional Doctorate Degrees”, 2017; “Professional Doctorates”, 
n.d.), as well as the practicality of the research outcome. The shorter allocated 
timeframe for the research element in the DIT course (i.e. 1.5 years for DIT 
compared to 4 years for PhD) certainly imposed some limits on various aspects of 
the research process as a whole compared to those of the PhD research thesis.  
Another limitation is the precision of the research outcomes, which can only 
be as accurate as the assessment metrics allows. If the research conclusion had 
showed that a framework cannot be built to guide the development of an Android 
mobile ETP application in compliance with security requirements, synthesising a 
custom security mechanism was not within the scope of this research. Moreover, this 
research was not designed to be flexible enough to accommodate provision for future 
changes in the technologies used in the proposed model or amendments in the 
relevant laws, regulations and standards. Another significant limitation of this 
research is that it provides no insight into the potential use of iOS despite its large 
consumer base comparable to Android OS. 
This research did not explore its potential impacts and usefulness beyond the 
Australian Healthcare Industry despite its prospective applicability in countries with 
ETP capability. The research findings of Subsidiary Research Question 1 only 
concerned the current acts, regulations, standards and publications issued by the 
Department of Health and Aging (DoHA), the Australian Digital Health Agency 
(ADHA previously NEHTA) and Standards Australia. Although the research 
findings of Subsidiary Research Question 1 are generally applicable to any fully 
electronic prescription transfer applications in the Australian healthcare industry, 
both Subsidiary Research Question 2 and the Primary Research Question strictly 
intended to explore the Android’s native security features and other candidate 
technologies which were currently available on the market, and to build a framework 
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using those features and technologies. Despite the widespread use of the prior 
versions of Android Operating System (OS) on the market, the exploration and 
experimentations for Subsidiary Research Question 2 were only concerned with the 
Android OS version 4.0 or later.  
In addition to the abovementioned limitations specific to this particular study, 
there were also limitations inherited from the chosen research methodology. Some 
inherent limitations due to being a qualitative research are: 
❖ The credibility and quality of the research findings may be limited by the 
competence of the analysis process (Dawson, 1979, 1982; Ginsberg, 1990; Kirk 
& Miller, 1986; Kvale, 1989a; LeCompte & Goetz, 1982). 
❖ The relationship of the researcher to the research may limit the researcher’s 
ability to interpret data meaningfully (May, 2002). 
❖ The credibility and quality of the research conclusions may be influenced by the 
distinct possibility of researcher bias (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
This research was initially designed to address these limitations by employing 
the triangulation process using a panel of external/independent domain experts at the 
end of each stage. However, having two research supervisors with active 
involvement in the research context (i.e. one actively involved with both national and 
international digital health systems and eHealth standards, the other with extensive 
experience and knowledge in clinical and health IT industry) rendered the need for 
such expert panel redundant. 
The research findings at the end of each stage were therefore verified by the 
internal “supervisory expert review” process before proceeding to the next stage. 
Furthermore, the final outcomes were also reviewed by the supervisory panel of 
domain experts in order to strengthen the credibility or value of the research’s 
outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH RESULTS AND PROPOSED 
SOLUTION 
4.1 Overview  
This chapter begins by presenting the research findings from the analysis of 
the various jurisdictions’ legislation and standards conducted for Subsidiary 
Research Question 1. Subsequently, and based upon the knowledge gathered from 
the second chapter, Literature Review, this fourth chapter proposes a potential 
alternative solution to the current ETP implementation (i.e. the mobile electronic 
prescription transfer application on Android smartphone) and, more so, sought 
additional details on the technologies involved in the proposed solution for further 
assessment. 
This chapter presents the research findings in an extended form, although a 
significant part of the chapter’s content has been published in a more concise form 
through four papers listed in Appendix-A (i.e. published in chronological order). 
4.2 Research Results 
This research found that although the Commonwealth Electronic Transaction 
Acts 1999 and those jurisdictional Electronic Transaction Acts at the various state 
and territory levels enable the use of electronic means in general, they do not directly 
impose or mandate any specific requirements on the electronic prescribing process. 
Both Table 4.1 and 4.2 list the research outcomes in a consolidated form for 
verification via potentially iterative experimentations. 
The analysis of the experiments subsequently promoted the derivation of a 
conclusion and ultimately led to the development of the framework. All the research 
outcomes listed in these two matrices were categorised into three groups as listed 
below: 
(1) Each jurisdiction’s readiness for the fully electronic ETP solution 
(Table 4.1) 
(2) Security requirements for electronic prescription from the data at rest 
perspective 
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(3) Security requirements for electronic prescription from the data in transit 
perspective (Table 4.2)  
Based on the research findings for Subsidiary Research Question 1, various 
acts, regulations and standards influencing the use of electronic prescription and how 
they affected the use of a fully electronic prescribing system (i.e. jurisdictions’ 
regulatory readiness for fully electronic prescription) were listed in the Table 4.1. 
The research findings from Subsidiary Research Question 1 also populated 
the first four columns (from left to right) of Table 4.2. In fact, the fourth column of 
Table 4.2 recorded the security requirements for electronic prescription information 
translated from those regulatory mandates by this research. Fundamentally, this 
defined the acceptance criteria or the minimal security requirements for the proposed 
mobile prescription transfer model. The last column of Table 4.2 documents the 
outcomes from the further research and iterative experimentations conducted for 
answering Subsidiary Research Question 2. 
Effectively, these documented experimentation outcomes were to indicate 
which candidate technology and third-party tools would comply with the security 
requirements listed in the fourth column of Table 4.2 (i.e. security requirements 
translated/derived from the regulatory mandates).     
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Table 4.1: Analysis matrix of each jurisdiction’s readiness for fully electronic ETP solution 
No. Feature or usage Jurisdiction 
Governing regulations, 
standards & specifications 
Requirements mandated and 
impact on proposed fully 
electronic prescribing process 
Jurisdiction’s readiness for the 
fully electronic ETP solution 
1 Use of electronic 
prescription 
Western 
Australia 
Poisons Regulation 1965 
32A, 32B and Appendix K 
This enables the use of fully 
electronic prescribing process 
Ready for proposed fully 
electronic solution 
2 Use of electronic 
prescription 
Queensland Health (Drugs and Poisons) 
Regulation 1996 
82 (1)(b), 193 and 197 (2) 
This enables the use of fully 
electronic prescribing process 
Ready for proposed fully 
electronic solution 
3 Use of electronic 
prescription 
New South 
Wales 
Poisons and Therapeutic Goods 
Regulation 2008 
35 (2)(b) and 80 (2)(b) 
This enables the use of fully 
electronic prescribing process 
Ready for proposed fully 
electronic solution 
4 Use of electronic 
prescription 
Australian 
Capital 
Territory 
Medicines, Poisons and 
Therapeutic Goods Regulation 
2008 
The “Note” part of the section 40 
No special mention on the use of 
electronic system 
Ready for proposed fully 
electronic solution 
5 Use of electronic 
prescription 
Victoria Drugs, Poisons and Controlled 
Substances Regulations 2006 
26 (1)(b) 
This enables the use of fully 
electronic prescribing process 
Ready for proposed fully 
electronic solution 
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No. Feature or usage Jurisdiction 
Governing regulations, 
standards & specifications 
Requirements mandated and 
impact on proposed fully 
electronic prescribing process 
Jurisdiction’s readiness for the 
fully electronic ETP solution 
6 Use of electronic 
prescription. 
South Australia Controlled Substances (Poisons) 
Regulations 2011 33 (5) 
This enables the use of fully 
electronic prescribing process 
Ready for proposed fully 
electronic solution 
7 Use of electronic 
prescription 
Northern 
Territory 
Medicines, Poisons and 
Therapeutic Goods Regulation 
The section “Note for Division 1” 
This enables the use of fully 
electronic prescribing process 
Ready for proposed fully 
electronic solution 
8 Use of electronic 
prescription. 
Tasmania Poisons Regulations 2008 
16 (1) and (2) 
 
This enables the use of fully 
electronic prescribing process 
Ready for proposed fully 
electronic solution 
9 Implies prescriber's 
hand-written signature 
not required in 
electronic prescription 
Western 
Australia 
Poisons Regulation 1965 
Schedule 4: 37. (1A) (1B)  
Schedule 8: 51. (1A) (1B) and 
(1C) 
This enables the use of fully 
electronic prescribing process 
Ready for proposed fully 
electronic solution 
10 Implies prescriber's 
hand-written signature 
is not required in 
electronic prescription 
 
Queensland Health (Drugs and Poisons) 
Regulation 1996 
79 (7) and 190 (5) 
This enables the use of fully 
electronic prescribing process 
Ready for proposed fully 
electronic solution 
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No. Feature or usage Jurisdiction 
Governing regulations, 
standards & specifications 
Requirements mandated and 
impact on proposed fully 
electronic prescribing process 
Jurisdiction’s readiness for the 
fully electronic ETP solution 
11 Implies prescriber's 
hand-written signature 
is not required in 
electronic prescription 
South Australia Controlled Substances (Poisons) 
Regulations 2011 
33 (5) and 34 (3) 
This enables the use of fully 
electronic prescribing process 
Ready for proposed fully 
electronic solution 
12 Implies prescriber's 
hand-written signature 
is not required in 
electronic prescription 
Tasmania Poisons Regulations 2008 
16 (5) 
This enables the use of fully 
electronic prescribing process 
Ready for proposed fully 
electronic solution 
13 Prescriber’s signature 
is required. 
New South 
Wales 
Poisons and Therapeutic Goods 
Regulation 2008 
35 (2) and 80 (2) 
Unless there is regulatory change 
for the use of electronic/digital 
signature in prescriptions, this 
requirement prevents the use of 
fully electronic prescription 
May require regulatory change 
as the regulation requires 
prescriber’s signature. But it 
neither explicitly approves the 
use electronic/digital signature 
nor exempt electronic 
prescription from requiring 
written signature. 
14 Prescriber’s signature 
is required. 
Australian 
Capital 
Territory 
Medicines, Poisons and 
Therapeutic Goods Regulation 
2008 
40 (a) and the “Note” part of the 
Unless there is regulatory change 
for the use of electronic/digital 
signature in prescriptions, this 
requirement prevents the use of 
May require regulatory change 
as the regulation requires 
prescriber’s signature. But it 
neither explicitly approves the 
use electronic/digital signature 
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No. Feature or usage Jurisdiction 
Governing regulations, 
standards & specifications 
Requirements mandated and 
impact on proposed fully 
electronic prescribing process 
Jurisdiction’s readiness for the 
fully electronic ETP solution 
section 40 (a) fully electronic prescription nor exempt electronic 
prescription from requiring 
written signature. 
15 Prescriber’s signature 
is required. 
Victoria Drugs, Poisons and Controlled 
Substances Regulations 2006 
26 (3)(d) 
Unless there is regulatory change 
for the use of electronic/digital 
signature in prescriptions, this 
requirement prevents the use of 
fully electronic prescription 
May require regulatory change 
as the regulation requires 
prescriber’s signature. But it 
neither explicitly approves the 
use electronic/digital signature 
nor exempt electronic 
prescription from requiring 
written signature. 
16 Prescriber’s signature 
is required. 
Northern 
Territory 
Medicines, Poisons and 
Therapeutic Goods Regulation 
8. (m) 
Unless there is regulatory change 
for the use of electronic/digital 
signature in prescriptions, this 
requirement prevents the use of 
fully electronic prescription 
May require regulatory change 
as the regulation requires 
prescriber’s signature. But it 
neither explicitly approves the 
use electronic/digital signature 
nor exempt electronic 
prescription from requiring 
written signature. 
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Table 4.2: Analysis matrix of Security requirements for electronic prescription information 
No. Feature or usage Jurisdiction 
Governing regulations, 
standards & specifications 
Security requirements mandated  
Technology conforming to the 
mandated requirement 
 Section (1): Security requirements for electronic prescription from data at rest perspective 
1 Encryption of the 
electronic prescription 
Nationwide ATS 4888.2-2013 
section 5.3.6 
The electronic prescription is to be 
encrypted using a symmetric key 
derived from DAK 
? 
2 Saving the DAK and 
any of its derived keys 
on any permanent 
storage 
Nationwide ATS 4888.2-2013 
section 7.3.3 
Minimum of 128 bit encryption for 
storing DAK or any of its derived 
keys on any stable storage 
? 
3 HL7 message structure 
for electronic 
prescription 
Nationwide AS 4700.3-2014 Mandated HL7 message structure 
for the electronic prescription 
? 
 Section (2): Security requirements for electronic prescription from data in transit perspective 
4 Security of electronic 
prescription 
Nationwide ATS 4888.2-2013 
section 5.3.5 
Security of data in transit between 
ETP service participants are 
specific to the implementation 
‘platform’ 
? 
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From the legislative and regulatory perspectives, this research revealed that 
although the use of electronic prescription was supported in all jurisdictions, the use 
of electronic/digital signature for the electronic prescription in place of prescriber’s 
written signature was neither explicitly approved nor prohibited in ACT, NSW, VIC 
and NT. 
These states’ regulations mandated that the prescriber’s signature be present 
on the prescription but did not specify whether it has to be a handwritten signature or 
electronic/digital signature of the prescriber. Since the current ETP implementation 
also produces the printed prescriptions, serving dual-purpose as a legal prescription 
document as well as a transfer mechanism for DAK from the prescriber to the 
dispenser (i.e. serving as the printed prescription notification), the presence of the 
prescriber’s written signature on the printed prescription also legalises it by 
complying with these regulatory requirements. However, once it has been converted 
to a fully electronic prescribing process it would be impossible to accommodate the 
prescriber’s written signature, necessitating minor amendments/modification to the 
regulation before transitioning to the fully electronic prescribing process.  
Despite the mixed results obtained (i.e. non-definitive outcomes for the 
presence of prescriber’s signature in written/digital format) from Subsidiary 
Research Question 1 (i.e. from the legislative and regulatory perspectives), the 
experimentations conducted for Subsidiary Research Question 2 revealed that the 
proposed mobile solution complied with all the security requirements mandated by 
the existing standards and specifications governing the current ETP implementation. 
In addition, while the proposed mobile solution (any fully electronic 
prescribing process in this case) does not fully adhere to some jurisdictions’ 
regulatory mandates for the presence of the prescriber’s signature, the Electronic 
Transaction Act recognises and approves alternative ways to use written signature in 
identifying a person and indicating the approval of the information 
contained/communicated (“The Electronic Transactions Act 1999”, n.d.). 
Therefore, this research was justified and hence proceeded further by 
proposing a cheaper, if not completely cost-free, fully electronic prescription transfer 
solution with comparable security assurance (i.e. comparable to the current ETP 
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implementation using PES systems) which utilised the patient’s Android smartphone 
as an alternative secured transfer medium. 
4.3 The proposed alternative solution using Android smartphones 
The Electronic Transactions Act 1999 primarily supports the creation, 
transfer and storage of the electronic prescription, amendments 51(1A), 51(1B) and 
51(1C) of the Poisons Regulations 1965 for Western Australia effectively allows an 
electronic prescription to be a legal document without the prescriber’s written 
signature when issued electronically. These two amendments, combined with other 
changes in the governance of the Commonwealth, states and territories to enable 
eHealth, are sufficient to support an ETP Level 3 model.  
 
Figure 4.1: Proposed fully-electronic mobile prescription transfer process (Htat, Williams, & 
McCauley, 2015) 
In the proposed fully electronic mobile prescription transfer model, the EPS 
generates an electronic prescription, encrypts it using the DAK as per the data 
security conformance guidelines in ATS4888.2, encrypts the DAK with the 128-bit 
symmetric encryption and then transfers it to the patient’s mobile device (i.e. 
Android smartphone) through a wireless connectivity using either NFC or Bluetooth. 
The encrypted electronic prescription is stored on the mobile device (i.e. the 
patient’s or agent’s Android smartphone) in the same way in which it is stored within 
the PES in the current prescribing model. When the mobile device is presented at the 
pharmacy by the patient/agent, the encrypted prescription, together with the DAK, is 
transferred to the pharmacy system. The prescription is then decrypted by the 
pharmacy system using the DAK. This proposed fully electronic mobile ETP transfer 
model bypasses the PES entirely by using the mobile device as the transfer medium 
for the electronic prescription. 
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Once the medication has been dispensed, the pharmacy’s EDS uploads the 
dispensing information into the NPDR. In this proposed mobile ETP model the 
prescription is issued and transferred in fully-electronic form, thus being exempted 
from the requirement to have the prescriber’s written signature in accordance with 
the various acts and regulations governing the Poisons and Therapeutic Goods for 
each jurisdiction (e.g. section 51(1A), 51(1B) and 51(1C) of the Poisons Regulations 
1965 in Western Australia).  
This proposed ETP transfer model supports ETP adoption Level 3 as long as 
there is a fully electronic mechanism to securely transfer the electronic prescription 
from the prescriber’s EPS to the mobile storage device and from the mobile storage 
device to the dispenser’s EDS. This proposed mobile ETP model is envisaged to use 
Near Field Communication (NFC) or Bluetooth technology as the alternative 
prescription transfer mechanism. 
NFC was designed for use in close proximity (i.e. up to a few centimetres) for 
secure data transfer and supports strong security features that facilitate the highly 
secure transfer and storage of data. The NFC technology’s reliability and practicality 
is evident by its use in the banking industry, including its use by the Commonwealth 
Bank for its product, Tap & Pay. Nevertheless, this preference of employing NFC for 
data transfer was not solely based on the technical viability but also on the consumer 
acceptance of and confidence in the technology. NFC’s simplicity from a user 
perspective enables easy information sharing and NFC is now enabled on the 
majority of recent model mobile phones by various manufacturers (“NFC phones: 
The definitive list”, 2016). 
Bluetooth, on the other hand, is a mature, short-range wireless 
communication technology with widespread support from almost all mobile phone 
manufacturers and with many applications in the healthcare industry ("Medical & 
Health", 2017; "Mobile Phones & Smart Phones", 2017). With the advent of 
Bluetooth Low Energy (Bluetooth LE) in recent years, it has extended its application 
to millions of medical devices and countless Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices 
(“Bluetooth”, 2016). As the global standard enabling the IoT by assuring the 
connectivity between various devices from various industries (ibid), it is also a strong 
candidate technology for the proposed mobile ETP model. 
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In the current hybrid ETP model, the PES makes uploaded prescriptions 
available to dispensers and also prevents access to prescriptions which have been 
cancelled, expired or fully dispensed. For the latter purpose, PES updates the 
dispensing state of each prescription after each dispense. 
In the proposed model, the smartphone utilised as the mobile storage device 
makes the prescription available to the dispenser and then the dispensing state of the 
prescription is updated by the dispenser’s EDS directly to the mobile storage device. 
Due to the connectionless nature of the proposed model, cancelling the prescription 
by the prescriber will require use of an additional service such as SMS to remotely 
update the dispensing state of the prescriptions stored on the smartphone. 
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Figure 4.2: Sharing of patient’s medication history in proposed solution 
As described in Figure 4.2, this proposed mobile ETP application also 
functions as a mobile repository of the patient’s medication history, thus making it 
available to hospitals and other healthcare service providers once the interface for 
integrating this mobile solution with the hospital information systems and clinical 
information systems has been implemented. This interface will allow direct transfer 
of the patient’s full medication history from the patient’s smartphone to the 
Research Thesis - 89 of 269 
hospital/clinical information system. Such access to the patient’s complete 
medication history would be of tremendous clinical advantage to the healthcare 
professionals in delivering better quality of care, substantially benefiting both 
patients and the healthcare providers. 
Further assessments to determine whether this proposed mobile ETP solution 
complies with the mandated security requirements for electronic prescription will 
require further detailed investigations and potentially iterative experimentations on 
the security measures and the governing standards of the potential candidate 
technologies such as the Android operating system’s encryption capability (Chapter 
5), NFC (sections 6.1~2 of Chapter 6) and Bluetooth wireless communication 
(sections 6.4~6 of Chapter 6). 
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Figure 4.3: Proposed solution from security of data at rest and in transit perspectives 
Whilst Table 4.2 of this chapter listed the mandatory security requirements 
constructed from answering Subsidiary Research Question 1 and section 4.3 
proposed an alternative mobile ETP solution, the two subsequent chapters (Chapter 5 
and Chapter 6) assess the technologies used in the proposed solution against those 
identified security requirements and will determine whether it complies with the 
same regulatory requirements as the current ETP implementation. In the same way 
that the security of the prescription information in the current ETP implementation 
was assessed, security of the prescription information in the proposed solution will 
also be evaluated from the very same security perspectives; the security of the 
prescription information at rest and the security of the prescription information in 
transit. 
Figure 4.3 depicts how the proposed solution can be divided into different 
sectors and assesses the security measures from the perspectives of both data at rest 
and data in transit. 
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CHAPTER 5. SECURITY OF THE DATA AT REST 
5.1 Android Native Security  
The investigation conducted in this section studied details of the Android 
OS’s architecture, process and security model and its potentials as a candidate 
technology for the proposed mobile ETP solution. This section also identified the 
possible issues associated with Android for the proposed mobile ETP solution. 
5.1.1 A brief history and overview 
Android is arguably the world most popular mobile operating system 
platform, rapidly taking the world by storm from its first release in 2009. It is the OS 
which oddly names each release after sweets and tasty desserts in an alphabetical 
order. Its market share in Australia from 2013 to 2017 is depicted in Figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1: Market share by smartphone OS in Australia 2013-2017 (“Market share held by 
smartphone operating systems in Australia from 2013 to 2017”, 2018) 
Despite its choice of sweet names for each release, Android ruthlessly 
conquered the world of mobile operating systems with rigour, as is evident in Figure 
5.1. 
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The Android Inc. of Palo Alto, California, was founded in 2003 by four 
young computing experts, Andy Rubin, Rich Miner, Nick Sears and Chris White, 
with the initial intention to develop an operating system for mobile devices, such as 
digital cameras, which would be aware of both a user’s location and their personal 
preferences (Callaham, 2017). The focus was later shifted to cellular phones as they 
realised that only targeting digital cameras would have a potentially low demand 
(Brachmann, 2014). 
In 2005, Android Inc. was procured by Google as part of its venture into 
mobile operating platforms (ibid).  Foundation of the Open Handset Alliance (OHA) 
by Google in 2005 was one of the primary forces behind Android’s rapid success and 
dominance of the mobile computing world. The OHA is a consortium of technology 
manufacturers working together to create open mobile device standards (ibid). 
Wireless telecommunications providers such as T-Mobil, mobile handset 
manufacturers such as Motorola and High Tech Computer (HTC) and chipset 
manufacturers such as Texas Instruments and Qualcomm were among the constituent 
34 companies when the consortium was founded (ibid). Being a product from a 
coalition of various technology manufacturers dedicated to creating open mobile 
device standards, compatibility plays a crucial role in Android’s ecosystem. 
The Android community believes that “Android ecosystem thrives with 
device compatibility” and this is depicted in Figure 5.2 (“Android Compatibility”, 
n.d.). 
 
Figure 5.2: Android ecosystem (“Android Compatibility”, n.d.) 
Before its world dominance, HTC Dream’s debut in late 2008 with Android 
version 1.0 was the Android’s first appearance as a commercial smartphone 
operating system. Then, in April 2009, with HTC Magic, Android introduced its 
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tasty name series to the world with the release of Android version 1.5, more 
commonly known as Cupcake (Brachmann, 2014; Callaham, 2017). In September 
2009, Android version 1.6 (Donut) was released with various significant updates and 
began its course of dominating the mobile operating system world with the highest 
adoption rate (ibid). Android’s rapid popularity and adoption rate is well matched by 
the pace of development of the operating system itself (Brachmann, 2014). 
The fledgling work commenced in 2009 has transformed repeatedly over the 
past few years and has been refined into the feature-packed suite we see today on 
many devices of various sizes and shapes (ibid). However, despite being the most 
widely adopted mobile operating system with frequent updates and rapid 
improvements, it is a far-from-perfect OS with a number of vulnerabilities. In fact, 
until the release of Android version 5 (Lollipop) it was vulnerable to privilege 
escalation attack (Avkash, 2014) and it still has numerous vulnerabilities associated 
with varying levels of complexity and risks (“Android Security Bulletin”, 2017). 
These vulnerabilities do not, however, prevent the Android OS from being one of the 
best candidates for this research’s proposed mobile electronic prescription transfer 
application. 
Among many sources of information, the full extent of the Android’s 
publicly-known vulnerabilities can be found in vulnerabilities databases such as 
AndroidVulnerabilities.org (AVO) and Varutra’s Mobile Vulnerabilities Database 
(MVD). These vulnerabilities databases and additional information can be linked 
together by the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures List (CVE), sponsored by 
the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) (“All 
vulnerabilities”, n.d.; “MVD: Mobile Vulnerability Database”, 2013; “Android: 
Security Vulnerabilities”, n.d.). Further information such as the fixes for these 
vulnerabilities can be found at the U.S. National Vulnerability Database (NVD) 
(ibid). 
 
Research Thesis - 93 of 269 
5.1.2 Architecture and Security 
From an architectural perspective, the Android OS was designed to be truly 
open for developers to build innovative applications whilst offering an application 
environment with security assurance for users, data, applications, the device and the 
network (“Security”, n.d.). Whilst providing the freedom to implement own/custom 
device specifications, drivers, interfaces and enhancements, each Android device 
must pass the Compatibility Test Suite (CTS) to ensure the compatibility, reliability 
and a high level of quality with consistent user experience (“Android Interfaces and 
Architecture”, n.d.). Figure 5.3 roughly depicts the Android software stack and their 
core nature/functionalities. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Android software stack (“Security”, n.d.) 
Over the past decade, the consumer focus has shifted from desktop to mobile 
computing devices (West, 2012). Nowadays, mobile phones are so much more than 
mere telecommunication devices: they have become an essential part of our lives for 
many other purposes such as social networking, health and fitness and performing 
financial transactions. 
However, in a similar way to security on the Internet of Things (IoT) devices, 
these mobile devices were not originally designed and built with security as a top 
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priority requirement, despite becoming an integral part our daily life in various 
aspects including such security sensitive contexts as personal banking and healthcare 
(Maddox, 2016). In addition to this inherent nature (i.e. security not being a high 
priority feature by design), the strengths and vulnerabilities of the OS platforms used 
also contribute significantly to the security factors of the device. In its early days, 
Android OS was created based on the Linux Kernel version 2.6 with adapted security 
mechanisms for the mobile and flash memory environment (“Tutorial: 
Understanding Android's Security Framework”, 2010; “Which Android runs which 
Linux kernel?” 2013). It utilised component-based framework for application 
development where each of them is made of different types of components, such as 
Activity, Service, ContentProvider and BroadcastReceiver (“Tutorial: Understanding 
Android's Security Framework”, 2010). This openness is one of Android’s most 
attractive features over other OS platforms, and it also has the least restricted 
application deployment strategy, which allows applications to be published easily 
(“Publish Your App”, n.d.). 
On the other hand, however, this openness also allows publication of 
malicious applications without scrutiny (ibid). Android permits the developers to 
self-sign their applications for the ease of upgrading or patching their own software, 
and the applications signed with the same key can request to run with the same user 
identifier (UID). This mechanism also allows developers to copy data from existing 
versions without creating complicated interfaces and permissions. 
5.1.3 Process and Security Model 
In Android OS architecture, just a small amount of Android OS code runs as 
root (i.e. superuser with unrestricted control over the device) and all the rest of the 
OS code above the Linux Kernel is restricted by the Application Sandbox 
(“Security”, n.d.). Then, all the applications are isolated from each other by 
individually running in separate processes under distinct low-privileged UID. Each 
of these UIDs has a distinct set of permissions limiting them from accessing other’s 
data or code (Felt, Chin, Hanna, Song & Wagner, 2011). 
Handling of the Application Programming Interface (API) calls are carried 
out in three steps through the layers of the Android’s OS architecture (see Figure 5.4 
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for details), and each call consists of a permission check determining the caller’s 
privileges to access that particular API prior to the actual invocation. In the Android 
version 2.2, there were 134 permissions categorised into four different levels, such as 
Normal, Dangerous, Signature and SignatureOrSystem, according to their associated 
risks/threats, and security was primarily achieved by enforcing these permissions at 
various points (Felt, Chin, Hanna, Song & Wagner, 2011). Figure 5.4 explains the 
Android’s process and security architecture. 
 
Figure 5.4: Android’s Security and Process Model 
The Android API framework consists of two parts: a library that resides in 
each application's virtual machine and the implementation of the API that runs in the 
system process (Felt, Chin, Hanna, Song & Wagner, 2011). It handles all the API 
calls in three steps as mentioned below: 
1. The application invokes the API library in its virtual machine (VM) 
2. The library then invokes the private interface, which is a Remote Procedure Call 
(RPC) stub in the same library 
3. The RPC stub finally initiates an RPC request with the system process that asks 
a system service to perform the desired operation 
Another simple yet effective mechanism supplementing the process isolation 
method is the use of manifest permissions assigned to applications during the 
installation-time (“Application Fundamentals”, n.d.). This demands that every 
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application declare upfront which permissions it requires, and then during the 
installation the user is notified which permissions the application will be granted. 
These permissions/privileges determine what the application can perform such as 
taking pictures, using Global Positioning System (GPS) or making phone calls. 
The user permits or denies the requested permissions during the installation 
of the application via a dialog and the application’s permissions are then stored in the 
AndroidManifest.xml file, which cannot be changed after the installation process. A 
user’s denial to grant permission to the application will result in cancellation of that 
installation process. This security mechanism allows users to have control over their 
privacy and helps reduce the impact of bugs, as well as vulnerabilities in the 
applications. These permissions are also used in controlling access to privacy-related 
and security-related parts of API invocations (ibid). 
However, this mechanism would be ineffective if the application request 
more permissions than it actually requires, or the user does not recognise the 
importance of this notification and its consequences (Felt, Chin, Hanna, Song & 
Wagner, 2011). 
5.1.4 Reasons for being a good candidate for the proposed solution 
Since one of the intentions of this research was to find a viable alternative 
transfer mechanism for the electronic prescription with minimal infrastructural 
requirements and associated cost, the Android’s huge market base (see Figure 5.1) 
enables it to be the top potential candidate for this research. Once this research has 
proven the suitability and practicality of the proposed mobile electronic prescription 
transfer model on Android mobile devices, Android’s huge consumer base will 
create enough traction in the Australian healthcare industry for the major players to 
give their attention to this alternative approach, ultimately becoming an alternative 
transfer mechanism for electronic prescription. 
Android’s assurance for compatibility is another good reason for Android 
being an excellent candidate for this research’s proposed solution. It is impossible for 
any device manufacturer to speculate all the software that users could ever 
conceivably need and provide them as pre-installed applications with their products. 
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Therefore, Android was designed as an open and secure environment for running the 
aftermarket applications developed by the third-party developers to write the 
application users wanted. The Android Open Source Project (AOSP) aims at making 
the application development as easy and open as possible (“Security”, n.d.; “Android 
Compatibility”, n.d.; Hildenbrand, 2017). At the same time, the necessity to comply 
with the Android Compatibility Definition Document (CDD) and pass the 
Compatibility Test Suite (CTS) ensures the compatibility among various devices and 
operating system platforms. This assurance guaranteed the compatibility and it was a 
significant incentive for the choice of the Android platform (“Security”, n.d.; 
“Android Compatibility”, n.d.)  for this research’s proposed solution. 
As the most popular mobile operating system, with the highest adoption rate 
and largest consumer base, the Android inevitably has extensive developer 
community support. This support was another viable reason for choosing the 
Android platform to be a candidate for this research. Last but not the least, the 
Android’s developer friendliness, its open architecture and its availability of 
abundant tools and frameworks in the market made it a very natural and easy choice. 
5.1.5 Potential issues of Android for the proposed solution 
Despite its numerous benefits, the Android’s openness also attracted 
individuals and organisations which had malicious intent. Despite other potential 
vulnerabilities, the following ones could pose serious impacts on the security of the 
mobile ETP application’s data and hence require the devising of counter measures 
for securing against them. 
5.1.5.1 Vulnerabilities as of 2013 
As previously mentioned, the vulnerabilities listed below had significant 
impacts on the sensitive data stored by the mobile ETP application. However, this 
assessment was initially performed at the early stage of the research in 2013, and the 
following findings are those of that time. 
Lack of device level data encryption: Device level encryption mainly 
protects data from unauthorised access via Android Debug Bridge (ADB) port, 
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dumped device image or booting from the SD card. Until 2014, Android stored data 
unencrypted both on the internal file system and on the removable mass storage 
media such as Secure Digital (SD) memory card (“Encryption”, n.d.; Raphael, 2017). 
Whilst the data stored on the internal file system of the device received little 
protection by the process isolation and permission control mechanisms, the data on 
the removable media was unprotected due to the use of Virtual File Allocation Table 
(VFAT) file system for the ease of data transfer between different devices (“Mobile 
Application Security on Android”, 2009). However, the device level encryption 
feature was supported in some devices running Android version 2.3.4 
(“Gingerbread”) such as Samsung Galaxy S II and Motorola Droid Bionic, tablets 
running Android 3.0 (“Honeycomb”) and Android 4.0 devices (“Ice Cream 
Sandwich”) (“Android 4.0 Platform Highlights”, n.d.). In the Android 4.0, the 
encryption of the removable storage such as SD card was not supported natively. 
User rooting the device: Rooting offers freedom or power at the expense of 
security. It allows side-loading, bypassing the restrictions imposed by the carrier, use 
of third-party software and custom Read-Only Memory (ROM). Despite the user 
becoming more powerful locally, rooted Android devices are likely to have a few or 
all of the following vulnerabilities: 
❖ Rooted device may no longer receive over-the-air (OTA) updates from the 
carrier, exposing the devices’ vulnerabilities to new threats due to being left 
unpatched (Kassner, 2011). 
❖ On a rooted Android phone the hardware is the only limitation for an application 
with root access. For instance, the mobile OS boot-loader, other programs' 
private data, system settings and files and SMS are all at the mercy of an 
application with the root access. 
❖ A rooted application can also hide itself from the system and user, or pretend to 
be uninstalled while being perfectly well and alive. (“What are the security 
disadvantages of rooting an Android phone?”, 2011)  
❖ The rooting process of a device usually leaves the ADB port open, providing an 
open invitation to all other perpetrators to bypass security measures like screen 
lock. (“Issue 17918: Device can be accessed via ADB when encryption is 
enabled”, 2011) 
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❖ On a rooted android phone device, the mobile OS system is more vulnerable to 
malware due to a weakened overall security and integrity of the device. 
Privilege Escalation: All Android versions so far are still subject to this 
vulnerability. This vulnerability enables an infected but seemingly harmless 
application to install additional applications with a lower level of permission, 
allowing operations such as accessing call records, texts, Web browsing history and 
storage media without the user’s install-time approval for those permissions (Chavez, 
2011; Webster, 2011). 
5.1.5.2 Vulnerabilities as of 2016 
Android’s vulnerabilities and their impacts on research were revised in 2016 
during the experimentation and analysis stage of the research thesis. Most of the 
findings were fairly different to those from the initial investigation and therefore 
their impacts on this research have been updated accordingly. 
The full-disk encryption was supported in Android version 4.0+ and, since 
the number of the devices running prior to Android version 4.0 is only 2.3% in total, 
the impact of the vulnerability due to the lack of device level data encryption is now 
significantly low. In the Android version 6.0, the removable storage such as the SD 
card can be treated as internal storage and is therefore encrypted by default. In prior 
versions, however, it was up to the device manufacturer building the firmware to 
enable the encryption feature for the SD card, although Android provided the 
capability for filesystem encryption ("Does Android's Full Filesystem Encryption 
also encrypt the SD card?", 2012). 
Despite the various changes in the Android operating system platform over 
the past a few years, the vulnerabilities associated with user rooting the Android 
device remains the same and still pose serious security risks for its data and 
applications. 
Many privilege escalation vulnerabilities have been identified and rectified 
either as a patch for the current version or in the later version. At the time of this 
research, the most recent privilege escalation vulnerability patched up in Android 
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version 5.0 (Lollipop) was the one due to the flaw resided in the 
java.io.ObjectInputStream (Avkash, 2014). However, since these vulnerabilities 
originated from various sources such as logic bugs in the applications, bugs in the 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) frameworks or in the Kernel drivers, it is 
impossible to say that privilege escalation vulnerabilities are a thing of the past even 
though it would appear there are none at large at present. 
Another important factor in Android security is the Linux Kernel version on 
which the Android was built. Linux Kernel sits at the bottom of the Android software 
stack as shown in the Figure 5.4 and generally Android inherits its strength and 
weaknesses from the Linux Kernel on which it was built. Table 5.1 lists which 
Android versions make use of which Linux Kernel version for further investigation. 
However, there is no hard and fast rule defined in the association or dependency 
between Android and Linux Kernel versions since devices from different 
manufacturers running the same Android version can run on different Linux Kernels. 
Table 5.1 merely lists the common association or dependency between Android and 
Linux Kernel versions. 
Table 5.1: Android version and Linux Kernels (“Which Android runs which Linux kernel?”, 2013) 
Android Version Name API Level Linux Kernel in 
AOSP 1.5 Cupcake 3 2.6.27 
1.6 Donut 4 2.6.29 
2.0/1 Éclair 5-7 2.6.29 
2.2.x Froyo 8 2.6.32 
2.3.x Gingerbread 9, 10 2.6.35 
3.x.x Honeycomb 11-13 2.6.36 
4.0.x Ice Cream Sandwich 14, 15 3.0.1 
4.1.x Jelly Bean 16 3.0.31 
4.2.x Jelly Bean 17 3.4.0 
4.3 Jelly Bean 18 3.4.39 
4.4 Kit Kat 19, 20 3.10 
5.x Lollipop 21, 22 3.16.1 
6.0 Marshmallow 23 3.18.10 
In addition, the Figure 5.5 shows the distribution of various Android versions 
currently being used. This information is vital in estimating the impact of certain 
vulnerabilities based on a specific version of Android. 
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Figure 5.5: Distribution among Android versions (“Dashboards”, n.d.) 
5.1.6 Conclusion 
Since one of this research’s objectives was to eliminate the requirement of the 
special supporting infrastructure along with its associated costs, the Android’s 
existing strong consumer community made it a suitable candidate for this research. 
Android’s openness in its architectural design and its firm support for the 
development of innovative applications by the third-party developers was another 
major driving force behind the selection of Android for this research. Its well-
established development community with widely supported compatibility among 
various devices from different manufacturers and its assurance for the security of 
data and application whilst providing a consistent user experience with a high level 
of quality are the added benefits of using the Android platform. Therefore, the 
vulnerabilities identified did not prevent Android OS from being selected as the 
candidate OS because the strength/benefits it offers outweighs its vulnerabilities for 
this research. 
All the research findings so far indicate that the use of Android as the OS 
platform for the proposed mobile ETP application will benefit both the healthcare 
industry and its already-established large consumer base. Whether it has the 
necessary encryption capability for securing electronic prescriptions is yet to be 
determined by the experiments in the following section (section 5.2). 
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5.2 Experiment 1: Android’s Encryption – Security of the data at rest 
5.2.1 Overview 
The “Confidentiality of data at rest” section of the ATS4888.2-2013 (i.e. 
section 5.3.6 of ATS4888.2-2013) mandates that the payload of the Clinical 
Document managed by the Prescription Exchange is to be encrypted using a 
symmetric key derived from the Document Access Key (DAK). In addition, the 
“Data security conformance points ETP 22-2” section of the ATS4888.2-2013 also 
mandates that DAK and any of its derived cipher keys need to be encrypted with a 
secret cipher key of at least 128 bits before being stored on any stable storage. 
Therefore, the aim of this experiment was to verify that the Android OS 
platform can support the required encryption capabilities with adequate performance. 
The prototype developed to test the Android’s encryption was initially executed 
using the Android device emulator. Then, in order to verify how it performs on the 
actual Android smartphones, it was deployed and tested on two Android phones from 
two different manufacturers, HTC One and Samsung Galaxy A3 model smartphones. 
5.2.2 Experiment details 
The prototype application for this experiment was developed using the 
Android Studio package, which was downloaded from the official Android Studio 
website (“Android Developers”, n.d.), and the development environment was 
configured to use the Android version 5.0.1 with API 21. The installation and 
configuration process for this experiment went seamlessly compared to the 
researcher’s prior experience with earlier versions of Eclipse Integrated Development 
Environment (IDE) bundled with Android Developer Tools (ADT). 
Initially, the development environment for this experiment was set up using a 
laptop with 64-bit Windows 7 Operating System, 16 GB of RAM and 200 GB of free 
storage space on the disk drive. The researcher verified the setup of the development 
environment by writing a simple “Hello World” application and executing it within 
the emulator. During the early stage of this experiment it became necessary, due to 
work requirements, to upgrade the operating system of the laptop to 64-bit Windows 
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8.1. When this experiment was resumed after the Windows upgrade, the Android 
Studio failed to compile even the simplest “Hello World” application, showing the 
following compile-time error. 
 
Figure 5.6: Compilation error after OS upgrade from Windows 7 to Windows 8.1 
The encoding issue shown in Figure 5.6 was resolved by the setting the 
project’s encoding and the build’s encoding to the same encoding system as shown in 
Figure 5.7. 
`  
Figure 5.7: Project encoding (Android Studio) 
Although rectifying the encoding issue fixed the prototype’s compilation 
error, the execution of the Android emulator threw more errors, depicted in Figure 
5.8, and failed to start up. 
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Figure 5.8: Emulator start-up error (Android Studio) 
Further investigation and research for this issue discovered that it was due to 
the Hyper-V feature, Microsoft’s virtualisation technology introduced by the 
Windows 8.1, and found a range of workarounds on technical forums and discussion 
pages on the Internet. The approach taken by the researcher to overcome this 
situation was to create a dual boot option without Hyper-V feature. Once the 
Windows OS was loaded with this “No Hyper-V” option, the Android emulator 
executed well without any issue as shown in Figure 5.9. 
 
Figure 5.9: Successful emulator start-up with “No Hyper-V” 
In fact, this “No Hyper-V” option not only enabled execution of the Android 
emulator but also other virtualisation technologies such as VMWare and Oracle’s 
VirtualBox. With this approach, the experiment progressed and the prototype 
application to test the encryption on Android platform was created using the 
Android’s “javax.crypto” libraries. 
This prototype used the sample HL7 CDA (Clinical Document Architecture) 
document, which was downloaded from the Gleaning Resource Descriptions from 
Dialects of Languages (GRDDL) Primer section of the W3C website for its 
encrypting and decrypting operations, in order to reflect the file size and complexity 
of the actual electronic prescriptions.  However, to avoid the unnecessary technical 
complexity in the development of the prototype for this experiment, it stored the 
entire content of the CDA file into a literal string variable and performed the 
encryption and decryption operations using this string variable instead of reading and 
writing to/from the Android file system. An illustration of how the prototype 
operated and how it was executed in the Android emulator is depicted in Figure 5.10. 
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Figure 5.10: Prototype running in Android emulator 
Since this prototype used the 128-bit AES encryption as shown in Figure 5.11 
for encrypting and decrypting the CDA content, it proved that the Android satisfied 
the technical requirements mandated by the ATS4888.2-2013 for security of data at 
rest for electronic prescription. 
 
Figure 5.11: Use of AES 128-bit encryption 
However, since all the development and testing so far were conducted only 
within the development environment using an emulator, the prototype needed to be 
deployed onto an actual Android device to test the performance of the operating 
system and device in performing these encryption and decryption operations in 
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reality. The first device to be tested on was the research’s HTC One handset running 
Android version 5.0.2.  
The first issue encountered in the attempt to repeat this test on HTC One 
handset was that the Android Studio did not recognise the HTC One handset and 
therefore it was not possible for the prototype to be deployed and tested on that 
particular HTC One device. 
This was due to not having the USB driver for the HTC One device on the 
development machine, and, after several hours of investigation and analysis, it was 
found that the USB driver for the HTC One phone only came as part of the HTC 
Sync Manager utility program. Therefore, the HTC Sync Manager was downloaded 
from the HTC Support web site (HTC, 2016) and successfully installed as shown in 
the following figures: Figure 5.12, 5.13 and 5.14. 
 
Figure 5.12: The HTC Sync Manager downloaded from HTC Support web site 
 
Figure 5.13: HTC Sync Manager (installation step 1) 
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Figure 5.14: HTC Sync Manager (installation step 2) 
 
Once the HTC Sync Manger was installed, both the Windows Device 
Manager and the Control Panel’s “Programs and Features” section displayed its 
presence as illustrated in Figure 5.15 and 5.16 respectively. 
 
Figure 5.15: Windows Device Manager 
 
Figure 5.16: Windows Program and Feature 
However, the Android Studio and its Android Device Monitor utility still did 
not recognise the HTC One device correctly in order to deploy and execute the 
prototype application on it. Figure 5.17 demonstrated that the Android Device 
Manager detected the presence of the HTC One device but its status was showing as 
being offline. 
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Figure 5.17: Android Device Monitor (Android Studio) 
The USB connection from the laptop to the HTC One device seemed to be 
only responsive to the HTC Sync Manager alone and not to any other programs at 
all. Further investigations on this issue revealed that after the installation of the HTC 
Sync Manager, it was necessary to uninstall the HTC Sync Manager from the system 
so that it will leave only the HTC USB driver on the system. The following Figure 
5.18 and 5.19 depicted how the Windows Device Manager and the Control Panel’s 
Programs and Features section looked like once the HTC Sync Manager had been 
uninstalled from the system. 
 
Figure 5.18: Windows Device Manager (after HTC Sync Manager uninstalled) 
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Figure 5.19: Windows Program and Feature (after HTC Sync Manager uninstalled) 
Once the HTC Sync Manager was removed from the system, the HTC One 
device started working correctly with the Android Studio as shown in Figure 5.20. 
 
Figure 5.20: Android Device Manager (after HTC Sync Manager uninstalled) 
Figure 5.21 showed the prototype application deployed and executed on the 
actual Android device. This experiment also revealed that the encryption and 
decryption operations took less time when the prototype was executed on the actual 
device compared to the time taken when it was executed in the emulator. On the 
actual device, it took between approximately 0.05 to 1 second to decrypt or encrypt 
the HL7 CDA document which is 36.2 KB in size. 
Subsequently, the experimentation was repeated on the Samsung Galaxy A3 
handset without any changes or reconfiguration. 
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Figure 5.21: Prototype executed on actual Android device 
5.2.3 Experiment 1: Results/Outcomes. 
From this experiment, it was found that security features available on 
Android platform were more than sufficient to ensure the security of data at rest as it 
was mandated by the ATS4888.2-2013 with adequate performance. This experiment 
outcome indicated that the use of an Android device as the alternative data transfer 
mechanism for exchanging the electronic prescription between prescriber’s EPS 
system and pharmacy’s EDS system will provide comparable security assurance to 
that of the current mechanism using the Prescription Exchange Services.  
5.2.4 Experiment 1: Lessons learnt 
During the experiment, the deployment of the prototype application from the 
Android Studio development environment to the HTC One device encountered the 
HTC USB driver related issue. However, this issue was only associated with a 
specific scenario where the application was directly deployed to an actual device 
Research Thesis - 111 of 269 
from the Android Studio development environment and it is completely irrelevant 
when the application is deployed via the Google PlayStore.  
Some of the issues encountered during this experiment, such as the Android 
emulator issue on Windows 8.1 with Hyper-V feature and the HTC Sync Manager 
issue, would have taken a much longer time with a lot more effort and frustration 
without the combined knowledge and support from various online communities, 
technical forums and discussions web pages. The researcher spent many hours 
researching, investigating and rectifying through these digital resources in search of 
any relevant information on the issues encountered, and they provided crucial 
information and potential solutions for resolving those issues over the course this 
experiment. 
5.2.5 Experiment 1: Modifications. 
Neither additional modification nor another round of experimentation was 
required as this experiment successfully proved that the Android operating system 
platform has sufficient encryption capabilities to satisfy the security requirements 
mandated by the ATS4888.2-2013 for storing electronic prescription. 
5.2.6  Conclusion 
Experiment 1 successfully proved that the Android operating system platform 
has sufficient encryption capabilities to satisfy the security requirements mandated 
by the ATS4888.2-2013 for storing electronic prescription. 
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5.3 Learning from the Research 
The analysis of the relevant regulations and standards allowed this research to 
determine the readiness of each jurisdiction for a fully electronic prescription system, 
and established that the use of DAK and 128-bit symmetric encryption were the 
minimal requirements for securing electronic prescriptions from the data at rest 
perspective. These findings were collated in Table 4.1 and Section (1) of Table 4.2. 
Subsequently, Experiment 1 verified that the proposed Android operating 
system has sufficient encryption capability for securing electronic prescriptions by 
complying with the requirements mandated by ATS4888.2-2013. The experiment 
which encrypted and decrypted the sample HL7 CDA document not only proved that 
it does not require any third-party utility or tools for performing the 128-bit 
symmetric encryption, but also exhibited the fact that such encryption can be done 
with a decent performance (i.e. between 0.2-1 seconds for encrypting the HL7 CDA 
document of 36k). 
The experimentation outcomes indicated that the proposed Android mobile 
ETP application offered the security assurances equivalent to that of the current ETP 
implementation from the data at rest perspective. This stage was therefore concluded, 
leading to the next phase of the research. The paper produced at the end of this stage 
(i.e. Research Paper 2 in Appendix A) briefly describes the current security 
mechanisms for ETP from the data at rest perspective, how these can be achieved on 
Android OS platform and proposes an Android mobile ETP application with NFC as 
the alternative transfer mechanism for electronic prescriptions between ETP 
participants. The research findings published in the paper were verified by the 
double-blinded peer review process at the time of publication. 
Htat, K. K., Williams, P. A. H., & McCauley, V. (2015). Security of ePrescription: 
Security of data at rest in Prescription Exchange Services vs on mobile 
devices. In Proceedings of the 4th Australian eHealth Informatics and 
Security Conference 2015, Perth, Australia. (pp. 15-22). doi: 
10.14221/aeis.2015.2 
Contributions: Htat (80%), Williams (15%) and McCauley (5%) 
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CHAPTER 6. SECURITY OF THE DATA IN TRANSIT 
The “Confidentiality of data in transit” section of the ATS4888.2-2013 states 
that “The mechanisms used to ensure the confidentiality of data in transit between 
ETP service participants are specific to the implementation ‘platform’”. However, as 
much as the ATS4888 series mentions the implementation details on securing 
prescription information from the data at rest perspective, there was no further 
information on what the recommended approach is or how it should be implemented 
to secure prescription information from the data in transit perspective. 
In addition, the research context turned out to be not only highly regulated 
but also highly proprietary. This made it impossible to investigate how the electronic 
prescriptions were transferred in the current implementation and search for an 
alternative transfer mechanism with comparable security measures. Therefore, using 
more of a “black-box” approach, this research endeavoured to find a transfer 
mechanism (i.e. a short-range wireless communication technology) that is 
comparable in security measures to using the Internet. 
This chapter studied the details of the NFC and Bluetooth wireless 
communication technologies followed by experimentation determining their 
suitability for the proposed mobile ETP solution. 
6.1 Near Field Communication 
The investigation conducted in this section studied details of the NFC 
technology’s architecture, security model and its potentials as a candidate technology 
for the proposed mobile ETP solution. This section also identified the possible issues 
associated with NFC for the proposed mobile ETP solution. 
6.1.1 A brief history and how it works 
As the name suggests, near field communication (NFC) is a short-range, high 
frequency and low bandwidth wireless communication technology which enables 
secure two-way interactions between NFC enabled devices in a ubiquitous manner 
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(Coskun, et al., 2013). This new technology, which is now supported by majority of 
the smartphone manufacturers (“NFC phones: The definitive list”,2016), was 
invented in 2002 by Franz Amtmann, Philippe Maugars and researchers working at 
NXP Semiconductors and Sony ("Winners the European Inventor Award 2015", 
2015). 
Various industries’ widespread acceptance and support of this NFC 
technology became evident at an early stage when it was adopted as a standard by the 
European Computer Manufacturers Association (ECMA) International in December 
2002 (Coskun, et al., 2013). The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 
and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) adopted NFC technology in 
December 2003, and in 2004 the NFC Forum was founded by NXP Semiconductors, 
Phillips and Sony to further promote the technology and its interoperability among 
devices and services (Coskun, et al., 2012). 
Technically, NFC is a subset of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
technology (“The Difference between RFID and NFC”, 2011) which was extended 
by using smart card technologies’ interfaces (Coskun, et al., 2013). The NFC devices 
communicate at a frequency of 13.56 MHz, which is that originally used by RFID, 
and so the communication occurred only when the devices are in close proximity 
(ibid). 
In a way, NFC is an evolution of RFID, influenced by the synergy of several 
technologies including wireless communications, mobile devices, mobile 
applications and smart cards ("Winners the European Inventor Award 2015", 2015). 
Being a descendent of the RFID technology, NFC’s evolution dates back to 1940s 
with the use of Barcode technology, and its ancestry is roughly depicted by Coskun 
et al. (2013) as in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1: Evolution of NFC (Coskun, et al., 2012) 
NFC restricted its communication range to maximum of 4cm, with the data 
transfer rate of up to 424 Kbps (Coskun, et al., 2013). While Figure 6.2 presents a 
broad comparison of NFC’s communication range and data transfer rate against other 
wireless communication technologies, further details such as operating frequency, 
data rate and range of each technology are listed in Table 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.2: NFC’s communication range in comparison with other wireless communication 
technologies (Coskun, et al., 2012) 
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Table 6.1: Frequency, data rate and range of wireless technologies (Coskun, et al., 2013) 
 
This new technology’s success (i.e. widespread usages) and the emergence of 
its ecosystem evolved around its simple and ubiquitous nature (Coskun, et al., 2013). 
Just as personal computers (PCs) have changed the way users interact with a 
computer using keyboards and monitors instead of punch cards, and touch screens 
have drastically changed the human-computer interactions, NFC has changed the 
way connection is established between devices by simply requiring very close 
proximity, also known as “touching” (ibid). Instead of users having to perform the 
various pairing and authentication steps required by the technology such as Bluetooth 
and WiFi, NFC technology adjusts to normal human behaviour in performing 
activities. From a higher perspective, NFC’s seamless pairing and communication 
nature takes us a step further toward ubiquitous computing where human-computer 
interaction is integrated into our everyday life to the highest level with little effort in 
using them (Reisenhofer, et al., 2016; Coskun, et al., 2012). 
An NFC device is categorised as either an active or a passive device, based 
on whether it has its own power source (Coskun, et al., 2013). An active device has 
its own power/energy source whereas a passive device is powered using the energy 
created by an electromagnetic field generated by an active device (ibid). 
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In a similar way to RFID data exchange and other existing client-server 
communication paradigms, NFC communication involves two parties: (1) the 
initiator and (2) the target. The initiator, an active device, initiates the 
communication with the target device and this responds to the initiator’s request 
(ibid). In the case of the target being a passive device, it uses the initiator’s 
power/energy in responding to the initiator’s communication request. On the other 
hand, the initiator always needs to be an active device as it requires a power source to 
initiate the communication even if it does not have to power the target (i.e. in 
scenarios where the target is also an active device) (ibid). 
In addition to these active or passive device types and communication modes 
(i.e. being an initiator or target), NFC has three operating modes: (1) reader/writer 
mode which reads data from and writes to a target, (2) card emulator mode which 
acts like an RFID tag when they are within communication range of another NFC or 
RFID device and (3) peer-to-peer mode where data exchange occurs in both 
directions (Igoe, et al., 2014). Coskun et al. (2012) depict these operating modes and 
the governing standard for each in Figure 6.3. 
1
2
3
 
Figure 6.3: Three operation modes of NFC (Coskun, et al., 2012) 
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At present, despite being governed by myriad standards and specifications, 
this research found that the NFC ecosystem is mainly made up of action components 
belonging to the following three categories: NFC mobiles, NFC readers and NFC 
tags. 
• NFC mobiles: These are NFC-enabled mobile phones or smartphones. The 
integration of NFC technology with these devices was the primary enabler which 
unlocked vast opportunities for various innovative uses and widespread 
acceptance of the NFC ecosystem (Coskun, et al., 2012) 
• NFC readers: These perform data transfer with an NFC component/device. Some 
real life uses would be the contactless POS (Point of Sale) terminal which 
supports contactless NFC payments such as CommBank Tap & Pay and ANZ 
Mobile Pay. ("COMMBANK Tap & Pay", 2016; “ANZ Mobile Pay”, 2015) 
• NFC tags: Technically, these are classified as passive RFID tags that have no 
integrated power source of their own. During the communication, a small 
amount of power is taken by the NFC tag from the reader/writer in order to 
power the tag’s electronics and perform the data transfer to the reader/writer (i.e. 
NFC enabled device) (Poole, n.d.) 
The category to which an NFC device belongs dictates how security will be 
implemented and which standards and specifications it will be governed by. 
6.1.2 Architecture and Security 
Security is NFC’s most critical concern as its primary motivation being 
integrating personal and private information such as credit/debit card data into 
mobile devices. Like many other information systems, NFC’s vulnerability to attacks 
and its defence mechanisms are mostly subject to different use cases (Coskun, et al., 
2012). Due to the context of this research thesis, this section will only emphasise on 
NFC’s generic security features and those security features specific to the NFC 
smartphones operating in peer-to-peer mode and card emulation mode. 
Similar to the 7 Layers Model by Open System Interconnection (OSI), the 
mental model of NFC architecture (i.e. Figure 6.4) by Igoe et al. (2014) helps in 
visualising and understanding each layer of the NFC stack. Figure 6.4 also maps each 
Research Thesis - 119 of 269 
layer of the NFC stack with their specific governing standards. Further details on 
those governing standards will be discussed in the next section, “Governing 
Standards”.  
 
Figure 6.4: NFC protocol stack (Igoe, et al., 2014) 
From the NFC’s security perspective, RFID technology’s wireless 
communication range was considered too far, and this long communication range 
exposed the radio signal to signal-interception. Therefore, NFC technology 
significantly shortened its communication range to a maximum distance of 4 cm 
between devices. This requirement for device proximity strengthens security as the 
chances of the devices’ radio signals being intercepted is significantly reduced over 
such a short distance (Hamblen, 2012). 
Another security feature of NFC is its native support for encryption. As per 
NFC Forum’s specification, the secure element (SE) or secure access module was 
designed to be programmable and capable of running small programs on its own 
(Coskun, et al., 2013). It can generate hashes and verify codes/values using public 
key encryption and decryption (Igoe, et al., 2014). Any NFC-enabled smartphone has 
at least one SE for performing secure proximity transactions with external NFC 
devices (Coskun, et al., 2013). The SE also enables secure storage of data such as 
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users’ credit card information and the secure execution of NFC-enabled services such 
as contactless payments (ibid). Despite SE being a combination of hardware, 
software, interfaces and protocols, a variety of modules such as Universal Integrated 
Circuit Cards (UICC), secure memory cards or embedded chip/hardware can serve as 
SEs (Coskun, et al., 2012). These various types of SEs and their interaction with 
other components of the NFC technology are depicted in Figure 6.5 by Coskun, et al.  
(2012). 
 
Figure 6.5: Various SE configurations in NFC (Coskun, et al., 2012) 
Among these various SE types, the use of UICC based SEs is ideal for current 
use as they are portable and easily manageable via Over-the-Air (OTA) technology, 
while ensuring the secure execution of transactions (Coskun, et al., 2013). OTA is 
the standard for exchanging applications and application related information via 
wireless communication. 
Even with all of these security features, NFC is not without security 
vulnerabilities. NFC has inherent security issues which can be categorised into 
reader/writer related issues, smart card related issues and communication related 
issues. However, these issues are being addressed using many standardised security 
protocols developed and maintained by organisations such as ECMA International, 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), International Electrotechnical 
Research Thesis - 121 of 269 
Commission (IEC) and NFC Forum founded by Nokia, Philips, and Sony (Coskun, et 
al., 2013). Further details on each standard are given in the next section, “Governing 
Standards”, as well as information such as which security issue that standard is 
addressing, and which organisation is governing it. 
6.1.3 Governing Standards 
This research found that many device manufacturers currently support NFC 
and its uses are promoted by many organisations. Due to its origin involving a few 
technologies (i.e. such as smart cards, mobile phones and card readers etc.) and 
complex use cases such as mobile wireless payment systems, several standards were 
developed and governed by numerous respective organisation bodies. 
Among many organisations with influence over NFC, the principal 
standardisation bodies are: NFC Forum, GlobalPlatform, GSM Association (GSMA), 
International Organisation for Standardisation/International Electrotechnical 
Commission (ISO/IEC), European Computer Manufacturers Association (ECMA) 
International European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and ETSI 
Smart Card Platform (ETSI SCP), Java Community Process (JCP), Open Mobile 
Alliance (OMA), 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), and EMVCo. 
Whilst interoperability is essential to the functionality of the technology, 
security is another mandatory aspect as Coskun et al (2013) stated “a service is 
useful only when it is both functional and secure enough”. Integration and 
implementation of these standards is to be secure while remaining functional. Some 
major standards for NFC technology were briefly listed in the following table, Table 
6.2. 
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Table 6.2: NFC standards (Coskun, et al., 2013) 
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6.1.4 Reasons for being a good candidate for the proposed solution 
Nowadays almost everyone carries a smartphone, and the majority of the 
smartphone manufacturers support NFC. The use of NFC technology is therefore a 
very practical solution for short-range data transfer. Another reason for the candidacy 
of NFC technology is its implicit security feature, the very short and restricted 
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communication range providing a very low probability of signal-interception 
(Coskun, et al., 2012). 
In addition to its functionalities and security, NFC, unlike other wireless 
communication technology such as Bluetooth and WiFi, does not require much 
human intervention in establishing connection between devices. Intuitively, the 
touching action was considered as the triggering condition, and establishing 
communication or launching an installed application occurred as soon as two NFC 
devices were touched. From a higher perspective, this behaviour not only simplifies 
the communication process but also enables and promotes ubiquitous computing 
(Coskun, et al., 2012). 
Last but not the least is its well supported interoperability. The integration 
and application of the NFC technology is well governed by various standards and 
specifications with support from the international standardisation bodies and industry 
entities (Coskun, et al., 2013). This assures the interoperability of the NFC 
technology and its functionalities despite having many stake holders in its ecosystem 
(Clark, 2015). For example, any two devices compliant with version 1.3 of the 
Logical Link Control Protocol (LLCP) specification are able to establish peer-to-peer 
unauthenticated secure connection and exchange AES encrypted LLCP messages as 
soon as they are brought together (ibid). 
6.1.5 Potential issues of NFC for the proposed solution 
With all these governing standards and specifications, NFC’s interoperability 
at the end-user level is excellent. Tap virtually any two NFC-enabled smartphones 
and they will establish a connection and exchange data almost instantaneously, 
requiring nothing more than being kept very closely together. However, NFC’s 
interoperability at the software development level is not so seamless. Among various 
NFC card reader/writer devices produced by many manufacturers, only the Sony 
FeliCa card readers/writers are recognised as proximity devices and operate well for 
application development for Windows 8+ (i.e. Windows 8 or higher) platforms using 
Windows Proximity APIs, a set of classes in the Windows operating system runtime 
that support connections between devices within close distance. 
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This is the result of the joint venture between Sony (i.e. the FeliCa 
technology) and XNP Semiconductors (i.e. Mifare technology) to enable the global 
adoption of contactless smart card applications in mobile phones (“NXP and Sony 
announce joint venture”, 2006). At present, NXP Semiconductors is the only 
hardware vendor that made Windows 8+ (i.e. Windows 8 or higher) compatible 
proximity drivers publicly available (Sharief, 2013). For the rest of the NFC card 
reader/writer devices, application development for Windows 8 or higher had to resort 
to using other, less generic, approaches such as low-level socket programming, 
instead of making use of the Windows Proximity APIs provided by the Windows 
Runtime. 
6.1.6 Conclusion 
Use of NFC for the electronic prescription transfer is likely to be well 
accepted by users as they have already been introduced to using the same technology 
in ticketing, loyalty card programmes and even in performing more mission-critical 
operations such as financial transactions (i.e. mobile payments).  
NFC is widely supported by most device manufacturers and it has an 
excellent end-user level interoperability. However, this pre-experiment study of the 
technology found that there is room for improvement in software development on 
Windows platform to make use of the Window Proximity APIs provided by the 
Windows Runtime. 
This shortcoming was likely to result in having to use a less generic approach 
such as low-level socket programming, and the solution ended up being less 
interoperable and portable. Nonetheless, whether NFC technology has the necessary 
security measures and is practical (i.e. from development and deployment of the 
solution perspectives) to be an alternative secured transfer mechanism for electronic 
prescriptions in the Australian healthcare industry is yet to be determined by the 
experimentation in the following section (Experiment 2: NFC – Security of the data 
in transit). 
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6.2 Experiment 2: NFC – Security of the data in transit 
6.2.1 Overview 
Since the preliminary study in section 6.1 found the NFC technology to be 
the potential secured transfer mechanism for the proposed mobile ETP solution from 
various aspects (i.e. widespread support by various smartphone manufacturers, 
excellent interoperability and convenience of use), this experimentation began with 
the NFC technology verifying its suitability for the proposed mobile ETP solution.  
6.2.2 Experiment details 
NFC was selected as the transfer mechanism for exchanging electronic 
prescription data between the prescriber’s electronic prescribing system (EPS), the 
client’s/patient’s smartphone and the electronic dispensing system (EDS) at the 
pharmacy because of its widespread support by the majority of the smartphone 
manufacturers, excellent interoperability between devices, adequate support for 
security and its ease of use in establishing communication with another device as 
long as both devices are NFC enabled. 
Since the majority of  both the Clinical Management Systems used at the 
primary care clinics and the Pharmacy Management Systems in Australia run on 
Windows operating system platform, it is envisaged that the transfer of the electronic 
prescription from the prescriber’s electronic prescribing system to the 
client’s/patient’s smartphone, and from the client’s/patient’s smartphone to the 
pharmacy’s electronic dispensing system, will be NFC communications between 
Windows machines/PCs and Android smartphone. 
Therefore, the proposed solution envisioned that this communication will 
occur between a NFC reader/writer device attached to the prescriber’s EPS or 
dispenser’s EDS and the client’s/patient’s Android smartphone, as the use of an NFC 
reader/writer device is more practical than acquiring a new computing device, laptop 
or tablet with NFC capability. An experimental prototype was developed using the 
C# .NET programming language, taking full advantage of the Windows Proximity 
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APIs supported by the Windows Runtime (WinRT) to leverage its efficiency, 
reliability, portability and security. 
Among many generic NFC card reader/writer devices produced by various 
manufacturers, the researcher procured a USB ACR122U contactless RFID 
smartcard reader/writer from Advanced Card Systems (ACS) due to its widespread 
use in various industries. The NFC reader/writer device was shipped with an 
installation CD containing the device driver software and Software Development Kit 
(SDK). However, the following error occurred when the device driver software was 
installed from the provided installer CD. 
 
Figure 6.6: NFC device driver installation error on Windows 8.1 
After some investigation and analysis, the researcher discovered that some 
discussion forums suggested that the error is likely to be resolved by using a newer 
version of the driver software than the one shipped with the device. Therefore, as 
shown in the following Figure 6.7, a newer version of the installer was acquired and 
installed from the ACR122U’s Product page (i.e. “http://www.acs.com.hk/en/ 
products/3/acr122u-usb-nfc-reader/”) of the ACS website and then successfully 
installed.  
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Figure 6.7: ACR112U device’s product page 
On Windows 8.1 systems, the ACR122U NFC reader/writer was correctly 
detected even before the device driver installation. However, Figure 6.8 indicated 
that it will not function properly as the Windows operating system could not 
determine the right driver software for it. 
 
Figure 6.8: Windows Device Manager (no driver for NFC reader/writer) 
Installing the newer version of the driver software downloaded from the ACS 
website rectified this issue and the following Figure 6.9 showed that the correct 
driver software for the NFC reader/writer was detected by the Windows operating 
system and the device was ready to function. 
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Figure 6.9: Windows Device Manager (driver found for NFC reader/writer) 
Once the driver issue was resolved, the Software Development Kit (SDK) for 
the device was installed from the provided CD. The SDK installation process was 
simple and successfully completed after following on-screen prompts. The 
researcher’s verification of the installed components from “Programs and Features” 
windows of the “Control Panel” is displayed as in the Figure 6.10. 
 
Figure 6.10: Programs and Features (after ACR122U SDK installed) 
With the researcher’s limited knowledge of NFC application development at 
that point in time, the setup of the NFC reader/writer was considered to be 
successfully completed and the development of the prototype had commenced. 
According to the research plan, the prototype was developed as a Window Store App 
in Visual Studio 2013 using C# .NET framework and Window Proximity API. 
Instead of creating a Windows Desktop application, the prototype was created as a 
Windows Store App because access to the WinRT Features such as Proximity APIs 
is more seamless and less restricted from Windows Store Apps (Xavier, 2012).  
Using WinRT in C# .NET framework, accessing the NFC devices began with 
instantiating a ProximityDevice object using the ProximityDevice class. This 
instantiation was done by invoking the “GetDefault” static method of the 
ProximityDevice class in the Windows.Networking.Proximity package. Once a 
ProximityDevice object was instantiated, it was used by the application in handling 
events such as an NFC device getting within the communication range and leaving 
the communication range by subscribing to DeviceArrived and DeviceDeparted 
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events. However, as shown in the following Figure 6.11, the GetDefault static 
method of the ProximityDevice class always returned a null object in this prototype, 
preventing any further development. 
 
Figure 6.11: Issue in using Proximity Library 
After some in-depth research it was found that “FeliCa” NFC card 
readers/writers from Sony were the only devices that could be recognised as 
Proximity devices by the WinRT on Windows 8 and higher versions. Figure 6.12 
presents how a Sony’s FeliCa NFC card reader/writer appeared as a proximity device 
in the Windows Device Manager panel. 
 
Figure 6.12: FeliCa NFC device in Windows Device Manager (“NFC Troubleshooting Guide”, n.d.) 
The reason for this is that NXP Semiconductors, Sony’s joint venture partner 
in enabling the global adoption of contactless smart card applications on mobile 
phones (“NXP and Sony announce joint venture”, 2006), is the only provider of 
proximity driver software compatible with Windows 8 and above (Sharief, 2013). 
Therefore, application development using any other NFC card reader/writer devices 
for Windows 8 or higher versions required resorting to less generic approaches, such 
as low-level socket-based connection, instead of making use of Windows Proximity 
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APIs, the more abstract and portable approach provided by the WinRT. Use of 
socket-based connections required reserving certain IP addresses and ports for the 
communication purpose between the devices. Such requirement could result in 
imposing some issues, such as IP and port conflict etc., as the application could be 
interacting with multiple devices dynamically. 
Unlike Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of Sales (EFTPOS) systems, where 
both hardware and software are provided by the same vendor, usually by a financial 
institution, this research does not picture that a specific brand of NFC reader/writer 
devices, pre-configured to use certain IP address and port, will be provided by the 
software vendor of the Electronic Prescribing System (EPS) or Electronic Dispensing 
System (EDS) for the mobile electronic prescription transfer. 
In addition, there may be various applications and peripherals devices 
installed at the prescriber’s or dispenser’s facility, potentially resulting in some of 
those required IP addresses and ports already being occupied.  Therefore, in order to 
be a vendor agnostic solution in this primary health care environment, use of low-
level socket-based connections in implementing the mobile electronic prescription 
transfer application is likely to be impractical in reality. 
Despite the fact that the prototype development was deterred by the lack of a 
publicly available proximity driver for the NFC card reader/writer being used, this 
experiment found another aspect of limitation in NFC’s interoperability. The NFC 
Data Exchange Format (NDEF) is the most widely supported format by various 
manufacturers and it was the format in which most NFC devices and applications 
exchange data with one another. 
According to the NDEC specification, the capacity of the NDEF payload was 
232-1 (i.e. approximately 4GB) but it was mostly limited by the storage capacity of 
the NFC tag or device participating in the data exchange. However, if the data to be 
exchanged was in a non-NDEF format, the interoperability would be severely limited 
because defining the protocol stack for exchanging data was entirely up to the 
application developer (“Advanced NFC”, n.d.). This not only severely impacted the 
application’s interoperability but also inherently introduced security-, reliability- and 
efficiency-related risks.  
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6.2.3 Experiment 2: Results/Outcomes. 
Despite how it initially appeared, this experiment found that interfacing with 
the NFC readers/writers (i.e. except for the FeliCa NFC card readers/writers) 
required the use of the software development kit (SDK) provided by the hardware 
manufacturer. This severely limited the solution’s portability (i.e. interfacing with 
different NFC readers/writers by various manufacturers) and interoperability (i.e. 
integration with EPS and EDS developed by various software vendors). On the other 
hand, the necessity to use a specific brand of NFC reader/writer (i.e. the FeliCa NFC 
card readers/writers) for all the Electronic Prescribing Systems (EPS) and all the 
Electronic Dispensing Systems (EDS) was too limiting and impractical for the 
Australian healthcare industry. In fact, this experiment discovered that use of NFC 
technology failed to be both device manufacturer agnostic and EPS and EDS 
software vendor agnostic from the perspectives of application development, 
portability and interoperability. 
Therefore, this experiment deemed that the NFC technology was not a 
suitable alternative transport mechanism for transferring electronic prescriptions 
between the EPS, the EDS and the client’s/patient’s smartphone. 
 
6.2.4 Experiment 2: Lessons Learnt. 
The tools and sample applications provided by the manufacturer were 
primarily designed for configuring the security settings of the NFC cards and the 
device itself and for reading/writing the data to and from the NFC cards at the block 
and segment levels.  
NFC has the best interoperability at the end-user level for exchanging 
photographs, contacts and web URLs. However, this experiment found that 
development of NFC application in C# for the non-mobile environment, such as 
Desktop or Windows Store App environments, was not as efficient and portable as 
its mobile counterparts. The NFC application development was the most efficient 
and best supported in the mobile environment where the driver software, along with 
the hardware, is provided by the manufacturer. Essentially, any issues between the 
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hardware and the driver software were taken care when the device was manufactured 
with inbuilt NFC capability. However, application development for NFC in the 
Windows desktop environment, including the Windows Store Apps, is yet to mature 
and still has room for improvement. 
Although the exchange of NDEF-type data between various NFC devices and 
applications are widely supported among various NFC devices and applications, 
exchanging the non-NDEF data requires defining the protocol stack and thus has 
very limited interoperability compared to the NDEF data. 
6.2.5 Experiment 2: Modifications. 
Since this experiment proved that the NFC technology is not suitable for 
transferring electronic prescriptions between the EPS, the EDS and the 
client’s/patient’s smartphone, the researcher has commenced the next iteration by 
conducting a detailed literature review on Bluetooth, the rival technology in short 
range radio communication. The next section (Section 6.4) describes the detailed 
literature review on Bluetooth technology and is followed by Section 6.5 in which its 
suitability for transferring electronic prescription information in the proposed fully 
electronic mobile ETP solution is verified through an experimentation. 
6.2.6  Conclusion 
Despite the findings from the preliminary study, this experiment proved that 
use of NFC technology is not suitable (see sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 for details) for the 
proposed mobile ETP solution. The experiment found that only the Sony’s FeliCa 
NFC reader/writer can be programmed using C# .NET and Windows Proximity API, 
and the rest of the NFC reader/writer devices required the use of SDK from their 
device manufacturers. This is mainly due to the hardware manufacturers not making 
the proximity driver of their devices publicly available for software development and 
integration. 
This experiment concluded as a failure because, if developed using any of 
these vendor-specific SDK, the solution would work only for those specific devices, 
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thereby introducing a portability issue that invalidates the use of NFC technology as 
a practical solution for the Australian healthcare industry. 
6.3 Learning from the Research 
Despite NFC technology’s widespread support from most mobile device 
manufacturers, excellent end-user level interoperability and explicit acceptance by 
users even in mission critical operations such as financial transactions (i.e. mobile 
payments), this experimentation found that it has much room for improvement in the 
software development from the perspectives of interoperability and portability. 
The NFC application development was best supported in the mobile 
environment where the driver software and libraries were provided by the 
manufacturer alongside with the hardware. However, application development to 
interact with NFC devices in Windows environment (i.e. as extensions of EPS and 
EDS to communicate with its mobile counterpart) was yet to mature and still has 
much room for improvement.  
The tools and utilities provided by the NFC device manufacturers are mainly 
designed to configure the security settings of the NFC cards/devices and to perform 
the read/write operations at the block and segment levels (i.e. low-level data access 
operations). At present, only the FeliCa NFC readers/writers are recognised as 
proximity devices on Windows 8.1 and later operating system platforms in order to 
leverage the use of Window Proximity API for software development. Application 
development for the other NFC devices necessitated resorting to using less 
generic/portable approaches such as low-level socket programming and vendor 
provided SDKs. Therefore, the application ends up being less interoperable and 
portable. These experiment outcomes have a severe impact on the practicality of the 
proposed mobile ETP solution for the Australian healthcare industry, where it was 
intended to be device manufacturer (i.e. NFC reader/writer) agnostic as well as EPS 
and EDS software vendor agnostic. 
Furthermore, in this environment it is impractical to have an application 
which requires certain IP addresses and ports reserved solely for its communication 
purpose, as these may potentially be occupied by various other applications and 
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peripherals installed at the prescriber’s or dispenser’s facility. Therefore, the use of 
NFC technology is deemed not suitable as the alternative transport mechanism for 
the proposed mobile ETP solution and hence the researcher commenced another 
iteration of experimentation on the next potential candidate rivalling NFC in short 
range radio communication; Bluetooth. 
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6.4 Bluetooth 
6.4.1 A brief history and how it works 
Bluetooth, named after the 10th century King Harald Blåtand (i.e. Harold 
Bluetooth in English) of Denmark, is a low-power, short-range radio communication 
technology for point-to-point and point-to-multipoint communications (“Bluetooth 
fact or fiction”, 2016). The men behind this technology were Sven Mattisson and 
Jaap Haartsen from Lund Ericsson Lab in 1998. It was initially called Multi-
Communicator (MC) Links and was conceived as a low-cost wireless solution to 
replace RS-232 standard cables. 
Bluetooth technology was the first low-power radio communication 
technology to wirelessly connect various accessories (i.e. devices such as wristband, 
headset and portable speaker etc.) from different industries (i.e. telecommunication, 
entertainment, health, sports and fitness etc.) (“Bluetooth fact or fiction”, 2016) 
enabling the building of Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPAN). 
This technology unlocked many new opportunities for various devices and 
changed the consumer perspective permanently. In fact, Bluetooth has transcended 
its usual/intended applications by permeating various other devices across all 
industries and markets such as smart home, wearables and location-based 
technologies.  Emergence of Bluetooth version 4, also known as Bluetooth Low 
Energy (BLE), enabled this permeation even further and its market growth can be 
witnessed in the following two figures (Kaye, 2014). 
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Figure 6.13: Bluetooth’s market growth (Kaye, 2014) 
 
Figure 6.14: Bluetooth devices worldwide ("Bluetooth SIG 2014 Annual Report", 2015) 
Bluetooth makes use of the spread spectrum frequency-hopping technology 
and shares the same frequency band, 2.4 GHz, with Wi-Fi and many other household 
appliances such as microwave oven and cordless phone (“What can an attacker do”, 
2013). 
From its very early days, Bluetooth technology was governed and guided by 
the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG). Bluetooth SIG was initially founded with 
five companies (i.e. Ericsson, IBM, Intel, Nokia, and Toshiba) and now it has over 
33,000 members worldwide ("Wireless History Timeline", 2016; "Member 
Directory", 2016). Bluetooth version 3 (i.e. not the latest version but the most widely 
used version in current market) supports a data transfer rate up to 24 megabits per 
second (Mbps) and has three connection types: Asynchronous Connection-Less 
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(ACL), Synchronous Connection-Oriented (SCO) and extended Synchronous 
Connection-Oriented (eSCO). The ACL connection is used for both asymmetric and 
symmetric data transfer and the integrity of data is ensured by the packet 
retransmission (IEEE, 2005). SCO connection is symmetric and used for real-time 
two-way voice communication. The voice can be distorted when the Bit Error Rate 
(BER) is high as SCO does not use packet retransmission. The eSOC is symmetric 
and is also used for real-time two-way voice transmission. However, it ensures the 
data integrity by using retransmission packets. This assurance of data integrity 
enables eSOC connection to carry data packet as well (ibid). 
When Bluetooth devices communicate with one another, the connection 
initiator becomes the piconet master and the remaining devices become slaves. A 
piconet is a tiny network composed of two or more Bluetooth devices occupying the 
same physical channel (i.e. synchronised to a common clock and hopping sequence) 
(Haataja, et al., 2013; "Communications Topology", 2016). Each Bluetooth-enabled 
device may participate in more than one piconet simultaneously and a slave in one 
piconet can be a master in another piconet. Within a piconet all communications go 
through the piconet master, and the piconet master is also in charge of the frequency 
hopping and synchronisation with the slave devices. When piconets share a common 
device between them, the common device relays the data between the different 
piconets and together they form a scatternet. These common piconet members are 
called scatternet members and it is how Bluetooth extends its data transmission range 
restriction (ibid). This network topology and how it works is roughly depicted in the 
following diagram, Figure 6.15. 
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Figure 6.15: Bluetooth network topology (Mahmoud, 2003) 
Current Bluetooth architecture allows up to seven active slaves in a piconet, 
with many more connected in parked state in which slaves enter reduced power mode 
but remain synchronised with the master, ready to be active and part of the piconet 
again (“Baseband Architecture”, 2016; Blankenbeckler, 2010; "Communications 
Topology", 2016). 
6.4.2 Architecture and Security 
Bluetooth architecture consists of the core system and specific profiles based 
on the intended use case or application. Each Bluetooth profile states possible 
applications and defines the general behaviours of how it will communicate with 
other devices in order to achieve its function. Therefore, a Bluetooth-enabled device 
must be able to interpret certain Bluetooth profiles to perform its intended functions. 
Fundamentally, Figure 6.16 depicts the Bluetooth core system specified by 
both Bluetooth SIG and IEEE Std 802.15.1-2005. The diagram also shows that the 
lowest three layers (i.e. Link Manager, Baseband and Radio layers) of the Bluetooth 
core system are grouped into a subsystem called Bluetooth Controller. 
Scatternet 
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Figure 6.16: Bluetooth core system ("Core System Architecture", 2016) 
Just as the lowest three layers of the Bluetooth stack are grouped into the 
Bluetooth Controller subsystem, the rest of the layers, except the Application Layer, 
are grouped together as the Bluetooth Host subsystem. The interoperability between 
the two subsystems, Bluetooth Controller and Bluetooth Host, is supported by 
defining the common interface (“Core System Architecture”, 2016). 
There is a wide range of Bluetooth profiles, each describing many different 
types of applications or use cases for devices, and the Bluetooth-adopted 
specification section of the Bluetooth SIG website lists a wide range of supported 
profiles for each specific Bluetooth core specification version. Interoperable or 
compatible applications are to be designed and developed by following the guidance 
provided by these specifications and profiles ("Adopted specifications", 2016). 
Figure 6.17 provides a high-level perspective on how the Bluetooth profiles and the 
core system fits together to form the entire Bluetooth protocol stack. 
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Figure 6.17: Bluetooth protocol stack ("Bluetooth core specification", 2016) 
Due to the way they are illustrated, the prior two diagrams (Figure 6.16 and 
6.17) do not clearly show how they fit together. Therefore, Figure 6.18 emphasises 
on showing how they are related and integrated.   
 
Figure 6.18: Bluetooth protocol stack and core system mapping ("Bluetooth core specification", 
2016; "Core System Architecture", 2016) 
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In Figure 6.19, the IEEE Std 802.15.1 compares the OSI 7 layers model with 
the Bluetooth’s protocol stack. The diagram also includes IEEE 802.2 as a 
transitioning step between the two models as it shows the division of Data Link layer 
of the OSI model into MAC and LLC layers. 
 
Figure 6.19: OSI layers and Bluetooth protocol stack mapping (IEEE, 2005) 
The IEEE Std 802.15.1 specified Bluetooth’s security in terms of encryption, 
authentication and key generation schemes. In order to support usage protection and 
information confidentiality, security measures are provided at both Application 
Layer and Link Layer. Although user information is protected by encrypting the 
packet payload using a stream cipher called E0 which is resynchronized for every 
payload, the IEEE Std 802.15.1 dictates that the access code and packet header shall 
never be encrypted (IEEE, 2005). 
Bluetooth’s security fundamentals are Bluetooth Device Address 
(DB_ADDRESS), two secret keys and a pseudo-random number which will be 
generated for each new transaction. Table 6.3 summarises each of those entities and 
their sizes (ibid). 
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Table 6.3: Bluetooth security entities and their sizes (IEEE, 2005) 
 
The Bluetooth Device Address (BD_ADDR) is the primary identifier of a 
Bluetooth device, similar to Ethernet Media Access Control (MAC) address, and is 
acquired by the user interactions or via the automatic enquiry routine by a device. 
This 48-bit number uniquely identifies a Bluetooth device among peers in the 
piconet. Both secret keys, the authentication key and encryption key, are derived 
during the initialisation. The authentication key is often referred to as the link key, 
underlining its importance to the link/connection. 
As described in Table 6.3, the authentication key is a 128-bit random number 
shared between two or more parties as the base of all security transactions between 
these parties. The link key is not only used in the authentication routine but is also 
one of the parameters in deriving the encryption key. Whilst the encryption key and 
authentication are completely different keys, the encryption key is derived from the 
authentication key during the authentication process and each time encryption is 
activated. The piconet master can use separate encryption keys for each slave device 
in a point-to-multipoint configuration with ciphering activated. The random number 
is generated by a random or pseudo-random process in the device as a nonrepeating 
(i.e. it is highly unlikely that the value will repeat within the lifetime of the 
authentication key) and randomly generated (i.e. the chances of predicting its value is 
not significantly greater than zero) number (“Baseband Architecture”, 2016; 
Blankenbeckler, 2010; "Communications Topology", 2016; IEEE, 2005).  
Utilising these fundamental security components, Bluetooth Security 
Manager (SM) provides the Bluetooth protocol stack to generate and exchange 
security keys to create encrypted link for secure communication among peers. It 
defines two roles, Initiator and Responder, and supports three security procedures: 
Pairing, Bonding and Encryption Re-establishment. The Pairing procedure generates 
a temporary security key or short-term key (STK) and creates an encrypted link. 
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However, the generated security key is not stored and thus cannot be reused for later 
connections. The Bonding procedure on the other hand, which also includes the 
pairing step, creates a permanent association by sharing the security key which will 
be used for later connections until deleted by either side of the connection. Once 
bonded, the Encryption Re-establishment procedure defines how to re-establish a 
secure encrypted connection without having to go through the Bonding (i.e. Pairing 
and Bonding) procedure (IEEE, 2005; Townsend, et al., 2014). These Pairing and 
Bonding processes are depicted in the Figure 6.20. 
 
Figure 6.20: Bluetooth pairing and bonding (Townsend, et al., 2014) 
6.4.3 Governing Standards 
All the Bluetooth specifications were formalised by the Bluetooth SIG upon 
its establishment in 1998. Soon after that, in early 1999, Bluetooth was also adopted 
as IEEE Std 802.15 by the Working Group for Wireless Personal Area Networks 
within IEEE ("Wireless History Timeline", 2016; IEEE, 2005). 
6.4.4 Reasons for being a good candidate for the proposed solution 
Although this research could not find a consolidated list of mobile 
smartphones that support Bluetooth technology, the support for Bluetooth on mobile 
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smartphones is no less than that of NFC ("iOS: Supported Bluetooth profiles", 2015; 
"Any Android phones that do not support Bluetooth", 2012). 
Bluetooth technology has a longer communication range compared to NFC 
and this exposes the radio signal to signal interception attacks. However, its spread 
spectrum frequency-hopping behaviour, in addition to encryption, provides extra 
security against such threat. Using Adaptive Frequency Hopping (AFH), Bluetooth 
hops 1600 times per second between 79 channels within 2.4 GHz and 2.48 GHz ISM 
band (i.e. Industrial, Scientific and Medical radio bands) (“What can an attacker do”, 
2013). 
Using the Bluetooth technology, establishing connection between devices is 
less seamless, requiring extra steps to be performed manually, compared to using the 
NFC technology. However, from the perspective of mobile electronic prescription 
transfer application, this requirement to pair the devices (i.e. between prescriber’s 
device, client/patient’s smartphone and dispenser’s device) can be considered an 
additional security measure. Moreover, this pairing is not required for subsequent 
operations once the devices have been paired and bonded. 
From its early days, implementation and compliance of the Bluetooth 
technology has been closely governed and guided by the Bluetooth SIG. With 
manufacturers strictly adhering to the relevant profile specification of the device 
type, the interoperability between devices by different manufacturers from various 
industries is well supported. Moreover, with the release of version 4.x, Bluetooth 
also helped change the face of the healthcare industry as its increased use in many 
medical devices enables consumers to control and manage their own health. 
6.4.5 Potential issues of Bluetooth for the proposed solution 
Like any other wireless communication technology, Bluetooth is vulnerable 
to some security threats inherently. First of all, although Bluetooth’s standard 
communication range is 10 metres, it is not guaranteed that the radio signal is not 
accessible beyond that distance. This characteristic exposes Bluetooth’s signals to be 
easily interceptable by would-be attackers. 
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Along with its popularity and widespread uses, there are malware and worm 
programs exploiting Bluetooth design and/or implementation vulnerabilities. The 
Caribe worm and Bluejacking would be the less harmful form of these whilst 
Bluebugging can be more dangerous as it allows the attacker to remotely access the 
compromised phone and use its features, such as making/forwarding/listening calls 
and text messages. 
The Caribe (also known as Cari and Cabir.B) is the world’s first wireless 
worm which runs on the Symbian Operating System (Millard, 2004). Whilst most 
Internet-delivered content (i.e. primary source of various malware) is filtered by the 
telecommunication carrier for security, the Caribe worm replicates over Bluetooth 
connections in the form of a file called "caribe.sis" in the phone’s messaging inbox. 
When the user clicks the file and chooses to install it, the worm infects the device 
and starts looking for other Bluetooth-enabled devices to infect over Bluetooth 
connection (ibid). The worm scans for other Bluetooth-enabled devices and attempts 
to send itself onto the first device found every time the device is powered off and 
back on (i.e. propagation is triggered by the device activation). Setting a device to 
non-discoverable mode protects the device from being infected by the Cabir worm. 
However, once compromised, even disabling Bluetooth does not stop an infected 
device from infecting the other devices ("Bluetooth-Worm:SymbOS/Cabir", 2017; 
"SymbOS.Cabir", 2017). 
Bluejacking, also known as Bluespamming, allows the sending of unsolicited 
messages to other Bluetooth-enabled devices via Bluetooth. Despite the name, it 
neither hijacks nor steals information from the device. This technique uses the basic 
Object Exchange Stack that was used for "beaming" business cards and applications 
via Infrared on Palm OS and exploits the discoverability feature of Bluetooth 
devices. Whilst it generally poses minimal security risk, it can be extremely 
bothersome because the message alerts the recipient to take action such as reading, 
responding or deleting it (Leyden, 2003; Tan, 2007). 
Bluebugging on the other hand is taking full control of the device without the 
owner’s knowledge by exploiting the outdated firmware with faulty/vulnerable 
Bluetooth implementation. This attack begins by first gaining the trusted device 
status, potentially using the business-card transfer process, and then establishing a 
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connection with the targeted device by tricking it into believing that the attacker’s 
device is a harmless peripheral such as a Bluetooth headset. Once this is achieved, 
the compromised device and the data within are at the mercy of the attacker since 
most functions of the device can be controlled by the attacker via the AT command 
codes (i.e. the ATtention command set, also known as the Hayes command set, 
which is typically used by developers and service technicians). Fortunately, the 
vulnerability to Bluebugging attack was addressed in the later firmware upgrades 
(Doherty, 2015). 
Essentially, just as Doherty (2015) mentioned, Bluetooth presents a trade-off 
between convenience and security, and it will always be vulnerable to the limitations 
of user education and user risk awareness. Since this research is not about 
Bluetooth’s security, it relies on the relevant authorities producing security patches 
and necessary firmware upgrades, white-hat hackers exposing the vulnerabilities 
before the black-hat ones exploiting them. The experiment in Section 6.5 is to 
determine whether Bluetooth is a suitable electronic prescription transfer mechanism 
alternative to using the Internet for the proposed fully electronic mobile ETP 
solution. 
6.4.6 Conclusion 
Bluetooth is the first widely used radio technology for wireless peer-to-peer 
connection and with its constant advancements over the time, such as the advent of 
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), it is still going strong after almost two decades. 
Basically, Bluetooth technology is the global standard enabling the Internet-of-
Things (IoT) by assuring the connectivity between various devices from various 
industries (“Bluetooth”, 2016). Its widespread uses in various applications 
familiarises consumers with how the technology works, its security and reliability. 
Based on this familiarity and trust, built over a period of almost two decades, use of 
Bluetooth technology for mobile electronic prescription transfer is likely to be well 
accepted by the users. 
Bluetooth is well supported by most mobile smartphone manufactures and 
has an excellent interoperability between devices, which is assured by the Bluetooth 
SIG ("iOS: Supported Bluetooth profiles", 2015; "Any Android phones that do not 
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support Bluetooth", 2012). It is strongly supported by a large development 
community, with a variety of frameworks and tools/utilities on various hardware 
and/or software platforms. 
Compared to NFC, Bluetooth also has better support from the device 
manufacturers and software vendors. The research findings so far indicate that 
among all the current wireless communication technology Bluetooth is likely to be 
the most suitable transfer mechanism for the mobile electronic prescription transfer 
application. Nevertheless, whether it actually possesses adequate security measures 
to be an alternative secured transfer mechanism for electronic prescriptions and its 
practicality (i.e. from development and deployment of the solution perspectives) is 
yet to be determined by one of the experimentations in the next section (Experiment 
3: Bluetooth – Security of data in transit). 
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6.5 Experiment 3: Bluetooth – Security of the data in transit 
6.5.1 Overview 
Prior experiment was conducted using NFC technology as the transfer 
mechanism for exchanging electronic prescription data between devices. Despite its 
widespread support and excellent interoperability between devices at the end-user 
level, support for software development by the product manufacturers, such as 
availability of software drivers and software development frameworks, are still fairly 
limited. An example of this limitation is the fact that only the Sony FeliCa NFC card 
readers/writers are recognised as proximity devices by the Windows 8 and later 
versions, due to unavailability of the proximity driver for the products manufactured 
by other vendors.  
The necessity to use a specific brand of NFC reader/writer devices for both 
the primary care’s Electronic Prescribing System (EPS) and the pharmacy’s 
Electronic Dispensing System (EDS) is too limiting and this research does not deem 
it practical in reality for the Australian healthcare industry. 
Therefore, to come up with a more vendor agnostic and practical solution in 
this primary healthcare environment, another experiment for transferring the 
electronic prescription data between the PCs (i.e. primary care’s EPS and pharmacy’s 
EDS systems) and the mobile smartphone (i.e. client’s/patient’s phone) is conducted 
using a more mature short-range wireless communication technology, Bluetooth. 
6.5.2 Experiment details 
In this experiment, Bluetooth technology was used in transferring electronic 
prescription data between the prescriber’s electronic prescribing system (EPS), the 
client’s/patient’s mobile smartphone and the pharmacy’s electronic dispensing 
system (EDS). It is a mature technology with widespread support by almost all 
mobile smartphone manufacturers, an excellent interoperability among supported 
devices and adequate support for security. Although establishing connection between 
supported devices is not as seamless as using NFC since it requires manual pairing, 
this can also be considered an additional security feature in this application.  
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As per the prior experiment, this experiment was conducted using Windows 8 
operating system platform since the majority of the Clinical Management Systems 
used at primary care clinics and Pharmacy Management Systems in Australia run on 
Windows operating system platform. Therefore, despite the change of technology in 
transferring the electronic prescription data, both the desktop application and its 
mobile counterpart will remain using the same operating system platforms, Windows 
8 and Android. However, instead of using a desktop PC with external USB Bluetooth 
adaptor/dongle, similar to using the USB NFC card reader/writer as in the prior 
experiment, this experiment was conducted using a laptop with inbuilt Bluetooth 
capability to communicate with the mobile smartphone.  
The Windows metro application for the transfer of the electronic prescription 
from the prescriber’s electronic prescribing system (i.e. most likely a desktop PC or a 
laptop) to the client’s/patient’s mobile smartphone via Bluetooth can be implemented 
using various frameworks such as 32feet.NET open-source library from CodePlex or 
the PeerFinder class from the “Windows.Networking.Proximity” class library of the 
.NET framework. CodePlex is Microsoft’s open-source project hosting website 
where people from various professions and industries share projects and ideas. Since 
many resources and support can be found from various sources for utilising these 
libraries and frameworks, implementation of the Windows 8 metro application was 
not the focus of this proof of concept prototyping experiment. On the other hand, due 
to the limited processing power, storage space and supported features on mobile 
devices compared to those of PCs, encryption/decryption of the prescription may not 
actually be practical even if transferring the electronic prescription via Bluetooth is 
achievable. Therefore, this experiment will focus on the development of the 
application prototype for transferring the electronic prescription from the 
client’s/patient’s Android smartphone to the pharmacy’s electronic dispensing 
system (EDS) from achievability and practicality perspectives. As a result, an 
experimental prototype is to be developed for Android platform utilising full capacity 
of Android’s native support for the transfer of electronic prescription via Bluetooth 
communication with encryption for adequate levels of efficiency, reliability, 
portability and security. 
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The Android application development environment on Windows 8 platform 
was completed as part of Experiment 1 (i.e. experiment for 128-bit symmetric 
encryption on Android for security of prescriptions from the data at rest perspective), 
and therefore allows this experiment to begin straight after Experiment 2 (i.e. 
experiment on transferring electronic prescription via NFC connection from a 
Windows 8 metro application to Android phone). Initially, based on prior experience 
in programming for Android, the researcher attempted to suppress the Bluetooth 
pairing dialog screen in order to make the connection establishing process as 
seamless as it was in NFC. 
As shown in the following Figure 6.21, an attempt was made to suppress the 
Bluetooth pairing dialog screen by directly writing the destination device’s address 
into to the content provider. 
 
Figure 6.21: Suppressing the Bluetooth pairing step on Android 
At runtime, however, the above program code (Figure 6.21) generated the 
error shown in Figure 6.22. Despite having the correct access permission as 
illustrated in Figure 6.23, the debugging process (see Figure 6.24) identified that the 
error originated from accessing the Bluetooth share. Furthermore, the investigation 
revealed that, despite the application being granted the appropriate permissions to 
access the Bluetooth share, direct manipulation (i.e. writing) of the content provider 
is now protected for better security since Android version 4.1 (“Android Bluetooth 
print stopped working on 4.1”, 2012). In Bluetooth 4.1 and later versions, sharing of 
file over Bluetooth was achieved as shown in Figure 6.25. 
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Figure 6.22: Android runtime error (suppressing Bluetooth pairing) 
 
Figure 6.23: Android permission for Prototype 
 
 
Figure 6.24: Debugging the Bluetooth error 
 
Figure 6.25: Sharing file over Bluetooth (Bluetooth 4.1 and later versions) 
However, when approach shown in Figure 6.25 was taken, a dialog box 
popped up listing all the devices paired with the mobile phone in order to pick one 
for the destination. In favour of more seamless operation, the researcher attempted to 
suppress this dialog box by overriding the 
“android.bluetooth.devicepicker.action.LAUNCH” intent and broadcasting the 
“android.bluetooth.devicepicker.action.DEVICE_SELECTED” message in response 
to it. Unfortunately, it was found that broadcasting these messages has been internal 
since Android 4.1 and thus only the Android system itself can send those intent 
(“Caused by: java.lang.SecurityException: Permission Denial”, 2014).  
Aside from these two failed attempts by the researcher in making the use of 
Bluetooth more seamless as if using the NFC, the development of the prototype went 
well and the selected sample CDA file was successfully sent via Bluetooth to the 
paired laptop. Figure 6.26 shows where the selection was made for the use of the 
attached device (i.e. via a USB cable) or the emulator when the prototype was 
executed in the Android Studio. 
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Figure 6.26: Device selection in Android Studio 
Except for a few preliminary steps, all the testing in this experiment was 
conducted using an actual Android device connected via USB connection instead of 
the software emulator. Once the selection was made to use the connected Android 
device, the prototype was executed on that device as shown in the figure 6.27. 
 
Figure 6.27: The prototype running on an Android device 
In the prototype, the textbox with the red background is to display the 
encrypted content of the select CDA file and that with the green background will 
show the decrypted content of the previously encrypted file shown in the red textbox. 
Clicking on the “Select File” button will invoke a list of applications, as depicted in 
Figure 6.28, for selecting a file from various sources such as the Android file system 
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or the Dropbox. However, before any file is selected from the Android mobile 
prototype application to be sent to the paired laptop via Bluetooth, the laptop needs 
to be set to receive the file via the Bluetooth connection as shown in Figure 6.29. 
This step is only required in this experiment because the prototype application does 
not have the desktop/PC/laptop side counterpart representing the application 
operating at the pharmacy’s electronic dispensing system (EDS) end with which to 
receive the electronic prescription file from the client’s/patient’s mobile smartphone. 
The dialog shown in Figure 6.30 will be displayed once the “Receive a File” 
selection is made in Figure 6.29.  
 
Figure 6.28: Selecting the file 
 
Figure 6.29: Receiving the file 
 
The dialog displayed on the laptop in Figure 6.32 indicates that it is ready to 
receive the transmission so that the prototype running on the Android phone can 
transmit the CDA file via the Bluetooth connection to the laptop. Once the file to be 
sent is selected in the mobile prototype application, a dialog box will be displayed 
listing all the devices paired with phone (i.e. as the researcher’s attempt to broadcast 
the message has failed) as shown in Figure 6.30.  
When a destination is selected from the list, the prototype will commence 
encrypting the selected file. It will then save the encrypted content on the Android 
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file system, display the encrypted content in the UI’s red textbox and then decrypt 
the same content, to be displayed in the green textbox. The encrypted file written to 
the Android file system will then be sent to the selected destination via Bluetooth 
connection. Figure 6.31 depicts the prototype application after a file has been sent to 
the paired laptop. 
 
Figure 6.30: Selecting destination device 
 
Figure 6.31: Encrypted and decrypted content 
 
Figure 6.32: Awaiting the file transfer 
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At this point in time, the laptop will have received the file and a dialog box 
similar to the one shown in Figure 6.33 will be displayed awaiting user’s input on 
where to save the received file. 
 
Figure 6.33: File received via Bluetooth (Windows 8.1) 
Despite the fact that the process of establishing connection using Bluetooth is 
not as seamless as using NFC, the development of the prototype application went 
well without any issue. In addition to that, the prototype developed using the HTC 
One mobile works well on the Samsung Galaxy A3, with no changes or 
reconfiguration required. This experiment had no software driver related issue, and 
no special or vendor specific Software Development Kit (SDK) was required for 
using Bluetooth during the development of this prototype. Some modifications for 
improved security in the Android version 4 and later versions, such as making intents 
and messages protected, had an impact on the user-friendliness of the prototype; 
however, it was more of a nuisance in the connection establishing process than a 
critical deal breaker. 
6.5.3 Experiment 3: Results/Outcomes. 
This experiment found that the development of the prototype went well, 
neither experiencing any software driver related issue nor having to use 
manufacturer-specific SDK for using Bluetooth. The sample CDA file was 
successfully transferred from the mobile device to the paired laptop via Bluetooth 
with no performance issue. In addition, this experiment was successfully repeated on 
the Samsung Galaxy A3 phone (i.e. a device by different manufacturer) without any 
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changes or reconfiguration. This proved that unlike the prior experiment, Experiment 
2, use of Bluetooth as the alternative transfer mechanism will not suffer portability 
and interoperability issues. 
Due the fact that the research context is highly proprietary, the detailed 
information on encryption mechanism used or security protocols employed in the 
current transfer mechanism using the Internet (i.e. security from data in transit 
perspective) is not public available. Therefore, this research was only focusing on the 
standards applied by and strict governance of the relevant authority bodies over the 
technology. Bluetooth’s inbuilt security measures and standards are strictly governed 
by Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) and IEEE standard 802.15.1-2005, and 
strict governance by these two reputable authority bodies can be considered having 
an adequate governance for an alternative electronic prescription transfer 
mechanism. 
Therefore, this experiment concluded that the use of Bluetooth technology as 
the alternative transfer mechanism in the proposed mobile ETP solution is not only 
practical but also provides comparable assurance to the current approach (i.e. using 
the Internet) for the Australian healthcare industry. Although it was not the first 
choice of short-range wireless communication technology for this research, this 
experiment has proven that the Bluetooth technology provides adequate functionality 
and performance with sufficient security assurance for transferring electronic 
prescriptions between the EPS, EDS and client’s/patient’s mobile smartphone. 
In general, use of Bluetooth technology made it possible to implement a 
prototype of a mobile electronic prescription transfer application that is both device 
manufacturer agnostic and EPS and EDS software vendor agnostic. 
6.5.4 Experiment 3: Lessons Learnt. 
Support for Bluetooth on mobile smartphones is no less than that of NFC and 
it comes with better support by the vendors from the software development 
perspective. As a mature technology, the use of Bluetooth in the development of this 
prototype required neither any vendor specific software development kit (SDK) nor 
software driver update. Another benefit of using this mature technology is an 
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excellent portability and interoperability as this prototype works well on another 
Android smartphone by a different manufacturer without any issue and 
communicates seamlessly with the paired laptop exactly in the same way. 
Bluetooth’s requirement to pair the devices before data transfer operation was 
initially considered unintuitive and undesirable as it is the opposite of ubiquitous 
computing. However, since the pairing is not required for subsequent operations once 
the devices have been bonded, this experiment deemed the requirement for pairing as 
an added security feature for this application. 
Although this experiment was conducted using a laptop with in-built 
Bluetooth capability, a USB Bluetooth adaptor/dongle can be used for this 
communication at the clinic or pharmacy instead of using a desktop PC or laptop 
with in-built Bluetooth capability. Bluetooth SIG’s strict specifications and influence 
over the industry assures that it is vendor agnostic and the use of USB Bluetooth 
dongle will work just as well as the in-built Bluetooth feature. 
6.5.5 Experiment 3: Modifications. 
No further modification is required as this experiment succeeded in proving 
that the Bluetooth technology is suitable to be the transfer mechanism for exchanging 
electronic prescription data between devices such as a prescriber’s EPS system, a 
patient’s mobile device and a pharmacy’s EDS system. 
6.5.6  Conclusion 
For this research, Bluetooth was not initially the preferred short-range 
wireless communication technology for transferring electronic prescription between 
the ETP participant devices (i.e. prescriber’s EPS system, patient’s mobile device 
and pharmacy’s EDS system). However, this experiment proved that Bluetooth is 
suitable for such purpose in the proposed mobile ETP solution because it not only 
offers comparable security assurance to using the Internet but also provides a 
practical solution from the development, portability and interoperability perspectives 
(see Section 6.5.3 for details). It has a few inconveniences such as having to pair the 
devices for the first time use. However, use of other tool/technology such as NFC 
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tags or QR codes can streamline this pairing process, and as an added benefit this 
pairing process can even be considered as an additional security measure. 
6.6 Learning from the Research 
Bluetooth is a mature technology with widespread support from almost all 
mobile smartphone manufacturers and has an excellent interoperability among 
supported devices with adequate support for security. Using Bluetooth, the process of 
establishing connection between supported devices is not as seamless as using NFC 
as it requires manual pairing for the first-time use. However, this pairing is not 
required for subsequent operations once the devices have been paired and bonded, 
and the extra step can in fact be considered an additional security feature in this 
application. 
This experimentation’s attempt to make the initial pairing process as seamless 
as in NFC by suppressing the pop-up dialog box (i.e. which lists all the devices to 
pair with) has failed due to the changes made in Android 4.1 and Bluetooth 4.1 for 
better security against harmful operations. Despite this minor hindrance, the 
development of the prototype went well and the sample CDA file was successfully 
transferred via Bluetooth to the paired laptop requiring neither vendor specific 
software development kit (SDK) nor software driver update. The prototype also 
executed well on another Android smartphone by a different manufacturer without 
issue and communicated well with the paired laptop in exactly the same way. From 
the compliance perspective, the strict compliance specifications and influence of the 
Bluetooth SIG and IEEE over the industry assures that it remains vendor agnostic 
with excellent portability and interoperability. Bluetooth’s inbuilt security measures, 
widespread support by device manufacturers, excellent interoperability and 
portability and strict compliance governance make it a suitable candidate technology 
for securely transferring electronic prescriptions. 
In addition, Experiment 3 succeeded in proving that Bluetooth technology is 
a suitable wireless communication technology for exchanging electronic prescription 
data for the proposed mobile ETP solution. Finally, this experimentation outcome 
proved Bluetooth to be a secure, vendor-agnostic and practical transfer mechanism 
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for exchanging electronic prescription data between the prescriber’s EPS system, 
patient’s mobile device and pharmacy’s EDS system in the Australian healthcare 
industry. Since no further revision or repetition was required, this iteration of the 
experimentation was successfully concluded, and this conclusion led to the next 
phase of the thesis; Discussion of Results.  
The paper produced at the end of this stage (i.e. Research Paper 3 in 
Appendix A) briefly describes the outcomes of Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 for 
securing electronic prescription information in the proposed mobile ETP solution 
from the data in transit perspective. Subsequently, the paper proposed Bluetooth 
wireless communication technology to be the secured transfer mechanism alternative 
to using the Internet for transferring electronic prescriptions as part of the proposed 
mobile ETP solution. The research findings presented in Research Paper 3 (in 
Appendix A) and produced at the end of this stage were verified by the “triple-
blinded peer review” process. 
Htat, K. K., Williams, P. A. H., & McCauley, V. (2017). Security of ePrescription: 
Data in Transit Comparison Using Existing and Mobile Device Services. In 
Proceedings of the Australasian Computer Science Week Multiconference. 
Geelong, Australia. ACM, doi: 10.1145/3014812.3014870 
Contributions: Htat (75%), Williams (20%) and McCauley (5%) 
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CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
7.1 Overview 
This chapter begins with the collation of the experimentation outcomes from 
Chapters 5 and 6 into the Analysis Matrix partially populated in Chapter 4 (i.e. Table 
4.2). It then provides further discussion built upon the literature review findings 
(Chapter 2), research results (Chapter 4) and the experimentation outcomes (Chapters 
5 and 6) from a more holistic perspective. The purpose and use of handwritten 
signatures are then discussed, along with those of their electronic counterparts, 
digital certificates, and their potential role as more than a mere digital equivalence of 
handwritten signatures, actively preventing fraudulent activities in the first place. 
Subsequently, a framework to guide the development of an Android mobile ETP 
solution in compliance with the security requirements mandated by the Australian 
healthcare industry is constructed using the outcomes and knowledge obtained from 
the research activities conducted. Such knowledge is later extended further and 
another framework is derived for assessing Android mobile ETP solutions for their 
compliance with the security mandates. The last part of Section 7.3 mentions that 
despite this research’s focus on Android OS both frameworks are mostly applicable 
to mobile ETP applications on any mobile operating system such as iOS. Finally, this 
section is concluded by a reflection on the Research Questions from a holistic point 
of view, based on the research outcomes. 
The paper produced during this stage (Research Paper 4) compares the 
current ETP implementation with the proposed Android mobile ETP solution from a 
more holistic perspective and it was verified by the “triple-blinded peer review” 
process. 
Htat, K. K., Williams, P. A. H., & McCauley, V. (2016). Future of Australia’s eTP: 
Script Exchange, Script Vault or secure mobile alternative. In Proceedings of 
the 14th Australian Information Security Management Conference, Perth, 
Australia (pp. 52-59). doi: 10.4225/75/58a69d860a643 
Contributions: Htat (80%), Williams (15%) and McCauley (5%) 
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7.2 Collation of Experimentation Results (Analysis Matrix collation) 
To this point, analysis of the regulatory mandates and iterative 
experimentations of the candidate technologies has contributed to understanding of 
the security requirements and how well these candidate technologies comply with 
those requirements. The experiments focused on securing the electronic prescriptions 
from the data at rest and data in transit perspectives while they are being stored and 
transferred between the prescriber’s electronic prescribing system (EPS), the 
client’s/patient’s Android smartphone and the pharmacy’s electronic dispensing 
system (EDS). These experiments have provided sufficient materials and knowledge 
to construct a vendor agnostic experimental proof-of-concept prototype focusing on 
the security, interoperability, portability and practicality in the industry. 
Using a rigorous analysis of the legislation, standards and regulatory 
mandates, Table 4.2 lists a set of security requirements for electronic prescription in 
the Australian healthcare industry. The experiments conducted in Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6 provide data for further assessment and discussion on each candidate 
technology for their compliance with relevant security requirements and practicality 
in the industry. To enable such assessment, the following Table 7.1 collate the 
security requirements initially recorded in the Table 4.2 together with relevant 
experimentation outcomes. The right-most column of the Table 7.1 (i.e. “Technology 
conforming to the mandated requirement”) briefly described the outcomes from the 
experiments conducted for each security requirements. 
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Table 7.1: Analysis matrix of Experiment outcomes for each security requirements of electronic prescription information 
No. Feature or usage Jurisdiction 
Governing regulations, 
standards & specifications 
Security requirements mandated  
Technology conforming to the 
mandated requirement 
 Section (1): Security requirements for electronic prescription from data at rest perspective 
1 Encryption of the 
electronic prescription 
Nationwide ATS 4888.2-2013 
section 5.3.6 
The electronic prescription is to be 
encrypted using a symmetric key 
derived from DAK 
The proposed solution also uses 
the same DAK and the 
prescription information is 
encrypted using a symmetric 
key derived from the DAK 
2 Saving the DAK and 
any of its derived keys 
on any permanent 
storage 
Nationwide ATS 4888.2-2013 
section 7.3.3 
Minimum of 128-bit encryption for 
storing DAK or any of its derived 
keys on any stable storage 
The experiment 1 proved that 
the Android platform supports 
the 128-bit symmetric 
encryption mandated by the 
specification. 
The experiment also found that 
the time taken for encrypting 
and decrypting the keys on the 
mobile devices is practical (i.e. 
acceptable). Please refer to the 
experiment 1, section 5.2.1, for 
further details. 
3 HL7 message structure 
for electronic 
Nationwide AS 4700.3-2014 Mandated HL7 message structure Theoretically, achieves better 
interoperability when comply 
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No. Feature or usage Jurisdiction 
Governing regulations, 
standards & specifications 
Security requirements mandated  
Technology conforming to the 
mandated requirement 
prescription for the electronic prescription with this standard. But, only one 
of the current PES services, 
Script Vault from MediSecure, 
uses HL7 messaging protocol. 
 Section (2): Security requirements for electronic prescription from data in transit perspective 
4 Security of electronic 
prescription 
Nationwide ATS 4888.2-2013 
section 5.3.5 
Security of data in transit between 
ETP service participants are 
specific to the implementation 
‘platform’ 
Bluetooth’s inbuilt security 
measures and standards are 
specified by the Bluetooth 
Special Interest Group (SIG) 
and IEEE standard 802.15.1-
2005. 
Strict governance by these two 
reputable authority bodies 
ensure an appropriately high 
level of security. 
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Table 7.1 together with Table 4.1 describes the essential security 
requirements for the electronic prescription and documents the research outcomes 
(i.e. analysis of the legislation, standards and regulatory mandates followed by a 
series of experiments) addressing each of those requirements for security 
compliance. It establishes the data from which the final conclusions were drawn after 
further deliberation in the next chapter, Chapter 8. 
7.3 The Proposed Solution and Framework 
The proof of concept prototype proved that by using the security compliance 
matrix, a mobile ETP application, compliant with security requirements, can be built 
using the Android OS and Bluetooth. This proof of concept prototype was presented 
merely to strengthen practicality of the research findings and was not intended to be 
a fully functional application demonstrating the end-to-end functionalities. 
The Acts and Regulations governing the prescription of schedule drugs in all 
states and territories support the use of electronic prescription without requiring any 
amendments or changes. However, acceptance of an electronic/digital signature in 
place of a prescriber’s handwritten signature in prescribing is still unclear (i.e. 
neither explicitly accepted nor rejected) in the Australian Capital Territory, New 
South Wales, Victoria and the Northern Territory. Regulations of these jurisdictions 
require the prescriber’s signature to be present on the prescription but do not 
explicitly specify whether it has to be a handwritten signature of the prescriber or can 
be its digital equivalence. Another regulatory change required to support a fully 
electronic prescription system is found in sections 41(1) and 88(1) of the NSW 
Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Regulation 2008, which mandate that the supplying 
personnel/pharmacist’s endorsement of details, such as the prescription reference 
number, address and date the substance is supplied, be written on the prescription 
itself in ink. Such requirement cannot be met once the entire prescribing process is 
done electronically. However, these regulatory constraints and uncertainties do not 
concern the current ETP implementation because, along with the electronic copy of 
the prescription (i.e. the one uploaded to the PES server), it also produces a printed 
prescription which is signed by the prescriber, this signature satisfying these 
regulatory requirements. The printed prescription also accommodates the NSW 
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prescription endorsement process. This is entirely due to the fact that the current ETP 
implementation was designed and built for the current legislation with change-
averting as its highest priority, rather than designed for what was needed for the ETP 
process. This failure of process in the current ETP implementation imposed various 
obstructions in moving towards a fully electronic ETP solution from both regulatory 
and IT infrastructure perspectives.  The ideal approach for ETP implementation 
would have been the simultaneous amendment of each jurisdiction’s legislations and 
regulations in accordance with the outcomes from a proper, purpose-oriented 
problem identification and design process and the putting in place of the supporting 
eHealth infrastructures and facilities at Commonwealth and jurisdiction levels. In 
reality however, instead of a solution such as this, in which provisioning for future is 
put in place while the legislation is changed accordingly over time, the implemented 
solution was built solely for the current legislation, with change-averting as its 
highest priority.  Therefore, transitioning to the fully electronic prescribing systems 
may require some regulatory changes in some jurisdictions as the fully electronic 
implementation eliminates the presence of prescriber’s handwritten signature from 
the prescriptions.  
Primarily, the purpose of a signature is to authenticate the content of the 
document to which it is applied to and one of the definitions provided by the 
Cambridge Dictionary for signature says “…to show that something has been 
written or agreed by you”. Various mechanisms such as the use of wax seals from 
ancient Mesopotamia to the use of rubber stamps in fairly recent days have been 
employed to authenticate the content of the document to which it is applied. A 
handwritten signature accomplishes this authentication process passively and is not a 
useful mechanism in preventing fraudulent activities; however, the use of digital 
certificates has the potential to achieve much more. Whilst forging a signature makes 
the fraudulent activity a criminal offence when prosecuted, the use of digital 
certificates can prevent the fraudulent activity in the first place, or at least make the 
signature less vulnerable to forgery, since possession of the private key is vital to 
producing a digital certificate (Fillingham, 1997). In addition, since other highly 
regulated and critical sectors of government such as Department of Immigration and 
Border Protection and Australian Taxation Office have already widely adopted the 
use of digital certificates in their processes, the acceptance of digital certificates in 
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place of handwritten signatures in the Australian healthcare industry is inevitable; it 
is merely a matter of how soon this change will take place. Moreover, the Electronic 
Transaction Act has recognised and approved alternatives to using handwritten 
signatures for the purpose of identifying a person and indicating the approval of the 
information contained/communicated (“The Electronic Transactions Act 1999”, 
n.d.). 
For that reason, despite some non-definitive results from investigating 
Subsidiary Research Question 1 (i.e. study from the legislative and regulatory 
perspectives) and the proposed mobile solution (i.e. any fully electronic prescribing 
process in this case) being not fully compliant with some jurisdictions’ regulatory 
mandates due to the absence of the prescriber’s hand written signature, this research 
proceeded further by conducting experimentations to answer Subsidiary Research 
Question 2 (i.e. iterative experimentations on the proposed solution’s candidate 
technologies; the Android’s encryption and the security of NFC and Bluetooth 
against each security requirements identified in prior stage). Except for the absence 
of the prescriber’s handwritten signatures, the experimentation outcomes proved that 
the proposed Android mobile solution complies with all the security requirements 
mandated by the standards and specifications currently in place and implemented by 
the existing ETP implementation. Therefore, this research progressed further still by 
proposing a fully electronic mobile alternative to the current ETP implementation 
that not only has comparable security assurance but is also a cheaper – in fact, 
potentially cost-free – alternative, making use of the patient’s Android smartphone as 
the substitute secured transfer medium. Hypothetically, the security of electronic 
prescriptions can even be potentially enhanced by using smartphone’s unique ID in 
the proposed mobile ETP solution. Such feature not only provides audit trail but also 
can be used to prevent cloning of prescriptions. 
The proposal of such mobile solution also aligns well with the Australian 
Digital Health Agency’s (ADHA) recent work on a mobile enablement program 
which is designed to allow information to be extracted from the MyHR into third-
party applications, and to create a way to upload data back into the MyHR system at 
a later time as this program progresses further. 
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Figure 7.1: Comparison of two security models (PES vs Mobile implementation) 
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Figure 7.1 compares the security model of the current ETP implementation 
(using PES services) with that of the proposed mobile solution. Despite the 
controversial difference in the transfer mechanism employed for the electronic 
prescription, Figure 7.1 demonstrates that the changes introduced by the proposed 
solution have minimal impact on the ETP participants with whom it is interacting 
(i.e. minimal impact on the EPS and EDS). From Figure 7.1 it is also evident that the 
printing of the DAK barcode is no longer necessary in the proposed solution as it 
transfers the electronic prescription itself along with the DAK instead of just 
transferring the prescription notification carrying the DAK barcode which is later 
used in downloading the electronic copy of the prescription form PES server. This 
change eliminates the use of the printed DAK barcode, along with the use of the 
Provider Identifier component of the DAK itself. Since the prescription is directly 
transferred from the patient’s mobile smartphone to the pharmacy’s EDS system, this 
proposed solution can operate with limited or no internet connection for simple 
dispensing purposes (e.g. no script owing, PSB claiming or NPDR update operations 
etc.). However, the proposed solution currently is incapable of supporting certain 
features such as Script Request (e.g. in a script owing scenario) due to its 
disconnected nature. It would have to employ certain messaging service (e.g. SMS or 
email) to support such a feature, potentially introducing associated costs.  
In current ETP specifications, the Dispense Record is primarily used for 
updating the Dispensing State of the prescription, issuing Dispense Notification to 
the prescriber and recording the dispense information to the National Prescription 
and Dispense Repository (NPDR). However, the automatic Dispense Notification 
service to the prescriber is currently disabled at the request of RACGP (McDonald, 
2013a) and it is therefore irrelevant for the proposed solution to support this feature. 
In the proposed ETP model, the recording of the dispense information to the NPDR 
will be integrated into the pharmacy’s EDS functionalities along with the other 
secondary use of the prescription information such as PBS online claiming. Hence, 
the proposed solution has minimal impact on the other ETP process participants. The 
security of the prescription information in the proposed mobile solution is governed 
by ATS 4888.2 in the same way as in the current implementation using PES services. 
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In the proposed solution, the potential issue for information sharing is 
reduced by strictly conforming to AS 4700.3-2014 and ATS 4888.3-2013 for 
electronic prescriptions. The implementation of the Dispense Record firmly adheres 
to ATS 4888.4-2013 for better information sharing. On the other hand, ATS 4888.5-
2013 (Platform implementation specific prescription request HL7 CDA 
implementation guide) is not relevant for the proposed solution since it does not 
support Script Request functionality. Similarly, ATS 4888.6-2013 (Platform 
implementation specific web service) is also irrelevant for the proposed solution 
because at this point in time it does not make use of the web service for any of its 
functionalities. However, this technical specification is potentially applicable in 
future for implementing additional features and functionalities.  
 In addition, and as described in Figure 4.2 of Chapter 4, the proposed mobile 
electronic prescription transfer application also functions as a mobile repository of 
the patient’s medication history. With the interface integrating the patient’s mobile 
smartphone with the Hospital Information System in place, the patient’s complete 
medication history can be transferred from their mobile smartphone directly to the 
Hospital Information System. This feature can be utilised to share the medication 
information with the other healthcare providers such as GPs and specialists. The 
ability to access such information enables the healthcare professionals to deliver 
better quality care, benefiting both patients as well as the healthcare providers. 
The knowledge accumulated in and findings drawn from this intellectual 
investigation are subsequently utilised in constructing a framework to guide the 
development of a fully electronic Android mobile ETP application in accordance 
with security requirements mandated by the Australian healthcare industry. Figure 
7.2 depicts this framework, which is the primary focus of this thesis. 
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Figure 7.2: The proposed framework for developing a security compliant ETP solution 
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Moreover, such knowledge gained from this research is further utilised by 
deriving another framework (Figure 7.3) for assessing Android mobile ETP solutions 
for their compliance with the security requirements mandated by the Acts, 
regulations and standards in the Australian healthcare industry. Figure 7.3 explains 
how to undertake such compliance assessment for Android mobile ETP applications. 
Identify governing Acts 
and Standards
Each jurisdiction s 
regulatory mandates
Translate regulatory 
mandates into security 
requirements
Security requirements
(data-at-rest)
Security requirements
(data-in-transit)
Security requirements 
for eTP
Technologies used in 
securing prescription 
information
Technologies/Features
(data-at-rest)
Technologies/Features
(data-in-transit)
Investigate how 
security is 
implemented
Experiment to assess the technology
for security compliance
Comply? + Practical?
No Yes
Populate analysis matrix with the 
successful experiment outcome
Populate analysis matrix with the failed 
experiment outcome
Determine the security conformance based 
on the matrix s content
Repeat for each technology used and security 
requirement
Security Requirements from 
Compliance Matrix (Table 4.1 & 7.1)
 
Figure 7.3: The proposed framework for assessing Android mobile ETP application for security 
compliance 
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Although the framework in Figure 7.3 is an additional product of the 
research, it represents significant and particular usefulness within the health industry 
that is highly regulated but lacking in detailed guidelines for assessing the security 
compliance of ETP applications. Despite the fact that all the research activities 
conducted in this research are limited by the scope of this research (i.e. technologies 
and features available to the Android operating system), both frameworks are in fact 
mostly applicable to any fully electronic implementation of ETP application in the 
Australian healthcare industry. Certainly, some additional effort is required to 
generalise these frameworks so that they are fully applicable to other operating 
systems (e.g. iOS), technologies and features available on those operating systems. 
Whilst such line of inquiry is beyond the scope of this research, it introduces 
compelling future research potential within this ETP context. 
7.4 Analysis Matrix 
The derivation of the above two frameworks was made possible by the data 
analysis process, consisting of three integrated activities: data reduction, conclusion 
drawing and verification, all performed on the two analysis matrixes, Table 4.1 and 
Table 7.1. The investigations conducted and translation of the regulatory mandates 
into security requirements as part of answering the Subsidiary Research Question 1 
populated the entire Table 4.1 (Analysis matrix of each jurisdiction’s readiness for 
fully electronic ETP solution) and the first five columns of Table 4.2 (Analysis 
matrix of security requirements for electronic prescription information). Rows 1, 2, 
6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of Table 4.1 indicate that the acts and regulations of Western 
Australia, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania support not only the use of 
electronic prescriptions but also the absence of the prescriber’s handwritten signature 
from the electronic prescriptions. While some states’ regulations recognise the use of 
digital/electronic signatures, others’ imply the same meaning by stating that a 
prescription that is not issued electronically shall be signed by the prescriber in his or 
her own handwriting. For instance, while sections 79 (7) and 190 (5) of Queensland’s 
Health (Drugs and Poisons) Regulation 1996 explicitly stated that as “The 
prescriber must sign a paper prescription or electronically sign an electronic 
prescription”, sections 37 (1A) (1B) and 51 (1A) (1B) of Western Australia’s 
Poisons Regulation 1965 rather imply the same in a more deductive logic approach. 
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Nevertheless, despite their differing ways of wording, these jurisdictions are ready to 
progress towards fully electronic implementation of ETP from a regulatory 
perspective and therefore the proposed mobile ETP solution will work well without 
any regulatory change in these states. In the meantime, the rest of the jurisdictions’ 
Acts and regulations (i.e. rows 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the Table 4.1) mandate the 
prescriber’s signature on the prescription in various ways; some are more 
straightforward while others are in more confounded statements. Sections 35 (2) and 
80 (2) of NSW's Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Regulation 2008 clearly state that 
“…the prescription must be signed by the person by whom it is issued” while section 
40 (a) and section 40’s “Note” of the ACT's Medicines, Poisons and Therapeutic 
Goods Regulation 2008 imply that electronic prescriptions also require prescriber’s 
signature. However, none of these mandates explicitly state whether the prescriber’s 
signature must be in handwritten form or its electronic/digital equivalence. These 
mandates, therefore, do not necessarily prohibit the use of a fully electronic ETP 
solution which makes use of electronic/digital signature of the prescribers, and hence 
the use of the proposed Android mobile ETP solution in these states may be possible 
without requiring regulatory changes. 
In Table 7.1, Analysis matrix of Experiment outcomes for each security 
requirement of electronic prescription information, both rows 1 and 2 are about 
securing the prescription information while the data is at rest. Row 1 reveals that 
section 5.3.6 of the ATS 4888.2-2013 mandates that the electronic prescription be 
encrypted using a symmetric key derived from DAK. Since the proposed mobile ETP 
solution is designed to use the same DAK and the prescription information is 
encrypted using a symmetric key derived from the DAK, it conforms to this security 
requirement. The right-most column of row 1 briefly recorded this for future use (i.e. 
analysis, discussion and framework derivation). Row 2 of the analysis matrix brings 
to light the fact that section 7.3.3 of the ATS 4888.2-2013 requires a minimum of 
128-bit encryption for storing DAK and any of its derived keys on any permanent 
storage medium/device. Experiment 1 (i.e. Encryption – Security of data at rest), 
conducted in response to Subsidiary Research Question 2, proved that the Android 
platform supports the 128-bit symmetric encryption thereby conforming to the 
security mandates imposed by ATS 4888.2-2013. The experiment also found that the 
time taken for encrypting and decrypting the CDA document on the mobile devices 
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is also practical (i.e. acceptable). Row 3 of the Table 7.1 reveals that HL7 message 
structure is recommended by the AS 4700.3-2014 for the electronic prescriptions, 
although the more prominent PES operator, Script Exchange from eRx, does not 
conform to this standard due to the fact that it was live nationwide seven months 
before the NEHTA published the first draft of the standard (“ETP Standards”, 2016). 
Since the proposed mobile ETP solution conforms to this recommendation, it will 
have better interoperability when interacting with other healthcare software 
components. The last row of Table 7.1, row 4, focuses on the security of the 
prescription information from the data in transit perspective. Section 5.3.5 of the 
ATS 4888.2-2013 mentions that security of data in transit between ETP service 
participants is specific to the implementation “platform”. This research finds no 
further details on the recommended approach or how this should be implemented. 
Therefore, the Experiments 2 and 3 were conducted to establish whether the use of 
NFC or Bluetooth wireless technology provides security assurance comparable to the 
current transfer mechanism of using the Internet. 
The preliminary study finds NFC to be a potentially suitable wireless 
communication technology for the proposed mobile ETP solution’s prescription 
transfer mechanism due to its widespread support by various smartphone 
manufacturers, its well-known interoperability and convenience of use and its close 
proximity communication range. However, Experiment 2 reveals that the use of NFC 
technology in the proposed mobile ETP solution will result in having a portability 
issue in practice. This research finds that, with the exception of Sony and NXP 
Semiconductors, the NFC device manufacturers do not make the proximity driver of 
their products available to the public. Therefore, only the Sony’s FeliCa card 
readers/writers can be programmed using the Windows Proximity API, and the rest 
of the NFC devices in the market require the SDK from the hardware manufacturer 
to interface with. Use of a specific SDK restricts the application to that particular 
hardware/device and this portability issue will severely impact the practicality of 
using the proposed mobile ETP solution in the industry. An ETP solution with such 
portability issue is impractical for the healthcare industry in Australia as the current 
electronic prescribing systems (i.e. a component of clinic management software) 
generally runs on existing hardware and system software platforms rather than on a 
vendor-provided hardware and software configuration. Therefore, the use of NFC 
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technology is deemed not suitable for the proposed mobile ETP solution, and as a 
result, this research conducted another round of experimentation. The next 
experiment, Experiment 3, focuses on investigating whether the use of Bluetooth 
technology for transferring electronic prescriptions provides comparable security 
assurance to that of the current implementation. Bluetooth’s inbuilt security measures 
and standards are strictly governed by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) 
and IEEE standard 802.15.1-2005. The strict governance by these two reputable 
authority bodies can be considered comparable to those of the current ETP 
implementation using the Internet. Unlike the outcome of Experiment 2, the 
development of the proof-of-concept went well without any portability issue, and the 
performance is also acceptable. This experiment effectively reveals that the use of 
Bluetooth technology in the proposed mobile ETP solution not only provides 
comparable assurance but is practical for the healthcare industry. However, the use 
of Bluetooth requires pairing of the devices (i.e. patient’s mobile smartphone with 
the prescriber’s and dispenser’s devices) for the first-time use (i.e. at the first visit to 
either the clinic or the pharmacy). As an added benefit, this extra step can be 
considered as an additional security measure rather than a mere nuisance. Moreover, 
this process can be streamlined by using other tools or technologies such as NFC or a 
QR code. Since every technology has its strength and vulnerabilities, however, this 
step should only be taken after a thorough investigation. Such line of inquiry is 
outside the scope of this research, but it suggests a compelling subject for further 
investigation with a view to extending this research. 
 
Research Thesis - 177 of 269 
7.5 Reflection on the research questions  
This section reflects on the Research Questions by discussing how they came 
about, what actions were taken in response to them and how they have driven the 
progression of the research through the meticulous document analysis and vigorous 
iterative experiments and reflection. 
7.5.1 Main Research Question  
Can a technical framework be constructed to serve as a guide for the development of 
Android mobile electronic prescription transfer applications in compliance with the 
security requirements mandated by the Australian healthcare laws, regulations and 
standards? 
The literature review and the preliminary study reveals that the current ETP 
implementation is tailored to suit the current regulatory requirements instead of being 
designed to facilitate the most beneficial healthcare outcome for patients and 
clinicians. While the current ETP implementation enabled the nation as whole to 
progress towards using electronic prescription with minimal legislative and 
regulatory changes, this change-averting solution has posed many obstructions in 
reaching the full potential benefits of eTP. Therefore, this research proposes an 
alternative solution with comparable security assurance which also tackles the 
shortcomings of the current ETP implementation, and creates a framework to guide 
the development of such solution in compliance with the security requirements. 
Answering this Research Question involves devising two additional 
supporting questions. The first question endeavours to translate the regulatory 
mandates into security requirements for later integration into a framework. The 
second question takes on the investigation of how this framework can be used in 
assessing Android mobile ETP application for their security conformance, ultimately 
deriving a framework to guide the development of such mobile application in 
compliance with security requirements. Based on the research findings from these 
supporting questions, the Primary Research Question is answered by proving that it 
is possible to build a framework to guide the development of an Android mobile ETP 
application compliant with the Australian healthcare industry’s security mandates. 
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This research not only draws the conclusion that it is possible to build the framework 
with which to guide the development an Android mobile ETP application in 
compliance with security mandates, but it also builds the framework that is derived 
from the proof-of-concept prototype developed as part of this research. Such 
framework, as well as the proof-of-concept prototype, is a significant contribution 
towards the national eHealth program’s expansion into a mobile ETP context. 
The preliminary study found little literature on existing proven theoretical 
frameworks and methodologies for use in this integrated field of medical informatics, 
public health and information security. Such lack of literature on the existing proven 
theoretical frameworks and methodologies drives the researcher to explore for a 
suitable theoretical framework and methodology to minimise (or prevent completely 
if possible) the unreliable research findings, and guide this research on track towards 
successful completion. The nature of this research (i.e. creating a technical 
framework based upon the decisions from law and opinions) drives its use of mixed 
methods, mixing exploratory qualitative research, iterative experimentation and 
reflection. The research employed to answer the first supporting question is of 
exploratory nature. Its endeavour to interpret legal text and explanations into a set of 
security requirements, providing a practical understanding for real-life application, 
fits well with the method selected for its earlier stage, this being the document 
analysis approach derived from Laverty’s (2003) Hermeneutical Circle. Answering 
the second supporting question follows an iterative experimentation and reflection 
approach for examining how the security requirements constructed in the prior stage 
can be used in assessing Android mobile ETP solutions for their security 
conformance. For better and in-depth understanding of the findings, all the studies 
and experimentations performed for this research are conducted from two different 
perspectives; the security of the prescription information both in data at rest and data 
in transit. 
The content of Table 4.1, populated by answering Supporting Question 1, 
indicates that although the Acts and regulations of various jurisdictions support the 
use of electronic prescription, the use of a digital/electronic signature in place of the 
prescriber’s handwritten signature is not recognised by all the jurisdictions, as 
discussed earlier in section 7.3. However, since none of these mandates for the 
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presence of prescriber’s signature explicitly mention that it must be in handwritten 
format, they do not necessarily prohibit the use of a fully electronic ETP solution as 
long as it makes use of the electronic/digital signature of the prescribers. Since the 
proposed Android mobile ETP solution makes use of the prescriber’s Medicare 
digital certificate, it may be possible to use the proposed Android mobile ETP 
solution in these states without any regulatory changes. Therefore, this research 
progresses further by proposing the Android mobile ETP solution and deriving the 
framework from it. 
The proposed Android mobile ETP solution from which the framework is 
derived makes use of the patients’ Android smartphone as the alternative transfer 
medium to using the PES services. Such a controversial solution requires proving 
that the proposed Android mobile ETP solution is as secure as – if not more secure 
than – the current ETP implementation using the PES services, thereby putting an 
end to the archaic belief that mobile applications are not secure enough for use in the 
healthcare industry (Barrett, 2011; Bromwich & Bromwich, 2016). Once the 
regulatory mandates have been translated into security requirements and recorded in 
the analysis matrices (i.e. row 1 and 2 of Table 4.2 and Table 7.1), it becomes 
evident that the electronic prescription is to be encrypted using a symmetric key 
derived from DAK, and the operating system running the mobile ETP application 
will need to support minimum of 128 bit symmetric encryption to store the electronic 
prescription, its associated DAK and other derived keys from DAK. Another crucial 
but vaguely defined security requirement recorded in the analysis matrices (i.e. row 4 
of Table 4.2 and Table 7.1) effectively implies that the transfer mechanism used in 
the proposed solution is required to provide comparable security assurance to that of 
the Internet for transferring the electronic prescriptions. Further information on how 
the security is implemented from the data in transit aspect in the current ETP 
implementation is unavailable, as the research context turns out to be not only highly 
regulated but also highly proprietary. Therefore, prevented from comparing the 
implementation details such as the file transfer protocols (e.g. FTP, HTTP, HPPTS or 
other files sharing) used in current implementation versus the ones used in the 
proposed solution, this research endeavours to find an alternative transfer mechanism 
(i.e. a wireless communication technology) that is comparable in security measures 
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to using the Internet from a more holistic perspective (i.e. using a more “black-box” 
approach). 
7.5.2 Subsidiary Research Question 1   
How can the security requirements imposed by the relevant laws regulations and 
standards in the Australian healthcare system be integrated into a framework for the 
assessment of mobile electronic prescription transfer applications? 
As part of the bigger undertaking, this supporting question focuses on 
translating the regulatory mandates into a set of security requirements prior to 
integrating them into a framework. The objective is to interpret the legislative and 
regulatory requirements mandated by the relevant Acts, regulations and standards 
into a set of acceptance criteria (i.e. security requirements) to be complied with by 
the native security features, third-party tools and technologies available on the 
Android operating system platform for the development of a proof-of-concept 
prototype ETP mobile solution. 
This is the part of the research governed by the document analysis approach, 
derived from Laverty’s (2003) Hermeneutical Circle, for deciphering the true 
meaning of what the legal texts imply and then interpreting them into a set of 
security requirements. This research is far more than a mere interpretation of text 
however, as it also endeavours to build a relationship between the legal explanation 
and their practical understanding for real-life applications. The research findings (i.e. 
translated security requirements) from answering this supporting question populate 
the analysis matrices (i.e. Table 4.1, column 1 to 4 of Table 4.2 and Table 7.1), 
leaving the last column of Table 4.2 to record the investigation and experimentation 
outcomes from the next stage of the research; iterative experimentations. Although 
not all the research finding are 100% in favour of the use of the proposed mobile 
ETP solution (i.e. any fully electronic ETP application in general in this case) due to 
the inherent absence of the prescriber’s handwritten signature, this research indicates 
that there is no obstacle from legislative or regulatory perspectives which explicitly 
opposes its use, since the proposed ETP solution uses the prescriber’s Medicare 
digital certificate in signing and encrypting the DAK associated with the electronic 
prescription.  
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Once the relevant regulatory mandates have been interpreted and recorded in 
the analysis matrices accordingly, the next stage of the thesis is commenced as a 
series of experimentations, followed by reflection based upon the experimentation 
outcomes against the identified security requirements. 
7.5.3 Subsidiary Research Question 2   
How can the assessment criteria framework from Subsidiary Research Question 1 be 
used in assessing the native security features and third-party tools on the ANDROID 
for the security compliance of mobile electronic prescription transfer applications? 
The emphasis of this second supporting Research Question is to explore and 
verify which of the native security features, third-party tools and technologies 
available on the Android operating system comply with the security requirements for 
the development of mobile ETP solution. Such verification was performed through a 
series of experiments and reflection on whether the experimentation outcome 
conforms to the security requirements identified in the prior stage. These iterative 
experimentations and reflection are conducted from the perspectives of both data at 
rest and data in transit in order to provide better and in-depth understanding of the 
findings. 
The exploration and verification activities conducted are governed by the 
iterative experimentation and reflection approach. In fact, every iteration of the 
experimentation is based on the Williamson’s (2002) depiction of the typical action 
research cycle, with a few alterations specific to this research. Such adaption of the 
experimentation and reflection approach from action research is supported by 
Williamson (2002) and it fits well for the nature of this research. The 
experimentation outcomes are recorded in the last column of Table 7.1 and are used 
in determining whether the candidate technology of the proposed mobile ETP 
solution conforms to the security requirements. 
Experiment 1 confirms that the Android operating system supports the 128-
bit symmetric encryption and hence conforms to the security requirements recorded 
in rows 1 and 2 of Table 7.1 (i.e. security from data at rest perspective). In addition, 
the proposed Android mobile ETP solution also conforms to the requirement 
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recorded in row 3 of Table 7.1, since it is designed to operate using CDA documents. 
This will also minimise any interoperability issues when interacting with other 
software components within the health sector. However, this does not seem to be a 
crucial requirement currently as only one of the current PES services (i.e. Script 
Vault from MediSecure) complies with this standard. Experiment 2 verifies whether 
the use of NFC for transferring electronic prescriptions between ETP participants 
provides comparable security assurance to that of the use of the Internet in the 
current ETP implementation. The research initially found the use of NFC technology 
to be a viable alternative transfer mechanism compliant with the security 
requirements for electronic prescription transfer, as well as a realistic solution in 
practice from end-user perspective. Regrettably, however, further experimentation 
reveals that the use of NFC technology imposes some unrealistic constraints for the 
development and deployment of the solution, and will have portability issues in 
practice. These subsequent findings render the use of NFC technology an impractical 
solution for the Australian healthcare industry. Therefore, another experiment (i.e. 
Experiment 3) is conducted to investigate whether the use of Bluetooth for 
transferring the electronic prescription offers security assurance comparable to that 
of using the Internet. This experiment shows that the use of Bluetooth not only offers 
comparable security assurance but also presents a practical solution for the 
Australian healthcare industry.  
7.6  Summary  
The proof-of-concept prototype developed as part of the iterative 
experimentation in this research is far from complete as it only focuses on the 
encryption and prescription transfer components critical for security conformance. 
However, the security requirements recorded in the analysis matrices are operating 
system and programming language agnostic, and in fact these matrices are applicable 
to any fully electronic ETP implementation whether a mobile or desktop application. 
During the iterative experimentations, Experiment 2 failed to prove that NFC 
technology is suitable for the proposed mobile ETP solution. That said, however, this 
technology should be kept under close observation as this situation could change 
drastically once the NFC device manufacturers make their devices’ proximity drivers 
openly available to the public.  
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The goal of this research is the construction of a framework to guide the 
development of an Android mobile ETP solution in compliance with security 
requirements for the Australian healthcare industry. In addition to the achievement of 
this, this research derived another framework for assessing Android ETP applications 
for their security compliance. Although an unintentional additional product of the 
research, this second framework has no less value for the emerging eHealth industry 
than the first (i.e. the framework for the development of Android mobile ETP 
solution). As more eTP-related enhancements and innovations are developed for the 
mobile platform, the eHealth industry will be in critical need of a tool that can 
quickly and effectively assess the security compliance of mobile ETP applications, 
and the second framework devised in this research fills that need. 
In summary, this research establishes the fundamental groundwork for future 
enhancements and innovations in a fully electronic ETP context for both mobile and 
desktop platforms in general. The proposed solution is perhaps somewhat limited, 
but the research effectively demolishes the archaic belief that mobile applications are 
not secure enough for use in the Australian healthcare industry, and this knowledge 
alone paves the way for countless opportunities and innovations in the mobile ETP 
context. 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
8.1 Thesis Overview 
In Chapter1, this thesis establishes the research journey with the statement of 
the problem in the use of electronic transfer of prescriptions in the Australian 
healthcare industry. The background and significance of the research are then 
discussed, followed by the establishment of the three Research Questions which 
dictate the research and are eventually answered through a series of steps. The 
literature review in Chapter 2 further elaborates on the issue mentioned in the 
problem statement and Chapter 3 discusses the selected theoretical framework and 
methodology that shapes the design of the research. Chapter 4 details the research 
results from answering the Research Questions, proposes the alternative mobile ETP 
solution and reviews the candidate technologies for use in the proposed mobile 
solution. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 feature a series of experimentations conducted on 
the proposed solution’s candidate technologies and their outcomes verify whether or 
not the proposed solution is viable from the perspectives of both practicality and 
security of data at rest and data in transit. These experimentations confirm that the 
proposed solution is both practical for use in the Australian healthcare industry and 
compliant to the security requirements detailed in the analysis matrices shown in 
Table 4.1 of Chapter 4 and Table 7.1 of Chapter 7.  
Chapter 7 presents further discussion, from a more holistic perspective, of the 
research results, the proposed mobile solution and the experimentation outcomes. 
Also examined in Chapter 7 is the purpose and use of handwritten signatures and 
their electronic counterparts, digital certificates, the potential of these electronic 
signatures as more than a mere digital equivalence of handwritten signatures, and 
they could be put into practise. Also in this chapter a framework is derived from the 
analysis matrices with which to guide the development of an Android mobile ETP 
solution in compliance with the security requirements of the Australian healthcare 
industry. An additional framework is derived from the analysis matrices for the 
assessment of Android mobile ETP solutions for their security compliance. This 
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chapter concludes with the reflection on the Research Questions based on the 
research outcomes. Chapter 8 summarises the research by highlighting the 
significance of the outcomes and its potential impact on the ETP in the Australian 
healthcare industry, stating its contribution to the body of knowledge. Future 
research to extend this study is also listed in Chapter 8. The last part of the thesis (i.e. 
Appendix A) documents the four publications arising from this thesis research in 
chronological order by the date submitted (i.e. not by publication dates). The first 
paper is the outcome from the literature review. The second paper compares the 
security of the prescription information, from the data at rest perspective, between 
the current ETP implementation and the proposed Android mobile ETP solution. 
Whilst also focusing on the comparison of security measures between the current 
ETP implementation and the proposed Android mobile ETP solution, the third paper 
considers the comparison from the data in transit perspective. The last paper briefly 
discusses the potential changes in the ETP context (e.g. Commonwealth subsidy 
criteria, the number of prescriptions per year etc.) and proposes the Android mobile 
solution, built upon the findings and technologies published in the second and third 
papers, as an alternative electronic prescription transfer mechanism. 
8.2 Research Summary  
The primary focus of this research was to devise a framework to guide the 
development of an Android mobile ETP application in compliance with the security 
requirements mandated by the Australian healthcare industry. In order to achieve 
this, the research began by studying the relevant Acts, regulations and standards 
governing electronic prescribing in the various jurisdictions of the Australian 
healthcare industry. These regulatory mandates were then transformed into a set of 
security requirements. This transformation made the regulatory mandates more easily 
understandable by non-regulatory experts and simplified the requirements that need 
to be fulfilled by the subsequent stages of the research. Next, mobile operating 
systems and wireless communication technologies were explored in search of an 
alternative solution which would be more cost-effective with comparable security 
measures. A series of experimentations were subsequently conducted to verify the 
candidate technologies for use in the proposed mobile solution, which proved that the 
proposed Android mobile ETP solution conforms to the security requirements 
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mandated by the Acts, regulations and standards. Finally, a framework for the 
development of an Android mobile electronic prescription transfer application in 
compliance with security requirements was derived from the analysis matrices 
constructed and collated throughout this research. 
Since this research was conducted in an emerging field which intersects the 
medical informatics, public health and information security, where there was very 
little literature about theoretical frameworks previously employed for a similar study 
within this context. The first part of the research was a study which embarked on 
interpreting and revising the knowledge of legal constraints and interpreting them 
into technical specifications, with the second part proposing a viable alternative 
mobile solution through a series of experimentations and finally deriving a 
framework. Therefore, this research employed a mixture of document analysis and 
iterative experimentation with reflection in exploring the potential solutions, 
verifying the candidate technologies and subsequently deriving a framework to 
answer the main Research Question. The process of deciphering the true meaning of 
the legal texts and interpreting them into a set of security requirements was governed 
by the document analysis approach, as it offers a theoretical framework for 
interpretive understanding or meaning with special attention to context and original 
purpose. The series of experimentations and framework derivation parts of the 
research were of applied research type with exploratory nature and the iterative 
experimentations and reflection approach was therefore employed when exploring 
and verifying the potential alternative solution and derivation of the framework. 
The proposed solution from this research was a proof-of-concept prototype 
mobile ETP solution on the Android operating system platform which utilised 
Bluetooth wireless technology as a transfer mechanism for the electronic 
prescriptions. This proposed solution was devised from the first phase of the study 
which explored the potential candidate technologies (i.e. operating systems and 
wireless communication technologies) for this research. This study examined each 
candidate technology’s architecture, security model and governing standards in order 
to determine how well it suits the proposed solution. The first phase of the study 
found that both wireless communication technologies (i.e. NFC and Bluetooth) and 
the Android operating system potentially comply with the security requirements 
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mandated for eTP. The experimentations conducted in the next stage of the research 
verified whether these candidate technologies truly conform to the ETP security 
requirements and their practicality for use in the industry. 
The first experiment conducted was to verify whether the encryption 
capability of the Android operating system conforms to the security requirements 
from the data at rest perspective. Sections 5.3.6 and 7.3.3 of the ATS 4888.2-2013 
mandates a minimum of 128-bit symmetric encryption for the electronic 
prescriptions and the storage of the DAK and any of its derived keys on any 
permanent storage. The prototype created for this experiment makes use of 
Android’s “javax.crypto” libraries for encrypting/decrypting the sample CDA 
document with 128 bit AES encryption. This experiment successfully 
encrypted/decrypted the sample CDA document and proved that the Android 
operating system has sufficient encryption capability for this research’s proposed 
mobile ETP solution. The subsequent experiment examined the NFC technology for 
its compliance with security requirements from the data in transit perspective. The 
prototype built for this experiment was written in C# .NET using the Windows 
Proximity APIs supported by the Windows Runtime (WinRT) and a USB ACR122U 
contactless RFID smartcard reader/writer from Advanced Card Systems (ACS). This 
experiment revealed that use of SDK from the NFC device manufacturer was 
required, imposing a significant limitation on the solution’s portability. Due to the 
use of non-standardised hardware and software in primary care facilities and 
pharmacies, it is crucial that the proposed mobile ETP solution be hardware and 
software vendor agnostic. This experiment therefore established that the use of NFC 
technology in development of the proposed solution is impractical for the Australian 
healthcare industry. The next experiment investigated whether the use of Bluetooth 
for transferring electronic prescriptions in the proposed solution conforms to the 
security mandates from the data in transit perspective. Despite the inconvenience of 
having to pair the devices at the first-time use (i.e. either at the first visit to a clinic or 
a pharmacy), this experiment proved that transferring electronic prescriptions 
between the patient’s mobile smartphone and the EPS and EDS via Bluetooth is as 
secure as using the Internet in the current implementation. Therefore, it was 
concluded that the use of Bluetooth in the proposed solution is secure enough and 
practical for the Australian healthcare industry. 
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Further in-depth discussion of both the rationale behind the proposed mobile 
ETP solution and the derivation of the framework was followed by the reflection of 
the Research Questions based upon the research findings. Although the outcomes 
from answering Subsidiary Research Question 1 revealed that not all the jurisdictions 
are ready for a fully electronic ETP implementation (i.e. some jurisdictions require 
the prescriber’s signature in prescriptions), none of them explicitly mandated the 
prescriber’s signature in handwritten form. Since the proposed mobile ETP solution 
uses the prescriber’s Medicare digital certificate in signing and encrypting the DAK 
associated with the electronic prescription, it does not violate those jurisdictions’ 
regulatory mandates. In addition to examining each jurisdiction’s readiness for fully 
electronic ETP implementation, this investigation also interpreted the true meaning 
of legal texts into a set of security requirements and recorded them in row 1 to 4 of 
Table 4.2 and 7.1. This established the acceptance criteria for the next stage of the 
research; iterative experimentations for each candidate technology which potentially 
fulfil those security requirements. The first experimentation outcome proved that the 
Android operating system has sufficient encryption capabilities required to securely 
store the electronic prescription information. The next experiment revealed that the 
use of NFC as an alternative transfer mechanism for electronic prescription is not a 
practical solution for the Australian healthcare industry. Therefore, the experiment 
was repeated using Bluetooth. This experiment proved not only that the use of 
Bluetooth is a secure alternative to using the Internet for transferring electronic 
prescriptions, but that it is also a practical solution. Based upon these findings, a 
framework (Figure 7.2) was constructed in response to answering the Main Research 
Question for guiding the development of an Android mobile ETP application in 
accordance with the security requirements mandated by the Australian healthcare 
industry. Furthermore, the accumulated findings and knowledge from this intellectual 
investigation was utilised to derive another framework (Figure 7.3) for assessing 
Android mobile ETP solutions for their compliance with the security requirements 
mandated by the Australian healthcare industry. 
The scope of this research and its experimentations focused exclusively on 
the Android operating system platform and NFC and Bluetooth wireless 
communication technologies in its exploration of potential candidate technologies for 
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the proposed mobile ETP solution. This provides considerable opportunity for future 
research into various lines of inquiry and innovation within the ETP context. 
8.3 Significance of Research 
This research translated the relevant Acts, regulations and standards 
governing the transfer of electronic prescription in various jurisdictions into a set of 
security requirements and proposed a secured mobile alternative which has been 
verified through a series of experimentations. As a result, this research has produced 
significant outcomes from multiple perspectives: reduced healthcare expenditure, 
improved patient safety and the demonstration of obsolete regulatory requirements 
and processes in current ETP, the sole purpose of which is merely to conform to 
obsolete requirements, as described below. 
The first significant outcome of this research is its potential to reduce the 
nation’s healthcare expenditure. The proposed mobile ETP solution is a cheaper (if 
not completely cost-free in most cases) alternative to the current implementation with 
comparable security measures. If widely used, this proposed solution would 
substantially reduce the nation’s spending on electronic prescription fees. These 
prescription fees currently cost the nation approximately AU$112,950 every day 
(“One billion eRx electronic scripts”, 2016). The nation’s increase in the aging 
population and chronic disease burden will only escalate this expenditure in the 
future and use of the proposed mobile ETP solution will make a significant 
contribution towards relieving this issue. 
As depicted in Figure 2.3, Patient involvement in the current ETP 
implementation consists of little more than delivering the Document Access Key 
(DAK) from the prescriber to the dispenser for downloading the electronic version of 
the prescription from the PES servers. In reality, patients can contribute a lot more by 
managing their own healthcare and medication related information. Maintaining 
updated drug allergy information and keeping a consolidated medication history are 
contributions patients can make, and this information will enable healthcare 
providers to make better informed decisions resulting in significantly improved 
treatment outcomes. The proposed mobile ETP solution enables such patient 
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involvement and encourages them to engage in managing their own healthcare 
information and subsequent care. This proposed mobile solution can also provide 
electronic Medication Management (eMM) systems with a consolidated medication 
history of the patient. Moreover, additional features such as alerts for script 
expiration and repeat-prescriptions can also be implemented as part of this mobile 
ETP solution on an individual basis (i.e. as plug-in modules) to enhance its benefits. 
The translation of ETP regulatory mandates into a set of security 
requirements (see Table 4.2 for details) makes security compliance in this context 
more easily understandable by non-regulatory experts. This understanding removes 
the major obstacle for security experts and software developers in this context, and 
indeed paves the way for numerous opportunities and innovations in the future. 
Besides those future potentials, this translation of regulatory mandates also 
highlighted a number of regulatory mandates which have no constructive value to 
eTP. These mandates were put into effect merely to avert legislative change and its 
associated implications during the early stage of adopting eHealth in the Australian 
healthcare industry. Until these regulatory mandates are revised and repealed or 
amended to align with the Electronic Transaction Act, they will continue to create 
obstacles for any fully electronic implementation of processes (e.g. such as electronic 
prescribing and electronic referral) in the healthcare industry. 
As part of synthesising the proposed mobile ETP solution, Section 1.2.2 and 
2.4.2 of this research revealed some features of the current ETP implementation that 
could have supported for better healthcare outcomes and patient safety. These 
features, such as drug allergy alerts and harmful dosage alerts, which could 
significantly improve the patient’s safety, could be incorporated into the proposed 
mobile solution. Incorporating these features within a patient-controlled context, 
such as on their own smartphone, is more likely to ensure such alerts are not 
overlooked. Adverse drug event such as the death of Mr Jared Charles Olsen in 2015 
could have been prevented if such critical warning is communicated effectively 
(“Inquest into the Death of Jared Charles OLSEN”, 2017). 
Although it was beyond the scope of this research project, the two 
frameworks constructed (i.e. one for development of Android mobile ETP 
application in compliance with ETP security requirements for the Australian 
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healthcare industry, and the other for assessing Android mobile ETP application for 
their security compliance) could be generalised for any fully electronic 
implementation of ETP in the Australian healthcare industry on various operating 
system platforms such as iOS and others. 
In addition to realising those new potentials, the disconnected nature of the 
proposed mobile solution (i.e. not relying on Internet connectivity for transferring 
prescription) makes it suitable for use in locations such as remote regions of 
Australia, where the network availability is limited or unreliable. As briefly 
discussed in Section 1.2.3, This makes the proposed solution also viable for use in 
developing countries with poor or non-existent Internet connectivity, provided that 
there is no legislative barrier. In fact, the significant increase in smartphone usage in 
emerging and developing countries indicates the potential prospect of this proposed 
mobile ETP solution (Poushter, 2016). 
Not only does the translation of the regulatory mandates into essential 
security requirements have broader uses than the scope of this research, the proposed 
mobile ETP solution also has potential to improve patient safety and healthcare 
outcomes in the Australian healthcare industry as well as in other countries and 
regions. Similarly, the frameworks constructed are not only applicable to the scope 
of this research (i.e. Android operating system platform) but can also be relevant for 
any fully electronic ETP implementation in the Australian healthcare industry. 
8.4 Contribution to Knowledge 
This research contributes to the current body of knowledge in the ETP 
context; first by building a bridge between the regulatory mandates in ETP and the 
security requirements for compliance verification; secondly by identifying the 
shortcomings in realising the full potential of the current implementation of eTP; 
thirdly by proposing a mobile alternative solution implemented on Android platform 
which can utilise the full potential of eTP; and finally by devising frameworks for 
developing and assessing such mobile solutions for security compliance as mandated 
by the acts, regulations and standards governing  ETP in the Australian healthcare 
industry. 
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As a unique contribution of knowledge to the ETP context, this research 
transformed the Acts, regulations and standards governing the electronic transfer of 
prescriptions in various jurisdictions into a set of security requirements for 
implementation and compliance verification in the Australian healthcare industry 
(see Figure 2.9, Table 4.1 and 4.2 for details). Such interpretation is essential 
knowledge in bridging the gap between the high-level regulatory mandates and the 
implementation-level security requirements conforming to those mandates. 
Furthermore, the applicability of these security requirements for ETP is not limited to 
this research’s proposed solution, implemented on the Android operating system 
platform only. They are applicable to any fully electronic implementation of ETP in 
the Australian healthcare industry developed on various operating system platforms 
such as iOS and Windows Phone. 
This research also contributes to the body of knowledge by revealing the fact 
that, despite the current public impression of the advancement in electronic 
prescribing, many significant features of ETP have not been realised to their full 
potential (see Section 2.4.2 for details). Patients are therefore not getting the full 
benefit of the current ETP implementation despite its hefty ongoing cost on the 
nation. This research proposes an Android mobile solution as a way to further realise 
the potential of ETP and enable patients to gain greater benefits such as safer and 
better healthcare outcomes. Such a solution was created by conforming to the 
security requirements explored in the prior stage of this research (see Table 4.2 for 
details). Synthesising the proposed solution involved conducting a series of 
experimentations, and the experimentation outcomes proved that the prototype 
application developed on Android platform with Bluetooth wireless communication 
provided sufficient security assurance for transfer of electronic prescriptions (see 
Chapter 5 and 6 for details). This finding lays to rest the archaic belief that mobile 
solutions are not secure enough for the healthcare industry (Barrett, 2011; Bromwich 
& Bromwich, 2016). This knowledge itself potentially opens up other significant 
opportunities and innovations in the mobile healthcare industry. 
The next contribution made by this research is the identification of regulatory 
requirements which have no actual value to the process of electronic prescription but 
which remain in effect as mere hindrances. It also highlights the components in the 
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current implementation of ETP which are in place merely to satisfy the 
abovementioned historical regulatory requirements. These implementations pose 
limitations not only to the proposed mobile solution but to any fully electronic 
implementation in the Australian healthcare industry. 
Finally, this research makes two unique, significant contributions by devising 
a framework which guides the development of an Android mobile ETP solution in 
compliance with mandated security requirements and a framework which assesses 
Android mobile ETP solutions for their security compliance (Figure 7.2 and 7.3). 
Although limited to the Android platform in the context of this research, both 
frameworks can be generalised with minimal effort for any fully electronic 
implementation of ETP in the Australian healthcare industry developed on various 
operating system platforms. 
8.5 Future Research 
This research can be extended in various ways. Generalising the framework 
to cover not only the Android operating system platform but any mobile operating 
system platform is one way to extend this research further. Since the outcomes from 
answering the supporting question 1 are applicable to any fully electronic ETP 
implementation, the need to translate the regulatory mandates into security 
requirements would be minimal for such continued study. In addition, such future 
line of inquiry could also make use of the theoretical framework and methodologies 
used in this research to repeat the process should regulatory change make it 
necessary to do so. 
Another area in which this research can be continued is exploring the use of 
other forms of secured portable storage and transfer mediums, such as smartcards 
and self-encrypting storage devices. Whilst the assessment framework would require 
some adjustment to accommodate such expansion, this continued research would 
also be based upon the security requirements produced from this research unless 
there has been regulatory change in ETP context. As mentioned above, in the face of 
legislative or regulatory change such continued research would still benefit from 
following the theoretical framework and methodologies used in this research. 
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One future research area that would significantly improve the proposed 
mobile ETP solution is the facilitation of “script owing” and “script cancellation” 
features. The disconnected nature of the proposed solution made implementation of 
these two features difficult. At present, SMS (Short Message Service) and the SMD 
(Secured Message Delivery) facility of the eHealth infrastructure appear to be 
potential candidates for implementing these features. It calls for a thorough 
investigation, however, and a continued line of inquiry for this represents another 
future research area.   
Since the proposed mobile ETP solution makes use of Bluetooth wireless 
communication for transferring electronic prescriptions between the EPS, EDS and 
the patient’s mobile smartphone, pairing of the devices is required for first-time use. 
The Bluetooth pairing process can be cumbersome at times, so streamlining this 
pairing process is in order. Such streamlining can be achieved by using technologies 
such as NFC tag or QR code to perform the pairing of the Bluetooth devices. 
However, every technology has vulnerabilities and introducing a combination of 
technologies may increase the risk. Such investigation opens another future line of 
inquiry extending this research. 
Despite the fact that the proposed mobile solution chose Bluetooth over NFC 
for practicality and portability of the solution (i.e. availability of the proximity 
driver), the NFC also provided sufficient security assurance in securing electronic 
prescription information. Moreover, its very short communication range and 
simplicity in establishing communication certainly makes NFC a technology to be 
kept under careful observation for future use. Once the NFC device manufacturers 
make the proximity driver for their products publicly available in the same way Sony 
and XNP Semiconductors did for their FeliCa card readers/writers (Sharief, 2013), 
NFC may very well become a better suited wireless transfer mechanism than 
Bluetooth for electronic prescriptions exchange. Therefore, in addition to careful 
observation of changes/improvements in the NFC technology, further exploration on 
more portable use of NFC in software development would be another future research 
with significant impact on the mobile ETP context. 
Research Thesis - 195 of 269 
8.6 Summary  
The proposed proof-of-concept mobile ETP solution and the frameworks 
built from this research may influence government departments, authority bodies and 
Health IT professionals to embrace modification of the current use of ETP in the 
Australian healthcare industry. In addition, this research has paved the way for future 
innovations and enhancements in ETP by making the regulatory mandates easily 
understandable for non-regulatory experts, and by establishing the fact that an 
alternative solution, in full compliance with these regulatory mandates, can be 
constructed using existing technologies. 
Such knowledge effectively disproves the archaic belief that mobile solutions 
are not secure enough for the healthcare industry (Barrett, 2011; Bromwich & 
Bromwich, 2016), thereby creating other opportunities and innovations in the mobile 
healthcare industry. This also aligns well with the Australian Digital Health 
Agency’s (ADHA) recent work on a mobile enablement program, designed to allow 
information to be extracted from MyHR into third-party applications, with a view to 
producing a mechanism to enable uploading data back into the MyHR system as the 
program progresses further. Together with a suite of other mobile healthcare 
applications such as the Healthi app by Chamonix, the MediTracker app by 
Precedence Health Care, the HealthNow app from Telstra Health and Best 
Practice’s patient app, the use of a mobile ETP application would make a significant 
contribution to building a more complete medication history and healthcare record of 
an individual. Availability of such information is a significant step towards more 
effective treatments and safer outcomes, benefiting both clinicians and patients, and 
with potentially less financial drain on the nation’s healthcare expenditure. 
In addition to their essential role in this research, the transformation of the 
ETP security requirements of the various regulatory mandates is applicable to any 
fully electronic ETP implementations in the Australian healthcare industry. 
Furthermore, since no previously established methodologies and frameworks have 
been verified and validated, particularly in this emerging eHealth context, the 
methodologies and framework used in this research may assist in future research in 
this sphere. 
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